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ABSTRACT 
The author1 explains how past problems with the Defense Department anthrax 
vaccine currently affect Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and 
Human Services policy. The departments included the BioThrax® anthrax vaccine in the 
Strategic National Stockpile following the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. According to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the vaccine’s “failing” status possibly motivated the 
letter attacks to create demand for the vaccine. 
This thesis explores the Department of Defense’s troubled experience with the 
vaccine through four methodologies. The multiprism methodological approach of 
“quadrangulation” serves to “box” in past safety, efficacy, regulatory, and legal 
problems. A literature review demonstrates an evolving shift in critiques of the vaccine, 
which parallels policy pronouncements. A case study tool offers a chronological review 
of the anthrax vaccine to evaluate causal events precipitating the anthrax letter attacks in 
2001. A program evaluation includes process tracing through quantitative, qualitative, 
summative, and formative reviews. Finally, a gap analysis aids in explaining continued 
reliance on the old vaccine technology. 
To conclude, the thesis recommendations encourage formulation of a Presidential 
Study and Policy Directive process to reassess the vaccine, while suggesting alternative 
Department of Homeland Security policy courses of actions centered on antibiotics and 
new technologies. 
 
1 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Rempfer is a distinguished academic and military graduate from the U.S. 
Air Force Academy and prepared this thesis as a graduation requirement for the Master of Arts Program 
with the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security. He is an Air Force 
Command pilot, experienced in F-16s, F-117s, A-10s, and MQ-1s. His prior service included membership 
on the U.S. Air Force Cyberspace Task Force, as well as flight safety and operational risk management 
duties. LtCol Rempfer has testified twice before Congress regarding the anthrax vaccine issue. Senior 
White House Office and DoD officials enlisted his expertise. He may be contacted at trempfer@aol.com. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Department of Homeland Security faces a vital challenge in charting fiscally 
practical and legally prudent policy to protect Americans. An important aspect of the 
Department’s duty includes the application of fundamental checks and balances with 
Departmental partners when selecting biodefense countermeasures in accordance with legal 
and regulatory standards. The following thesis project reveals a probable analysis deficit by 
the government when endorsing the Defense Department’s anthrax vaccine as a citizen-wide 
biodefense countermeasure for the Strategic National Stockpile. Synthesizing the complex 
history of the Department of Defense’s intimate involvement in the early development and 
past promotion of the vaccine requires a diligence to objectivity. The resulting intellectually 
independent lens enables an evaluation process where checks and balances prevail over 
politics to ensure a future national biodefense policy capable of withstanding scrutiny. 
The genesis of this thesis began in the summer of 2008, when the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation revealed the motive for the anthrax letter attacks of 2001. According to 
investigators, the “failing” status of the vaccine program preceded the attacks and served as 
the possible motive for the crimes. The perpetrator sought to revive confidence in the 
inoculation. Following the government’s revelations, thesis research efforts endeavored to 
incorporate varied academic means of reviewing the anthrax vaccine from a historical 
context. Therefore, the thesis analyzes why the Defense Department initiative was failing 
prior to 2001, the mechanisms behind its revival afterward, and the depth of governmental 
reflection on the past problems after federal legal authorities officially connected the vaccine 
to the letter attacker’s motive. What at face value appears as a well-intentioned attempt to 
protect the citizenry of the United States from a seemingly viable biological threat, and with a 
reputable remedy, ultimately evolves into a disquieting story about violations of the law, 
altered scientific assessments, and failed oversight that warrant renewed evaluation. 
In the case of the anthrax vaccine, a picture emerges about a vaccine invented, 
patented, licensed, procured, altered, and mandated for decades almost exclusively by the 
military for a captive audience—soldiers. Critiqued as inadequate by military scientists, the 
Pentagon pursued a replacement vaccine as early as 1985, to no avail. Faced with an assumed 
imminent threat in 1990, on the eve of the first Persian Gulf War, the military accelerated and 
 xx
altered the vaccine’s manufacturing process, but without proper regulatory approvals. The 
Pentagon mandated the vaccine for deployed troops, with many later reporting unexplained 
illnesses. The post–Gulf War era included attempts at Food and Drug Administration 
oversight through notices of intent to revoke the manufacturer’s license, belated approvals of 
1990s manufacturing changes, plant renovations, and generally critical reviews of the vaccine 
in scientific literature. Upon the expulsion of United Nations weapons inspectors from Iraq in 
1997, the armed forces initiated a mandatory immunization policy for all its personnel. The 
renewed use of the vaccine spawned legislative inquiry and conclusions about the vaccine’s 
illegal mandatory use and experimental status, later confirmed by federal courts. The 
controversy and regulatory hurdles left the military’s use of the vaccine stalled until 
reinvigorated by the deaths of Americans from the anthrax letter attacks. Since the attacks, 
over $1 billion in allocations for the vaccine accompanied nearly $60 billion for biodefense. 
Now the same vaccine, recommended for replacement 25 years earlier, enjoys sole source 
procurement status and product liability protection, despite a dubious regulatory history. 
The circumstances behind the apparent willful blindness of government officials 
regarding the vaccine, and the anthrax immunization program’s controversial resuscitation, 
warrant review through multiple techniques. In order to accomplish this task, the following 
thesis modifies the concept of “methodological triangulation” to scrutinize the timeline of 
events from four angles. The resulting methodological “quadrangulation” begins with a 
literature review. Significantly, the thesis claims and arguments actually reiterate the original 
critical conclusions previously held by Defense Department officials about the vaccine’s 
inadequate status. The thesis methodologies continue with a case study, a program 
evaluation, and a gap analysis to highlight problematic oversight. While the violations of law 
and the troubling alteration of the scientific and regulatory record documented in the four 
methodologies serve as the premise of the thesis, other unresolved vaccine issues pertaining 
to Gulf War Illness, manufacturing deviations, and increases in vaccine potency warrant 
further analysis, particularly given the reactionary stockpiling of the vaccine for civilians. 
To conclude, the thesis recommends a Presidential Study and Presidential Policy 
Directive process to resurvey judgments by the Department of Homeland Security. This 
course of action ensures the due diligence and meticulous review required by commonsense 
and the law for current and future countermeasures in America’s biodefense toolbox. 
 xxi
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND 
1. Problem Statement 
Documented problems with anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA, also known as 
BioThrax®) reveal historic regulatory and oversight gaps that affect national counter-
bioterrorism policy. Laws promulgated by the U.S. Congress and edicts by the President 
of the United States in the form of Homeland Security presidential directives (HSPDs) 
appoint the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the principal 
official for management of domestic bioterrorism events (President of the United States 
[POTUS], 2003b).2 The DHS, Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) each possesses authority under HSPDs 8, 10, 18, and 21 to 
determine and review bioterrorism countermeasures based upon preparedness and 
response directives issued by the president (POTUS, 2003c; POTUS, 2004; POTUS, 
2007a; POTUS, 2007b). The BioThrax® anthrax vaccine currently plays a central role in 
both biological warfare and bioterrorism defense policies. The delta between the past 
critical governmental reviews of the vaccine, compared to recent accelerated procurement 
following the anthrax letter attacks, dictates a comprehensive reevaluation. The 
conclusion of this reassessment process may render the current vaccine unnecessary as a 
complement to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), based upon the proven efficacy of 
antibiotics and pending the development of a satisfactory immunization. 
2. Background 
Anthrax as a disease results from bacterial infection due to toxins released by 
spores of Bacillus anthracis. The disease manifests itself through different routes of 
exposure. Skin infection, or cutaneous anthrax, leads to fatality rates of up to 20% absent 
antibiotics or <1% with antibiotic treatment. In rare cases, the ingestion of anthrax and 
subsequent gastrointestinal infection poses a fatality risk of between 25%–60%. The most 
 
2 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 was promulgated under Public Law 107-296. 
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lethal exposure relates to inhalation anthrax, sometimes referred to as pulmonary or 
inhaled anthrax, with a fatality risk of up to 89% if left untreated (Centers for Disease 
Control [CDC], 2000). A clinical study, sponsored by the DoD from 1954–1959, 
executed by Dr. Philip Brachman, explored the safety and efficacy of an earlier version of 
the currently stockpiled anthrax vaccine. The study appeared to demonstrate vaccine 
efficaciousness for cutaneous anthrax, but uncertainty prevailed for the next fifty years 
regarding effectiveness for inhalation anthrax (Brachman, Gold, Plotkin, Fekety, Werrin, 
& Ingraham, 1962). Regardless, in late 1997, the DoD announced plans to commence 
mandatory vaccinations with the vaccine to guard against inhalation anthrax anticipated 
in the battlefield environment from an aerosolized threat (United States Department of 
Defense [DoD], 1997b). By mid-1998, the DoD announced completion of a 
comprehensive review and launched the mandatory anthrax vaccine immunization 
program (AVIP) (DoD, 1998). 
Controversy over the current anthrax vaccine first surfaced during Dr. 
Brachman’s 1957 clinical trial in Manchester, New Hampshire. Four workers died in the 
first inhalation anthrax “epidemic” in a century (Belluck, 2001; Plotkin, 1960). By 1965, 
U.S. Army scientists had patented the current anthrax vaccine (Wright & Milton, 1965). 
The first license application occurred in 1966 (Elengold, 2000a; Elengold, 2000b). 
Though the government granted a license, during the process regulators noted a failure to 
submit the required “scientific evidence for efficacy of the vaccine” (see Appendix 1) 
(Pittman, 1969a, p. 1; Pittman, 1969b). The CDC specifically challenged the licensing 
application at that time due to the absence of proper data and noted “no controlled 
evaluation studies” (see Appendix 1) (Kokko, 1969, p. 2). 
The DoD also recognized problems with the anthrax vaccine as early as 1985 
through a request for proposal (RFP) for a new anthrax vaccine. The RFP stated, “There 
is an operational requirement to develop a safe and effective product which will protect 
US troops against exposure from virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis.” The RFP added, 
“There is no vaccine in current use which will safely and effectively protect military 
personnel against exposure to this hazardous bacterial agent.” The historic candor of the 
RFP document also clarified that the current vaccine is, “highly reactogenic [reactive], 
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requires multiple boosters to maintain immunity and may not be protective against all 
strains of the anthrax bacillus” (see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, p. 4). 
Also in 1985, a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory panel published a 
proposed rule in the Federal Register in order to finalize the anthrax vaccine’s license. 
The proposed rule noted that the “efficacy against inhalation anthrax is not well 
documented,” and that “no meaningful assessment of its value against inhalation anthrax 
is possible due to its low incidence” (United States Food and Drug Administration 
[FDA], 1985). The FDA delayed publication of a final rule and order for anthrax vaccine 
for 20 years until federal courts ruled in 2005 that mandatory use of the vaccine was 
illegal absent a finalized license (FDA, 2005). At present, the CDC does not generally 
recommend anthrax vaccine as a prophylaxis for anthrax infection. Instead, the CDC 
encourages the use of antibiotics, such as penicillin, ciprofloxacin, and doxycycline, as 
the “first line of defense” for anthrax infection (CDC, 2001; CDC, 2002; CDC, 2000). 
Adding to the licensing peculiarities, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reported that the manufacturer “did not notify FDA of a number of changes made 
in the manufacturing process in the early 1990s and no specific studies were undertaken 
to confirm that vaccine quality was not affected.” GAO added that the “ingredients used 
to make vaccine were changed from the original vaccine,” and that “prior to the time of 
licensing, no human efficacy testing of the … vaccine was performed” (United States 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2001b, p. 3). A congressional report 
evaluating the military’s controversial mandate of the vaccine determined that the DoD 
program violated FDA regulations due to the vaccine’s known “investigational” testing 
status. The report recommended that “while an improved vaccine is being developed, use 
of the current anthrax vaccine for force protection against biological warfare should be 
considered experimental and undertaken only pursuant to FDA regulations governing 
investigational testing for a new indication” (United States House of Representatives 
[HR] (HR 106-556), 2000, p. 4). 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) associated testing irregularities with 
the existing vaccine to the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. The FBI alleged a U.S. Army 
scientist’s motive stemmed from the fact that the “anthrax vaccine he was working on 
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was failing” due to potency problems, which the scientist was responsible for resolving. 
The scientist worried in the time frame preceding the letter attacks, “I think the **** is 
about to hit the fan … bigtime. The final lot … isn’t passing the potency test, and now 
there’s nothing to back it up. Plus, the control vaccine isn’t working … It’s just a fine 
mess” (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2008, pp. 12–15). Subsequent to the 
attacks, federal court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan ruled in Doe v. Rumsfeld, a legal 
challenge to the DoD anthrax vaccine mandate (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, 2004, 2007). The 
court declared the DoD program illegal, specifically in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 1107 
based on the same “investigational” findings articulated earlier by the Congress (Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 40).3 The illegal status of the vaccine’s mandatory use persisted until 
the FDA finalized the license and approved the product for use against inhaled anthrax 
(FDA, 2005b). Regarding the propriety of the new license, a federal court chose to “not 
substitute its own judgment when the FDA made no clear” (Doe v. Von Eschenbach, 
2008, p. 20).4 
Despite the arguably controversial history, the government also approved the 
vaccine’s altered manufacturing process in 2002 (FDA, 2002a), in addition to the final 
licensing order in 2005 (FDA, 2005b). On the heels of the August 2008 FBI revelations, 
the DHHS also announced on September 30, 2008 the procurement of up to 14.5 million 
additional doses of anthrax vaccine for the SNS at a cost of $404 million (Federal Budget 
Office [FBO], 2008). The DHHS cited 41 U.S.C. § 253, which authorizes 
“noncompetitive procedures” for sole source procurement, to justify continued inclusion 
of the vaccine in the SNS. The contract recipient, Emergent BioSolutions, specifically 
Emergent BioDefense Operations of Lansing, Michigan, held previous contracts with 
both the DoD and the DHHS to supply the government with anthrax vaccine. Over $1.2 
billion in contracts occurred after the anthrax letter attacks (FBO, 2004; FBO, 2005; 
 
3 October 17, 1998, was the effective date of the 1998 amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1). The 
amendment provided, “In the case of the administration of an investigational new drug or a drug 
unapproved for its applied use to a member of the armed forces in connection with the member’s 
participation in a particular military operation, the requirement that the member provide prior consent to 
receive the drug in accordance with the prior consent requirement imposed under section 505(i)(4) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355 (i)(4)) may be waived only by the President. 
4 Note: Upon further judicial review, U.S. courts to date continue to “defer to the FDA’s judgment” on 
the aptness of the new license (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009, p. 13–14). 
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FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008), attacks designed to rekindle vaccine demand according to the 
FBI. To date, the DoD inoculation program has impacted over 2.3 million U.S. armed 
forces personnel with more than 9 million doses of vaccine (DoD, 2009b). These figures 
pale in comparison to the potential magnitude of inoculations for the larger civilian 
population. 
An important additional problem for analysis involves reviewing the 
government’s failure to reevaluate reliance on anthrax vaccine following the FBI’s 
revelations. The problematic analysis requires a review of the implications of stockpiling 
a known antiquated product for the American people. The stockpiling appears to 
contradict previous accepted assessments that the “United States has developed an 
anthrax vaccine for use by military personnel, but there is no vaccine available for 
civilian use” (Wyatt, 2000, p. 66). This assessment about the vaccine’s inapplicability for 
civilian use likely relates to ill-suited applications for emergency response based on a 
five-dose protocol over 18 months. Other experts on the vaccine believe the “constraints 
on the present method of manufacturing argue strongly against procuring large amounts 
for civilian use,” particularly due to its inability to be “efficiently delivered to large 
populations” (Russell, 1999; Russell, 2007, p. S71). 
A successful investigation of the aforementioned problems allows a methodical 
determination of future national public health strategy for the general populace. If policy 
conclusions lead to a replacement of the old anthrax vaccine, the analysis then asks 
leaders to determine how to efficiently apportion future valuable research and limited 
resources toward the necessary development of “new vaccines, especially against 
anthrax” (Hamburg, 1999), as well as examining the potential benefits of relying on 
protections from CDC-recommended antibiotics. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the aforementioned background, one primary and three subordinate 
research questions materialized at the outset of the thesis research. 
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1. Primary Question 
Does an analysis of anthrax vaccine as a complement to the SNS reveal historic 
controversial scientific, regulatory, legislative, judicial, and ethical issues and concerns? 
2. Sub-Questions 
Is procurement and stockpiling of the current anthrax vaccine wasteful if the 
product proves unviable as a course of action for prophylaxis of anthrax in an emergency 
scenario? 
What countermeasure alternatives exist beyond the current anthrax vaccine, and 
what policy options exist in the absence of this current, yet old anthrax vaccine 
technology? 
What mechanisms for oversight exist for the procurement of the current anthrax 
vaccine or require formulation in the pursuit of future alternative countermeasures? 
C. RESEARCH ARGUMENT 
1. Summary of Claims 
In addressing the questions, the central research claim for the thesis argues that 
the existing anthrax vaccine deserves reevaluation as a component of the SNS in light of 
the controversial scientific, regulatory, legislative, judicial, and ethical issues discovered. 
The claim asserts that the procurement of anthrax vaccine is indeed wasteful, while 
alternatives with fewer liabilities already exist. The claim finds support through copious 
examples where the government fails to apply regulatory and legal standards, appears 
deficient in analyzing the vaccine’s problems, seemingly ceases corrective processes in 
reaction to the anthrax letter attacks, delays the synthesis of alternative countermeasures, 
and apparently suffers bias when evaluating the anthrax vaccine landscape. If compelled 
by presentation of the argument, DHS officials should recommend that the DHHS 
expedite the development of a new vaccine and stockpile proven efficacious and 
recommended antibiotic treatments for the SNS in the interim. The argument, or claim, 
boils down to the demand for good government and the vision to anticipate how future 
generations will judge policymakers’ past decisions. In the case of this thesis, we find 
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significant inconsistencies, misrepresentations, and omissions in the DoD experience 
with the anthrax vaccine. Expectantly, the DHS review will discover those same issues as 
they reevaluate the DoD program and model future SNS acquisition strategies. 
The thesis relies principally on past claims and recommendations by top 
governmental leaders, executive agencies, and judicial bodies. Their supportive 
conclusions, and those of DoD scientists, essentially echo the same argument presented 
herein. The argument of the present thesis and claim turns out to be indistinguishable 
from that of the DoD position prior to the 1998 policy announcements to mandate anthrax 
vaccine (Cohen, 1998b). The evidence for the thesis and claims originates primarily from 
DoD documents and governmental scientific accounts, adding weight to the merits or 
warrants of the argument. As a result, the thesis argument’s conclusion asks the 
government to resurvey its present policy by reflecting earnestly on its former position. 
The previous official DoD position, and the position advocated by the research argument 
in this thesis, advised officials to use the vaccine at a “minimum level” (Chu & Aldridge, 
2001). Ultimately, the argument’s claims and sub-claims merely intend to remind 
policymakers of those recommendations. By informing the government of these previous 
conclusions, we place the subsequent omissions, misrepresentations, and violations in 
perspective. The resulting conclusions may assist the current or next administration to 
demonstrate prudence when expending future taxpayer resources on safe, effective, and 
modern products that address the threat, versus presenting a façade by relying on those 
known to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. 
2. Warrants 
The thesis claim’s warrants, or reasons, involve complex regulatory, scientific, 
legal, and legislative landscapes that document historic government awareness about the 
safety, efficacy, and legality of problems with the old, currently stockpiled, anthrax 
vaccine technology. Unhealthy centralized decision-making processes, and extralegal 
regulatory mistakes by executive departments, provide the background leading up to the 
pivotal 2001 anthrax letter attacks. The FBI’s conclusions in 2008 that a DoD scientist’s 
motive in those attacks rested on concern over the vaccine’s “failing” status adds 
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important perspective as well regarding regulatory and scientific problems (FBI, 2008, 
p. 15). Concerning the regulatory and scientific processes, the FDA found that the DoD 
participated directly in a role “similar to a manufacturer” (FDA, 2002b, p. 8). Federal 
courts also ruled that the DoD anthrax vaccine program violated the law based on 
regulatory errors (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 40). Cumulatively, these warrants reinforce 
the merits for the argument that subsequent expenditures for the vaccine in the SNS 
require review. 
3. Evidence 
Evidence supporting the argument is derived primarily from historic and critical 
DoD, congressional, and scientific assessments about the vaccine. This evidence 
described the unsatisfactory and undefined nature of the product and problems related to 
efficacy. FBI evidence about scientific frustrations over vaccine potency problems in 
particular contributed to the motive for the anthrax letter attacks. Such evidence provides 
perspective to better understand the DoD’s awareness of the need for a new vaccine as 
early as 1985. These facts also help explain why the CDC recommends antibiotics to 
protect against the most deadly inhaled form of the disease in lieu of anthrax vaccine. 
Evidence of DoD consensus on the problems exists in multiple documents, including 
internal recommendations to minimize use of the vaccine prior to the anthrax letter 
attacks, along with advice to procure antibiotics and develop coherent doctrinal processes 
to deal with such threats in the future. Finally, the limitations with the product’s 
inoculation protocol, requiring five doses over 18 months, provides compelling evidence 
when realistically analyzing the vaccine’s compatibility as a bioterrorism prophylaxis in 
the SNS for the general population under emergency exigencies. While cost effectiveness 
also weighs in favor of antibiotic prophylaxis, the best evidence for the argument 
includes corroborative government findings across five decades where the DoD 
effectively made the same arguments presented in this thesis. 
Overall, the debate over the contents of the SNS involves many tentacles of 
evidence. The overarching argument to exclude the current anthrax vaccine from the 
stockpile relies on a series of claims based on this evidence. They include the fact that the 
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U.S. Army patented, altered, experimented with, mismanaged the licensing of, and 
perpetuated the use of a documented inadequate anthrax vaccine. After the anthrax letter 
attacks the subsequently confirmed illegal and experimental mandate on the troops 
evolved into reactionary stockpiling of the same product for the SNS to defend citizens 
against bioterrorism. The outwardly laudable goal of protecting soldiers and citizens with 
anthrax vaccine ultimately demands the multiple methodology analysis of this thesis in 
order to test the claim of wastefulness by procuring a recognized unsatisfactory 
immunization when recommended antibiotics protect civilians. 
The thesis reviews the methodologies utilized to more fully disclose and analyze 
this evidence after addressing the anticipated challenges to the research techniques. 
4. Anticipated Challenges 
Anticipated challenges to the claim, reasons, and arguments lie in the fact that the 
issue remains highly controversial, particularly given the noted lapses and conflicts 
within the DoD, FDA, and executive branch collectively. The argument spotlights those 
breaches in an effort to protect the DHS from adopting, or potentially assisting in closing, 
the programmatic gaps. The thesis attempts to surmount institutional or bureaucratic 
barriers to digesting its findings and recommendations by addressing the problem through 
the inherent authorities of the DHS and DHHS under HSPDs 8, 10, 18, and 21. Those 
directives obligate the DHS and DHHS to manage the composition of the SNS and to 
assess the bioterrorism threat. Stopping or redirecting the inertia of significant past and 
ongoing appropriations poses a challenge. Therefore, the HSPDs provide a methodical 
means to reevaluate past policy process errors, reflect on previous expert 
recommendations, and review legal rulings regarding the vaccine. 
The encouragement for review presents a main anticipated challenge as well. 
Notwithstanding the critical judicial and legislative branch reviews, the outgoing 
executive branch appeared to ignore the logical requirement to review past anthrax 
vaccine decisions following the letter attacks. Instead, the administration expended over 
$57 billion (Clark, 2009) on biodefense and over $1 billion on anthrax vaccine since the 
2001 anthrax letter attacks (FBO, 2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008). Therefore, 
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in the face of reactionary expenditures, and expanded use of anthrax vaccine outside 
DoD, the core argument for the thesis objectively hinges not only on past rulings and 
opinions, but also on the truth in the fine print of reports currently utilized to justify the 
program. 
However, claims of omissions, misrepresentations, or misinterpretations do not 
provide sufficient reason to exclude anthrax vaccine from the Strategic National 
Stockpile. Instead, the exclusions of data and misconstrued analysis only provide 
important perspective and context when making the argument to the larger audience, in 
particular lawmakers and public servants charged with the responsibility to provide the 
best available protections for their soldiers against the threat of biowarfare and for their 
citizens against the threat of bioterrorism. Instead of portraying potential distortions as 
the central claim, the evidence standard required for a dispassionate and objective thesis 
argument alternatively attempts to highlight government assessments of the vaccine 
before the DoD altered the message. 
Therefore, the methodical analysis must make the case dispassionately, primarily 
through analysis of past official government findings, as well as through the most recent 
FBI revelations. This method ensures process transparency and the prudent allocation of 
future resources toward research and development of modern vaccines and the 
stockpiling of CDC recommended antibiotics. Such a conclusion comports with the 
documentary record and prior governmental official positions revealed through the 
multimethod analysis. The thesis outlines the multiprism approach in the next section on 
methodologies. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To address the research questions the following thesis project incorporates a 
“quadrangulation” technique that utilizes four research methodologies: literature review, 
case study, program evaluation, and gap analysis. The multiprism approach begins by 
evaluating peer-reviewed and published literature sources, which enumerate an evolving 
record on safety, efficacy, regulatory, and legal issues. A methodological triangulation 
continues by employing the three additional research methods: case study, program 
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evaluation, and gap analysis. The methodological “quadrangulation” of the thesis 
effectively “boxes in,” and takes a snapshot of, the root facts to ensure that future policy 
decisions benefit from the historical patterns discovered.5 
1. Literature Review 
The first methodology tackled in the thesis revolves around the available literature 
on anthrax vaccine. The review of the writings on anthrax vaccine summarizes published 
sources and synthesizes a pattern, or shift, in the literature around the 1998 time frame. 
At that time, the DoD announced plans for mandatory immunization of the armed forces. 
Literature was generally negative about the vaccine prior to this point, but it shifts circa 
1998 to an overall pro-vaccine stance. The highly politicized atmosphere surrounding the 
DoD mandatory inoculations helps explain the evolution of the literature during a time 
frame when the United States attempted to assure its citizens that it could protect the 
troops in the Middle East in the midst of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) 
verification problems with the Iraq regime. Alternatively, changes to the vaccine’s 
manufacturing process, potentially improving the vaccine, might also explain a shift in 
professional assessments. The preponderance of supportive literature on anthrax vaccine 
emanates primarily from government and military sources. Civilian reviews generally 
commented on the vaccine negatively both before and after the 1998 time frame. 
Interesting to note, much of the literature surrounding the vaccine appears to emanate 
from a small group of government-affiliated scientists. Those authors continue to 
chronicle the vaccine reviews to this day. Their reviews similarly shifted over time from 
generally negative during the pre-policy mandate time frame to generally positive in the 
post-policy pronouncement era. 
2. Case Study 
The case study methodology allows pertinent issue analysis regarding the 
fundamental research question. The primary question explores the timeline of decision-
 
5 A certain degree of duplicative, yet unique, explanation of the factual background supporting the 
claims and arguments appears in each individual chapter or methodology. This technique allows any given 
methodological approach to stand on its own merit. 
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making processes leading to the inclusion of anthrax vaccine as a complement to the 
composition of the SNS. The case study traces specific relevant processes through an 
event and causal-factor analysis. Timeline tracing reveals multifaceted problems across 
lengthy time frames, as well as the complex causal processes involved. The timeline 
analysis and illustration directly support a subsequent event and causal-factor relationship 
illustration documenting root causes, contributing causes, direct causes, and problematic 
events. Using an event-cause metric, the case study breaks down the institutional actors 
involved and analyzes their participation in anthrax vaccine programmatic processes over 
time. 
The case study identifies anthrax vaccine use by the government to be an outlier 
or deviant case, one generally atypical in the administration of military medicine or 
public health policy. Due to the unacceptability of such deviations, the case study serves 
as a timely and valuable means of analyzing the current expansion of the anthrax 
vaccine’s use in the realm of civilian public-health policy. Throughout the case study, 
methodical process tracing serves as an instrumental tool in order to reveal recurring 
themes as the thesis formulates causal hypotheses about the problematic events. As well, 
Chapter VI, Recommendations, represents a continuation of the case study by offering 
future courses of action and corrective actions to address the potentially corrosive trends 
revealed throughout thesis process tracing. 
Overall, the sequence of events, and the actors involved or absent, assists in 
drawing causal connections. By leveraging the case study of the DoD anthrax vaccine 
experience, the thesis objectively derives a causal theory about the effectiveness of past 
policy by the DoD in order to extrapolate success or failure against future potential policy 
challenges faced by the DHS and the DHHS as those departments incorporate the anthrax 
vaccine in the SNS. 
3. Program Evaluation  
Following the case study, a program evaluation methodology serves to 
summatively and quantitatively evaluate DoD experiences with the old anthrax vaccine. 
Quantitative performance metrics include documenting acceptance of the program by 
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military members, as well as chronicling adverse reaction rates incurred (United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ 
Illnesses [DVA-RACGWVI], 2008, pp. 8, 125, 127). Government reports and studies 
primarily provide the data points. Additionally, the use of a formative and qualitative 
evaluation attempts to evaluate ongoing efforts to procure anthrax vaccine for the SNS 
and the administration of the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) (United 
States Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008a). The evolving nature of the 
policy regarding anthrax vaccine, particularly with a new president, DHHS Secretary, and 
FDA commissioner, dictates a formative evaluation as a natural means for current 
policymakers to anticipate and consider modification of governmental initiatives as future 
events warrant. The thesis research provides a balanced collection of lessons learned 
from the Pentagon experience with soldiers’ ethical objections (Pica-Branco & Hudak, 
2008, p. 2), as well as medical community recommendations (Centers for Disease 
Control, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [CDC-ACIP], 2008, p. 97). 
The program evaluation documents several recent reports that suggest stockpile 
alternatives and omit reference to the current anthrax vaccine altogether (Graham & 
Talent, 2008, pp. xviii, 32, 33, 109). Program-effectiveness lessons captured from the 
DoD experience with anthrax vaccine provide instructive generalizations for assessing 
expanded use of the vaccine by other governmental departments, as well as 
recommendations for improving strategies to procure alternative proven countermeasures 
for U.S. citizens. As with the case-study research method, use of process tracing and 
process evaluation within the program-evaluation methodology allows the project to 
explore both retrospective (summative) and anticipatory (formative) generalizations and 
recommendations regarding the mechanisms involved. The evaluation incorporates the 
unique experiences surrounding implementation of the DoD anthrax vaccine program, 
with the relevant frameworks of analysis involving executive department regulatory 
activities, legislative oversight and judicial review. 
Implementation evaluation permeates the thesis, providing an opportunity for 
process tracing to compare the “theory of action,” or plan for success, behind military and 
civilian anthrax vaccine programs, versus the realities encountered when faced with legal, 
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regulatory, and legislative oversight. Ultimately, conclusions derived from an evaluation 
of the DoD program translate directly to potential problems with implementing a similar 
program for the American public writ large. The public is in effect the target audience for 
the policymakers, who in turn are the target audience of this thesis. 
4. Gap Analysis  
The last research methodology, gap analysis, serves as a direct lead-in to the 
research conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. By defining the present state, 
and the inherited program problems, we have the ability to clearly outline the future 
desired target state, as well as to identify gaps and their causes. 
The gap analysis aspect of the research methodology remains the most important 
element for reflection leading into the corrective process to ensure that we understand the 
conditions and potential systemic problems that created the current state. The analysis 
identifies past opportunities to close the gap, as well as explanations for the failures and 
success to do so. 
The gap analysis concludes by evaluating essential trust issues required for repair 
of the current program and formulation of future programs. The concluding 
recommendations are intended to guide future policy in a direction free from adoption of 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literary review for the anthrax vaccine revealed a distinct disparity between pre-
1998 writings versus those sponsored primarily by the DoD thereafter. The DHS 
decision-making process regarding the anthrax-vaccine component of the SNS should 
take note of the pivotal period when the shift or delta in the literary record began—with 
DoD Secretary William Cohen’s announcement of the mandatory anthrax vaccine 
immunization program in 1998 (Cohen, 1998b). In addition to the pre- versus post-1998 
writings, literary subcategories worthy of analysis include scientific literature, 
government reports, judicial rulings, and literature exploring the SNS. 
A. PRE-1998 
1. Scientific Evaluations 
Early scientific literature negatively reviewed the safety and efficacy of the 
current anthrax vaccine used by the U.S. government. Literature chronicling the vaccine 
first surfaced following an anthrax epidemic in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1957, 
which resulted in four deaths due to inhalation anthrax infection (Belluck, 2001). 
Coincidently, the U.S. Army conducted an anthrax vaccine field trial (experiment) at the 
Manchester wool-sorting mill collocated with the epidemic (Schumm, Nazarinia, & 
Bosch, 2009, p. 597). Dr. Phillip Brachman published a study in 1962 discussing the field 
trial. He specifically noted the vaccine’s effectiveness against cutaneous (skin) infection. 
He wrote, however, that “when inhalation anthrax is considered, the limited experience 
with this form of the disease makes the data less significant in showing effectiveness of 
the vaccine” (Brachman et al., 1962, p. 642). American Journal of Pathology articles also 
evaluated the inhalation (pulmonary or lung) illnesses from the 1957 DoD field trial, 
reporting approximately a 50% survival rate without vaccination (Albrink & Goodlow, 
1959; Albrink & Goodlow, 1960). 
The American Journal of Medicine also chronicled the 1957 anthrax epidemic 
through author Dr. Stanley Plotkin, Dr. Brachman’s co-investigator during the field trial. 
Like Brachman, Dr. Plotkin remained rooted in the anthrax-vaccine literary history for 
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many years to come (Plotkin, S., Brachman, P., Utell, M., Bumford, F., and Atchison, M., 
1960). A Bacteriological Review article by Brachman corroborated the reasonable 
survival rate against inhaled infection without treatment when detailing an investigation 
supported by a U.S. Army Biological Center, Fort Detrick contract (Brachman, 
Kaufmann, & Dalldorf, 1966). Years later, DoD scientist Dr. Bruce Ivins, the alleged 
perpetrator of the anthrax letter attacks (FBI, 2008), confirmed for a memo written by 
U.S. Army Col. Arthur Friedlander, a researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research 
Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), that “no data on MDPH-PA [anthrax 
vaccine] efficacy in humans” existed with respect to inhalation anthrax (Ivins, 1992, p. 
2). MDPH referred to the Michigan Department of Public Health, a quasi-state entity 
managing anthrax vaccine as a surrogate for the DoD. Dr. Ivins published similar 
conclusions in a Clinical Immunology Newsletter (Ivins, 1988, p. 30–32). In another 
journal, Dr. Ivins described the current anthrax vaccine’s “drawbacks, including the need 
for frequent boosters, the apparent inability to protect adequately against certain strains of 
B. anthracis, and occasional local reactogenicity” (Ivins et al., 1988, pp. 12–19). Still 
other Army scientists described the product as an “experimental,” “limited use vaccine” 
(Takafuji & Russell, 1990, p.156). 
Expanding on the work of Dr. Brachman, Ivins, and others, articles in Medical 
Microbiology and Immunology and Vaccines discussed the “vaccine resistant” Ames 
strain (used in the 2001 bioterrorism crimes). The articles advanced the call for a “second 
generation anthrax vaccine,” one “containing only essential ingredients and producing 
effective levels of protection with a single or, at worst, two doses” and one which 
“produces no side reactions” (e.g.,  Turnbull, 1991; Turnbull, Leppla, Broster, Quinn & 
Melling, 1988, p. 535). Several of the same scientists, such as Dr. Brachman and Dr. 
Friedlander, with Dr. Plotkin as the editor, authored additional chapters in Vaccines over 
the next decade, continuing to describe the “unsatisfactory” nature of the current product 
due to its unknown purity, undefined nature, undesirable constituents, and problematic 
efficacy issues (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994; Brachman & Friedlander, 1998, pp. 629–
636). 
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Early literature up to the 1998 time frame exhibits a straightforward awareness of 
the anthrax vaccine’s problems in the safety, efficacy, legality, and regulatory realms. 
Post-1998 scientific literature does not appear to exhibit the same unembellished critique. 
Another important aspect of the early literature and studies includes the evidence of high 
survival rates without treatment, as opposed to the post-1998 message, which appears to 
exaggerate a “lethal threat” (Cragin, 1999) without anthrax vaccine as a form of 
protection. 
2. Government Reports 
In addition to scientific literature in the 1980s and 1990s, government reports also 
acknowledged the problems with the current anthrax vaccine. In 1985, the DoD 
attempted to solicit a new vaccine. The DoD request stated, “There is an operational 
requirement to develop a safe and effective product which will protect US troops against 
exposure from virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis.” The proposal added, “There is no 
vaccine in current use which will safely and effectively protect military personnel against 
exposure to this hazardous bacterial agent.” The request clarified that the current vaccine 
is, “highly reactogenic, requires multiple boosters to maintain immunity and may not be 
protective against all strains of the anthrax bacillus” (see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, p. 4). 
The RFP coincided in 1985 with publication of an FDA proposed rule to finalize the 
anthrax vaccine’s license, which cited similar efficacy inadequacies. The proposed rule 
noted the “efficacy against inhalation anthrax is not well documented,” and that “no 
meaningful assessment of its value against inhalation anthrax is possible due to its low 
incidence” (FDA, 1985, p. 51058). Shortly thereafter, just before the first Persian Gulf 
War, then-Senator William Cohen held membership on the Government Affairs 
Committee. In 1989, the U.S. Army briefed that committee on the limitations of the 
current anthrax vaccine to protect against the aerosolized anthrax, or the inhaled route of 
exposure expected on a battlefield: 
Current vaccines, particularly the anthrax vaccine, do not readily lend 
themselves to use in mass troop immunization for a variety of reasons:  the 
requirement in many cases for multiple immunizations to accomplish 
protective immunity, a higher than desirable rate of reactogenicity, and, in 
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some cases, lack of strong enough efficacy against infection by the aerosol 
route of exposure (United States Senate, 1989). 
In 1994, a Senate committee report analyzing anthrax vaccine employment during 
Desert Storm came to the same conclusion. The report found, “the vaccine’s effectiveness 
against inhaled anthrax is unknown,” and therefore should be “considered investigational 
when used as a protection against biological warfare.” The committee added a concern 
about “safety, particularly when given to thousands of soldiers in conjunction with other 
vaccines,” finding the data “not well established.” The Senate concluded, “Anthrax 
vaccine should continue to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in 
Persian Gulf military personnel” (United States Senate, 1994, p. 35). The DoD Joint 
Project Office for Biological Defense (JPOBD) also recognized anthrax vaccine as “not 
licensed for a biological defense indication,” based on the fact that efficacy remained 
unproven (see Appendix 3) (United States Department of Defense, Joint Project Office 
for Biological Defense [DoD-JPOBD], 1997, p. 5.5). As a result, the DoD applied to the 
FDA for a use, or labeling “indication,” for “inhalation anthrax” in 1996 (see Appendix 
4) (Myers, 1996). The DoD and the manufacturer collaborated by updating the FDA 
application in 1998 for this same indication (see Appendix 5) (DoD, 1999b, p. 1).  
Based on the written evidence prior to 1998, the anthrax vaccine received 
generally unfavorable governmental, military, and scientific reviews, with 
recommendations for limited use based on lack of known efficacy and safety. The 
assessments existed prior to the politically charged mandatory use of the anthrax vaccine 
(Cohen, 1998a; Cohen, 1998b; DoD, 1997a). The shift in policy to mandate the vaccine 
during the 1998 time frame coincided with a subsequent change in the scientific and 
governmental reviews of the vaccine, primarily those emanating from DoD. 
B. POST-1998 
1. Scientific Evaluations 
With the announcement of the DoD anthrax vaccine program in 1998, the 
conclusions in the literature appeared to change. Beginning with a JAMA article in 1999, 
most subsequent DoD-authored literature generally supported the vaccine as “safe,” 
 19
“effective,” and “FDA licensed” to treat anthrax infection against diverse strains, 
regardless of the route of exposure: cutaneous, gastrointestinal, or inhaled (Friedlander, 
Pittman, & Parker, 1999, pp. 2104–2106). The authors included three U.S. Army 
scientists, Col. Arthur M. Friedlander, Col. Phillip R. Pittman, and Col. Gerald W. 
Parker. An additional JAMA article by Dr. Thomas V. Inglesby, with familiar co-authors 
such as Friedlander, Parker, and Russell, provided an endorsement of the vaccine, finding 
it “likely that the vaccine would be safe and effective” (Inglesby, Henderson, & Bartlett, 
1999, p. 1742). Inglesby reiterated the safe and effective status of anthrax vaccine in a 
2002 JAMA article (Inglesby, O’Toole, Henderson, & Bartlett, 2002, pp. 2244, 2248). 
Another example of the scientific and medical reversal of opinion, published in 
the Air Power Journal by a Deputy Assistant in the DoD for Chemical and Biological 
Defense, provides a “tutorial on anthrax, the predominant bioweapon threat,” and a “clear 
rationale for our needing a viable vaccination defense” (Davis & Johnson-Winegar, 2000, 
p. 15). A DoD pharmacist joined the intellectual discussion in the same time frame, 
writing several pro-anthrax-vaccine articles. He assured the reader that the vaccine could 
be “prescribed with the confidence commensurate with dozens of human safety studies 
and experience in 1.8 million recent vaccinees” (Grabenstein, 2008, p. 134). Dr. Stanley 
Plotkin, the co-researcher involved with Dr. Brachman in the 1957 DoD anthrax trial and 
epidemic study, “invited” the article as the section editor for the Clinical Infectious 
Diseases Journal. The “million recent vaccinees” referred to by Grabenstein were 
soldiers, mandated to take the vaccine partially due to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
report, which was funded by the DoD (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2002, p. II). The 
report cleared the way for FDA approval of the Biologic License Application (BLA) for 
anthrax vaccine (FDA, 2002a). The report and approval also enabled the DoD to restart 
the mandatory anthrax vaccine program upon resolution of FDA-discovered quality-
control deficiencies and the earlier “notice of intent to revoke” the manufacturer license 
(see Appendix 6) (FDA, 1997). Notably, the IOM report found the vaccine “sufficiently 
safe and effective for use,” though “far from optimal,” and advised that a “new vaccine, 
developed according to more modern principles of vaccinology, is urgently needed” 
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(IOM, 2002, p. 208). A 2000 IOM report also determined, “there is a paucity of published 
peer-reviewed literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine” (IOM, 2000, p. 6). 
The familiar core group of government scientists, and those involved with the 
original clinical trial, Dr. Brachman, Colonel Friedlander, Colonel Grabenstein, with Dr. 
Plotkin again serving as the editor, published a recent update on the anthrax vaccine for a 
chapter in Vaccines. This time, citing the FDA’s conclusion and the IOM report to 
demonstrate efficacy for inhalation anthrax, the scientists acknowledged the fact that 
“there have been no controlled clinical trials in humans of the efficacy of the currently 
licensed U.S. vaccine.” They provided the caveat that “the differences between the U.S. 
licensed vaccine and the PA-based vaccine used in the Brachman et al. study are minor 
from a regulatory perspective”6 (Brachman et al., 2008, p. 119). Both the IOM and the 
FDA partially cite the Brachman study as evidence for the efficacy of the vaccine for 
inhaled anthrax, whereas the scientists in turn cite those entities to affirm efficacy. 
Scientists outside the DoD predominantly came to contrary conclusions. Those 
academics challenged the IOM report, asserting that the “Institute of Medicine ignored 
evidence of several recent research studies from three different nations that have 
implicated vaccines, often including anthrax vaccine, in the epidemiology of Gulf War 
illnesses” (Schumm, Webb, Jurich & Bollman, 2002). Others published reports of 
gastrointestinal adverse reactions. One article found that overall “reactions reported 
following anthrax vaccine was higher for every reaction analyzed in comparison to the 
adult vaccine control groups” (Geier & Geier, 2004, p. 762). In September of 2006, the 
Geier team also delivered a presentation sponsored by VaxGen Corp., a company later 
purchased by Emergent BioSolutions, the maker of BioThrax®. The Geier team 
determined that the “anthrax vaccine is causing massive damage” and revealed research 
showing that the vaccine “is associated with a series of serious adverse events that can 
significantly impact multiple organ systems within the body, and result in permanent 
disability” (Geier & Geier, 2006, slide 33). The same group found significant “joint 
related adverse reactions” (Geier & Geier, 2002, p. 217).  
 
6 “PA” refers to protective antigen, one of the proteins in Bacillus anthracis (FDA, 2002a, p.2). 
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The Journal of Emergency Medicine listed “lymphocytic vasculitis associated 
with the anthrax vaccine,” or immune-related vascular inflammation (Muniz, 2003, p. 
271). Another physician detailed in the American Journal of Epidemiology a “small 
observed association” of “birth defects among infants born to women who received 
anthrax vaccine in pregnancy” (Ryan, Smith, Sevick, Honner, Loach, Moore, 2008, 
p. 434). A doctor from Kansas State University, Dr. Walter Schumm, published research 
results in Psychological Reports, indicating “adverse long-term health outcomes as a 
result of anthrax vaccination” (Schumm, Reppert, Jurich, Bollman, Webb, Castelo, 2002, 
p. 649). Dr. Schumm also defended an editorial in the British Medical Journal, charging, 
“at least three major studies in England, Canada, and the United States had found 
problems with the anthrax or other vaccines among military veterans” (Schumm, 2004, p. 
978). Dr. Schumm, and a civilian practitioner, Dr. Meryl Nass, also discovered 
correlations between reactions to anthrax vaccine and optic neuritis (Nass, 2006; 
Schumm, 2007). 
Additionally, work by Dr. Schumm published in Medical Veritas exposed 
additional findings that warrant further research. Dr. Schumm’s research included 
mathematical models correlating the 1957 anthrax vaccine clinical field trial to a 
biological warfare anthrax attack on civilians (Schumm & Webb, 2005, p. 331). He 
discovered changes in the health of veterans from the first Persian Gulf War (Schumm, 
Jurich, Web, Bollman, Reppert & Castelo, 2007, p. 1414), and posed questions about the 
statistical legitimacy of using Dr. Brachman’s study to establish the efficacy of the 
anthrax vaccine (Schumm, 2005a, p. 342). He also questioned human rights violations 
related to the 1957 human anthrax vaccine trials (Schumm, 2005b, p. 343), as well as the 
long-term safety of anthrax vaccine (Schumm, Jurich, Bollman, Webb & Castelo, 2005, 
p. 348). Dr. Schumm challenged what he viewed as the biased nature of the regulatory 
process in an article titled “FDA’s acceptance of Brachman’s 1950s anthrax research:  
Good politics? Maybe. Good science? No” (Schumm & Nass, 2006, p. 747–752). Beyond 
Dr. Schumm and Dr. Nass’s extensive work, additional critical reviews discovered 
“hypersensitivity pneumonitis following anthrax vaccination,” warning physicians to be 
attentive to “vaccine related complications” (Timmer, Amundson, & Malone, 2002, 
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p. 744). Other publications confirmed that the U.S. Army investigated anthrax vaccine as 
a possible cause of hypersensitivity pneumonitis after anthrax vaccination (Oransky, 
2003, p. 543). 
In summary, while some literature began to minimize problems with the anthrax 
vaccine post-1998, the conclusions in DoD-sponsored literature generally stand in stark 
contrast to both pre-1998 scientific documentation and non-DoD post-1998 reviews of 
the vaccine. Coincidentally, the “stark divergence of the medical community’s 
assessment of the safety and efficacy of AVA [anthrax vaccine] occurred at exactly the 
same time as the AVIP was announced” (Dingle, 2001). A reasonable conclusion 
materializes, based on the coincidental timing of the literature shift, that some medical 
literature experienced biases due to the mandatory anthrax vaccine program. 
2. Government Reports 
Based perhaps on the inconsistencies documented in the abovementioned 
scientific literature, the United States House of Representatives held a series of hearings 
from 1999 to 2000 after the DoD launched mandatory inoculations.7 Ultimately, the 
House of Representatives published a report with findings that deemed the anthrax 
vaccine program investigational and in violation of FDA regulations. The final report 
from the House Government Reform Committee, titled “Unproven Force Protection,” 
recommended that use of the “current anthrax vaccine for force protection against 
biological warfare should be considered experimental and undertaken only pursuant to 
FDA regulations governing investigational testing for a new indication” (HR 106-556, 
2000, pp. 4, 52). The Senate held limited hearings. The legislative body withheld a 
formative, critical position regarding the anthrax vaccine, as occurred with the earlier 
 
7 Multiple hearing reports published by the Government Printing Office (GPO) for the U.S. Congress 
are available. See, e.g., United States House of Representatives [HR], Committee on Government Reform 
(HR 106-130) 1999e; HR, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Health and Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations (HR 106-28) 1999; HR 106-102 1999; HR, Committee on Government 
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (HR 106-131) 
1999d; HR, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 
International Relations (HR 106-17) 1999a; HR, Committee on Government Reform (HR 106-249) 2000; 
HR, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 
International Relations (HR 106-26) 1999b; HR, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on 
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations (HR 106-36) 1999c; HR, Committee on 
Armed Services (HR 106-62) 2000). 
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Senate Veteran’s Committee Report (United States Senate, 1994; United States Senate, 
Armed Services Committee, 2000). That earlier report occurred after the first Persian 
Gulf War, but before the mandatory DoD anthrax vaccine immunization program. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, often previewed in the 
congressional hearings, marked the most voluminous governmental research post-1998. 
The GAO persistently provided critical reviews of the vaccine program. Alternatively, 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) remained effectively mute on the issue. GAO 
confirmed the “long-term safety of the vaccine has not yet been studied”; that 
“ingredients used to make vaccine were changed from the original vaccine,” and that 
“prior to the time of licensing, no human efficacy testing of the MDPH vaccine was 
performed” (United States Government Accountability Office, National Security and 
International Affairs Division [GAO-NSIAD], 1999a, p.2–3). Twenty additional GAO 
reports worthy of further analysis found similarly critical conclusions concerning safety 
and efficacy.8 
An early GAO report of testimony to the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 
documented the vaccine as “licensed by the Food and Drug Administration,” and 
reported that it “has been routinely administered to populations at risk for several years” 
(GAO-NSIAD, 1998, p. 3). Later revelations ultimately debunked both assertions. For 
example, the lack of a final FDA license resulted in court injunctions and orders to 
finalize the vaccine license (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2007). Moreover, the U.S. Army admitted that “we did not intend to mislead or 
confuse people” when apologizing for overstating use as “widespread” (Funk, 1999). 
Subsequent GAO reports were consistently critical, to include an important discovery 
documented in a report involving the alteration of the vaccine with unapproved 
manufacturing changes (GAO, 2001b, p. 3–4). The FDA indifferently characterized the 
DoD role in this phenomenon when describing “DoD’s continuous involvement with, and 
 
8 Multiple reports critical of the anthrax program were published by the GPO for the GAO. See GAO-
NSIAD, 1999d; GAO-NSIAD, 1999g; GAO-NSIAD, 2000a; GAO-NSIAD, 2000b; GAO -NSIAD, 1999e; 
GAO-NSIAD, 1999f; GAO-NSIAD, 1999a; GAO-NSIAD, 1999b; GAO-NSIAD, 1999c; GAO, 2001a; 
GAO, 2000b; GAO, 2000a; GAO, 2001c; GAO, 2002a; GAO, 2002b; GAO, 2006; GAO, 2007a; GAO, 
2007b; GAO, 2008; GAO, 2007c; GAO, 2007d). 
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intimate knowledge of, the formulation and manufacturing processes of all of these 
versions of the anthrax vaccine” (FDA, 2002b, p. 8). The FDA ultimately cited the DoD’s 
involvement to justify the finalized license rule for anthrax vaccine in 2005. The anthrax 
vaccine finally received an FDA licensing 20 years after the 1985 proposed rule (FDA, 
2005b, p. 75180-98), fifty years after the vaccine’s advent, but only after the courts had 
ruled the mandatory DoD program illegal and “investigational” absent a license (Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 40). In effect, the government requested and responded to public 
comments about the proposed license and then completed the paperwork by adding the 
controversial indication for inhalation anthrax. Despite the apparent FDA acquiescence to 
the DoD’s central role, a consistently less-than-laudatory theme permeates the majority of 
the GAO reports following the 1998 potential policy-driven shift in the literature. 
Rounding out post-1998 governmental review, the CDC effectively recommended 
antibiotics, such as penicillin, ciprofloxacin, and doxycycline, as the treatment for 
anthrax infection instead of the vaccine (CDC, 2001; CDC, 2002; CDC, 2000). 
According to the CDC, anthrax vaccine remains “not recommended for routine pre-event 
anthrax vaccination,” notwithstanding a DHS and DHHS declaration of an “anthrax 
emergency” through the year 2015 (Centers for Infectious Disease Research and Police 
[CIDRAP], 2008). In contrast, DHS confirmation that, “there is not currently a domestic 
emergency involving anthrax,” that “there is not currently a heightened risk of an anthrax 
attack,” and that there is “no credible information indicating an imminent threat of an 
attack involving Bacillus anthracis.” Regardless, the DHHS indeed declared an “anthrax 
emergency” extending “through December 31, 2015” (Chertoff, 2008; United States 
Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], 2008b). Recently, proposed 
guidance reveals DHS recommendations for protective measures “during the first week 
following a wide-area anthrax attack.” The DHS proposal recommends “personal 
protective equipment and decontamination and hygiene procedures,” while clarifying that 
post-exposure use of the old anthrax vaccine requires the vetting of emergency use 
authorizations or investigational new drug approvals (DHS, 2009d, p. 55246). 
Table 1 summarizes highlights of the transformation in the scientific and 
government assessments of the anthrax vaccine detailed thus far in the literature review. 
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Ultimately, the pre- and post-1998 conclusion chasm captured in the preceding literature 
review requires consideration, along with the fact that later favorable literature originates 
from, or was sponsored by, the DoD. 
 
Critical Reviews Pre-Policy Morph to ‘Safe and Effective’ Rhetoric Post-Policy 
Pre-policy Post-policy 
“There is no vaccine in current use which 
will safely and effectively protect military 
personnel” (see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, 
p. 4) 
From DoD informational Web site: 
“The anthrax vaccine is safe and effective” 
(DoD, 2009b) 
“Efficacy against inhalation anthrax is not 
well documented,” & “no meaningful 
assessment of its value against inhalation 
anthrax is possible due to its low 
incidence” (FDA, 1985, p. 51058) 
“AVA [anthrax vaccine] is effective 
against B. anthracis strains that are 
dependent upon the anthrax toxin as a 
mechanism of virulence, regardless of the 
route of exposure” (FDA, 2005b, p. 75183) 
“When inhalation anthrax is considered, the 
limited experience with this form of the 
disease makes the data less significant in 
showing effectiveness of the vaccine” 
(Brachman et al., 1962, p. 642) 
“The US Food & Drug Administration 
independently affirmed that anthrax 
vaccine adsorbed prevents anthrax 
regardless of route of exposure” (Brachman 
et al., 2008, p. 119) 
“No data on MDPH-PA [anthrax vaccine] 
efficacy in humans” existed (Ivins, 1992, p. 
2) 
“Likely that the vaccine would be safe and 
effective” (Inglesby et al., 1999, p. 1742) 
FDA issued a “Notice of intent to revoke” 
the manufacturer license (FDA, 1997) 
“Safe,” “effective” and “FDA licensed” 
(Friedlander et al., 1999, pp. 2104–06) 
Early IOM letter report: 
“There is a paucity of published peer-
reviewed literature on the safety of the 
anthrax vaccine” (IOM, 2000, p. 6) 
“Sufficiently safe and effective for use,” 
though “far from optimal,” and advised that 
a “new vaccine, developed according to 
more modern principles of vaccinology, is 
urgently needed” (IOM, 2002, p. 208) 
DoD applied for a licensing approval for 
use against “inhalation anthrax” (see 
Appendix 5) (DoD, 1999b, p.1) 
“The vaccine is safe, effective, FDA-
licensed and essential” (Cragin, 1999) 
DoD scientists described the vaccine as an 
“experimental,” “limited use vaccine” 
(Takafuji & Russell, 1990, p.156) 
“Vaccine currently being administered to 
the US armed forces has been used safely 
for 30 years and has passed extensive 
testing by the FDA” (Davis & Johnson-
Winegar, 2000) 
“Current vaccines, particularly the anthrax 
vaccine, do not readily lend themselves to 
use in mass troop immunization for a 
“The US vaccine is licensed to prevent 
anthrax, regardless of the route of 
exposure. Its dosing schedule is 
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variety of reasons:  the requirement in 
many cases for multiple immunizations to 
accomplish protective immunity, a higher 
than desirable rate of reactogenicity, and, in 
some cases, lack of strong enough efficacy 
against infection by the aerosol route of 
exposure” (United States Senate, 1989) 
cumbersome and somewhat painful 
(shortcomings that may be resolved by 
ongoing clinical studies). It can be 
prescribed with the confidence 
commensurate with dozens of human 
safety studies and experience in 1.8 million 
recent vaccinees (Grabenstein, 2008, p. 
134) 
Anthrax vaccine “drawbacks, including the 
need for frequent boosters, the apparent 
inability to protect adequately against 
certain strains of B. anthracis, and 
occasional local reactogenicity” (Ivins, 
1988) 
“The current anthrax vaccine is a licensed 
vaccine and has been demonstrated to be 
clinically safe and effective for preventing 
inhalation anthrax after exposure to anthrax 
spores” (Hersack, 2002, p. 123) 
Brachman, et al: “unsatisfactory” nature of 
the current product due to its unknown 
purity, undefined nature, undesirable 
constituents and efficacy issues (Brachman 
& Friedlander, 1994; Brachman & 
Friedlander, 1998, pp. 629–36) 
Brachman, et al: “AVA as licensed is an 
effective vaccine for the protection of 
humans against anthrax, including 
inhalation anthrax, caused by all known or 
plausible engineered strains of B. 
anthracis” (Brachman et al., 2008, p. 119) 
Army Surgeon General Ronald Blanck 
Senate briefing: “Therefore, its safety, 
particularly when given to thousands of 
soldiers in conjunction with other vaccines, 
is not well established. Anthrax vaccine 
should continue to be considered as a 
potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in 
Persian Gulf military personnel because 
many of the support troops received 
anthrax vaccine, and because the DoD 
believes that the incidence of undiagnosed 
illnesses in support troops may be higher 
than that in combat troops” (United States 
Senate, 1994, p. 35, fn. 143) 
Army Surgeon General Ronald Blanck 
Opinion Editorial: 
Army Times: “Ignore the Paranoiacs; the 
Vaccine is Safe” (Blanck, 1999) 
Congressional Testimony: 
 “The threat is real,” (HR, Committee on 
Government Reform, Subcommittee on 
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 
International Relations, 1999, p. 14);  
“If they are not vaccinated, they will 
inevitably die” (HR, Committee on Armed 
Services, 1999, p. 27) 
Table 1.   Dichotomies in the Literary Record 
 
Within the review of the literature, an interesting note also discovered lies in the 
fact that the DoD informational Web site (DoD, 2009b) serves for news, policy, and as an 
archive of medical publications. Largely, the archive includes only literature supportive 
 27
of the institutional position, versus the less-than-favorable literature covered within this 
review. An additional note worth mentioning is the fact that the DoD placed the 1985 
Proposed Rule on their Web sites in a transcribed form, versus the original, stating “All 
the sections that discuss anthrax vaccine are reprinted in their entirety.” The DoD actually 
appeared to transcribe all sections except for the key “Proposed” aspect of the ruling 
(FDA, 1985, p. 1). This fact was not lost on the judicial review process by the federal 
courts where the never-finalized Proposed Rule led directly to preliminary (Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2003) and permanent injunctions (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004) that found the DoD 
mandate of the vaccine in violation of the law. The recasting of the scientific and medical 
evidence, and the significant legal implications of the omissions, make the historical 
literature review even more important. 
Overall, the DoD’s and the FDA’s documented pattern of reinterpreting the spirit 
and specifics of the medical and scientific appraisals for the anthrax vaccine in the post-
1998 era potentially represents an outlier case compared to the standards imposed on 
other pharmaceuticals. Oversight functions of Congress, the GAO, and the courts, as 
illustrated by the next section, partially provided a check and balance for the literature. 
Additionally, the CDC effectively maintained resolute recommendations centering on 
post-exposure use of antibiotics over the vaccine (CDC, 2000; CDC 2001; CDC, 2002; 
CDC, 2008; CDC-ACIP, 2008). 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review may ultimately serve as a means of adjudicating some finality in 
the literature by providing final decisions about continued reliance on BioThrax® for the 
SNS. The judicial record rendered the anthrax vaccine “investigational” and the program 
“illegal” due to a lack of licensing and an absence of approval for use against inhalation 
anthrax (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, pp. 40–41). Court rulings resulted in a preliminary 
injunction in December 2003 (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003), followed by a permanent 
injunction on summary judgment in October 2004 (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004). Though the 
rulings were not overturned, the military criminal courts system put forth an alternative 
ruling from the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (United States v. Kisala, 2006). A 
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critique of judicial review process became part of one of the rulings where a court found 
the depth of other rulings lacking. The court wrote: 
Taken as a whole, Judge Sullivan’s decisions in Doe v. Rumsfeld conclude 
that, prior to the FDA’s December 2005 rulemaking, it was a violation of 
federal law for military personnel to be subjected to involuntary AVA 
inoculation because the vaccine was neither the subject of a presidential 
waiver nor licensed for use against inhalation anthrax. … Other courts 
have affirmed the legality of pre-2005 orders subjecting military personnel 
to involuntary anthrax vaccination, although they did so without giving 
detailed consideration to the implications of the FDA’s licensing 
requirements (Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force Bd., 2008, pp. 18-19). 
Ultimately, additional federal court decisions affirmed the earlier rulings requiring 
proper licensure, but did not question the new licensure for the vaccine. Those 
subsequent judicial opinions deferred to the FDA’s scientific expertise on the issues (Doe 
v. Von Eschenbach, 2008).9 As part of the legal analysis of the literature, academic 
papers explored the anthrax vaccine program and the pivotal informed-consent rights that 
soldiers and citizens enjoy when it comes to vaccines (Miller, R., 2002). Other academic 
efforts highlighted the complex legal issues involved with ongoing litigation, while also 
concluding that the essential element of trust was missing with the anthrax program and 
required restoration (Lynch, 2003, p. 78–80). The judicial literature review remains 
incomplete due to the ongoing nature of the controversy, but court rulings to date 
document the impervious past illegality of the mandatory anthrax vaccine program up 
until the 2005 licensure of the vaccine. Judicial reviews reveal that when the federal 
courts looked deeply into the issue they discovered illegal conduct upon “detailed 
consideration” (Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force Bd., 2008, pp. 18–19). 
D. STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE 
Limited SNS policy literature exists. The CDC informed the U.S. public in a 
report on terrorism preparedness and emergency response (TPER) about the inclusion of 
“vaccines and antibiotics to prevent and treat anthrax” (CDC, 2009, pp. 20, 33). A report 
from the GAO also provided recommendations to preclude waste of BioThrax® through 
 
9 Note: Court deference to FDA also affirmed as recently as 2009 (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009). 
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a joint DoD-DHHS “single integrated inventory system” (GAO, 2007c, p. 26). Today, 
DoD utilizes stockpiled anthrax vaccine under a collaborative agreement with the DHHS 
(CDC, n.d.). The DHHS plans to distribute the anthrax vaccine in the event of an 
anticipated or actual anthrax emergency occurrence from CDC’s SNS via the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS). Receiving, staging, storage (RSS) and points of dispensing (PODs) nodes 
allow delivery of prepackaged antibiotics and anthrax vaccine if required. The MMRS 
program evolved after the 1996 Tokyo mass-transit attacks with sarin gas by Aum 
Shinrikyo. During the same time frame, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City intensified preparatory efforts (DHS, 2008a). 
DHS shares responsibility for the SNS, and Presidential Directives task the DHS 
with annual product content review (POTUS, 2007b). As mentioned, along with the GAO 
reports, a CRS report reviewed policy and procurement issues related to the SNS, 
including a cursory review of legal, safety, and sole-source procurement problems with 
the current anthrax vaccine versus a next-generation vaccine (Congressional Research 
Service, 2007, p. 13). Examination of BioShield Act legislation (Public Law 108–276, 
2004), a law to provide “medical countermeasures protecting Americans against a 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack,” makes no mention of 
anthrax vaccine (POTUS, 2004). Additionally, a thorough review of other presidential 
sources reveals early 2002 references to anthrax vaccine in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (NSHS) and the State of the Union Address (POTUS, 2002a; DHS, 
2002, pp. 1, 44). Yet by the 2007 NSHS (DHS, 2007), in a 2008 “Biodefense for the 21st 
Century” speech, the president omitted mention of the current anthrax vaccine, instead 
replacing BioThrax® with procurement announcements for “75 million doses of a second 
generation anthrax vaccine” (POTUS, 2008b). 
Although the governmental literature appears to deemphasize the anthrax vaccine, 
and even omit mention of it as time goes on, the DHHS continues to procure the vaccine 
for the SNS. The de-emphasis may be due to the fact that the FBI deemed a U.S. Army 
scientist’s motive for the letter attack crimes related to the anthrax vaccine’s “failing” 
status in 2001 (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15). But, considering the government procured over 
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$1 billion worth of BioThrax® since the anthrax letter attacks of 2001 (FBO, 2004; FBO, 
2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008),10 the disappearing act of anthrax vaccine from official 
National Strategies remains significant when contrasted against continued appropriations 
for the countermeasure. Additionally, the fading away of the earlier pronouncements of 
the anthrax threat contrast with the current, more evenhanded, assessments (GAO-
NSIAD, 2000a, p. 1). Indeed, the GAO confirmed as early as 1999 that “the nature and 
magnitude of the military threat of biological warfare (BW) has not changed since 1990, 
both in terms of the number of countries suspected of developing BW capability, the 
types of BW agents they possess, and their ability to weaponize and deliver those BW 
agents” (GAO-NSIAD, 1999a, p. 2). 
Overall, the inconsistencies between the threat pronouncements and the 
expenditures dictate scrutiny regarding continued procurement. Future policy regarding 
the SNS, based on the DHS’s statutory oversight, requires an intellectually forthright 
review of past inconsistencies within the literature in order to ensure credible and 
transparent government practices in the budget-constrained years ahead. The DHS’s task 
to provide the best countermeasures based on reliable threat assessments requires a 
candid process, one free of literary dichotomies and gaps. 
E. SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
In conclusion, the literature demonstrates that the courts, Congress, and the GAO 
in particular remain steadfast in maintaining the continuity of the literature, while 
literature emanating from the DoD or other government entities changed its position on 
the vaccine, apparently to coincide with changes in policy. As a result, the more “spotty” 
literature emanates from the DoD following the 1998 policy pronouncements for the 
mandatory anthrax-vaccine program. Ultimately, the DoD funded (IOM, 2002, p. II) 
efforts by the IOM to endorse the vaccine’s safety and efficacy, in contrast to years of 
alternative critical assessments. The IOM’s qualification that a “new vaccine … is 
 
10 On September 30, 2008, the DHHS procured $404 million worth of BioThrax® for use in the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). At the end of FY 2007, the DHHS procured $448 million. The DoD 
procured $245 million in 2003. The DoD’s original purchase price per dose rose from $2.26 to its current 
level of $29.91, a 1,235% increase, although “the contractual price per dose was expected to decrease as 
production quantities increased.” 
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urgently needed” appeared contradictory to policy resumptions (IOM, 2002, p. 208). A 
similarly inconsistent, circular argument by the IOM and the FDA involved referencing 
Dr. Brachman’s study to justify efficacy for inhalation anthrax. Even Dr. Brachman does 
not appear to take this leap himself. Instead, he acknowledges the absence of a required 
field trial for the old anthrax vaccine and in turn cites the FDA and the IOM as the basis 
for documenting the current vaccine’s efficacy against inhalation anthrax (Brachman et 
al., 2008, p. 119). 
Overall, as Dr. Brachman’s work demonstrates to this day, the majority of pro-
anthrax vaccine literature emanates from a small group of military and government 
scientists, many whom have been involved with the vaccine for decades. In the case of 
Dr. Brachman and Dr. Plotkin, participation in the scientific record on anthrax vaccine 
stretches back to the 1950s, not only with repetitious updates to articles, but through 
editorial contributions in medical journals. In comparison, most authors from the civilian 
medical community remain relatively constant in their critical assessments, or mute in 
other cases based on nonexposure to the subject matter. Potential expanded civilian 
exposure to the old anthrax vaccine through the SNS might change the current literary 
reality of the small core cadre of military and government scientists manufacturing most 
of the literature related to the vaccine. 
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III. CASE STUDY 
As discussed in the previous section on methodology, the following case study 
carefully analyzes the DoD experience with anthrax vaccine, revealing a deviant or 
outlier program and product. Evaluating the lengthy timeline and causal chain of events 
helps to place the deviations in perspective. Tracing programmatic processes across time 
assists the case study’s attempt to derive and explain the causal connections of the 
various conditions and subsequent problematic events outlined. The thesis focuses on two 
“emergency occurrences” related to anthrax vaccine as the premise to begin the study. 
The first involved the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, and the second relates to the DHHS 
declaration of an anthrax emergency in 2008. The DHHS declaration extends through 
2015 under the auspices of the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) 
Act (DHHS, 2005; DHHS, 2008b). 
According to government guidelines, “emergency occurrences” necessitate 
investigations using formal analytical models (United States Department of Energy 
[DOE], 1992). Federal guidelines propose root-cause analysis to identify program 
deficiencies and corrective actions. Preventing recurrences protects the public. In the case 
of this analysis, we focus on the public’s health. The five phases of analysis include  
Phase I, data collection; Phase II, assessment; Phase III, corrective actions; Phase IV, 
inform; and finally, Phase V, follow-up. This chapter’s case study specifically reviews 
the development of Phase I, data collection, and Phase II, assessment. Phase III, 
corrective actions; Phase IV, inform; and finally, Phase V, follow-up, are each addressed 
in the recommendations of the next chapter. 
A. PHASE I - DATA COLLECTION 
The “emergency occurrence” under investigation in this case study involves the 
anthrax letter attacks of 2001. Clearly, the anthrax letter attacks negatively affected the 
entire nation. The attacks qualify as an emergency occurrence worthy of analysis given 
that they represented the nation’s first anthrax related bioterrorism event in U.S. history. 
In accordance with the governmental guidelines, the Amerithrax (FBI, 2008) 
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investigation by the FBI allowed for initial data collection. Congressional and GAO 
reports detailed in Chapter II’s literature review contributed as well. In accordance with 
the recommendations in the following chapter, consequential data collection by the DoD, 
the DHS, the DHHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) should necessarily 
recommence a comprehensive Phase I data collection upon adoption of the suggestions 
outlined in this thesis. 
B. PHASE II – ASSESSMENT 
1. Identify the Problem 
According to government guidance, we must analyze and identify causal factors, 
specifically the root, contributing, and direct causes of any emergency occurrence in 
order to evaluate preceding or succeeding problematic events (DOE, 1992, p. 7–9). The 
first step in the assessment phase dictates identification of the root problem. Fortunately, 
the FBI Amerithrax investigation highlighted the root facts after several years of 
investigation, and therefore FBI findings serve as a foundation for the assessment phase. 
The lone U.S. Army scientist employing weaponized anthrax through the mail can be 
identified as a conceivable root cause of the problem. In essence, a DoD scientist’s 
involvement with the anthrax vaccine, and his related criminal actions, clearly fell outside 
the normal arenas of expertise, although the emergency occurrence would not have 
occurred absent DoD level involvement, security lapses, and history with anthrax 
vaccine. 
The root cause, DoD involvement with anthrax vaccine, if corrected, should 
preclude recurrences of the emergency event. The FDA previously acknowledged these 
root access issues by documenting “DoD’s continuous involvement with, and intimate 
knowledge of, the formulation and manufacturing processes of all of these versions of the 
anthrax vaccine” (FDA, 2002b, p. 8). Identification of DoD involvement as a root cause 
does not imply involvement itself equated to violations of the law or regulation. Instead, 
the ensuing analysis identifies subsequent violations of the law as contributing causes. 
The root cause of DoD involvement only served as the crux of the problem. In turn, the 
U.S. Army scientist’s anthrax letter attacks served as the direct cause, a highly significant 
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one considering the government appears to ignore the implications of the crime’s possible 
motive related to inherent “failings” of the vaccine. The root and direct causes 
consequently present a window to view the associated proximate or contributing causes, 
as well as the subsequent problematic events. 
2. Determine the Significance of the Problem 
The significance of a trusted military scientist turning his expertise and 
government resources into a weapon to murder American citizens cannot be understated. 
Documented problems with the government program emerging as a factor possibly 
motivating a scientist’s crime only adds to the significance. The government’s 
acknowledgment of the connection between anthrax vaccine program troubles and the 
crimes stands incongruously against the government’s reluctance to reflect on these 
revelations with respect to current policy. The government’s apparent failure to analyze 
the events and synthesize modifications to biodefense policy and SNS priorities 
represents the most significant of the resultant problematic events. 
The FBI released emails documenting the scientist’s frame of mind on August 6, 
2008. The U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Jeffrey Taylor, revealed that Dr. 
Bruce Ivins, a scientist at Fort Detrick’s USAMRIID, was the “sole suspect” in the letter 
attacks. The FBI concluded, “Dr. Ivins was the only person responsible for these attacks.” 
The motive included the fact that Dr. Ivins “was facing a difficult time professionally in 
the summer and fall of 2001 because an anthrax vaccine he was working on was failing.” 
Mr. Taylor stated that the “possible motive is his concern about the end of the vaccination 
program … and one theory is that by launching these attacks, he creates a situation, a 
scenario, where people all of a sudden realize the need to have this vaccine.” According 
to FBI affidavits chronicling e-mails by Dr. Ivins, the scientist wrote, “Unfortunately, 
since the BioPort people aren’t scientists, the task of solving their problem has fallen on 
us.” Ultimately, the apparent use of the letter attacks to help resolve production problems 
potentially led to the “scenario” to solve the “mess” (FBI, 2008, p. 12–15). 
Understandably, the DoD, unaware that the attacks were being perpetrated by an 
insider, then leveraged the tragic “scenario” to justify the belated licensure of the anthrax 
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vaccine. The DoD capitalized on the “situation” stating, “The anthrax attacks in October 
2001 illustrated the risk of an unprotected population in an environment contaminated 
with a biological warfare agent” (Keys & Taylor, 2005). The DoD also used the attacks 
to rationalize resumption of the suspended anthrax vaccine immunization program 
(AVIP), officially posting references to the “22 cases of anthrax resulted from attacks 
with anthrax spores” (DoD, 2009c, p. 4). As the FBI confirmed, the FDA “had suspended 
further production” because the “same vaccine was having problems in the production 
phase” (FBI, 2008, p. 15). Defense Web sites document the 2001 problems, stating, 
“DoD ordered a series of three temporary slowdowns of the AVIP, until additional FDA-
approved vaccine became available.” Congressional members previously queried DoD 
officials regarding these slowdowns and the availability of the vaccine based on 
invalidating FDA inspections. Representative Christopher Shays asked Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Rudy De Leon and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and 
Biological Defense Anna Johnson-Winegar, “Didn’t the FDA make it clear that they 
would not approve any more from this old plant and that they needed to upgrade it?” Dr. 
Winegar responded, “Yes.” Deputy Secretary De Leon replied, “Correct” (HR, 
Committee on Armed Services, Military Personnel Subcommittee (HR 106-62, 2000, p. 
63). The DoD acknowledged that the “supply was restored in January 2002, with FDA 
approval of renovations by BioPort Corporation of its facilities and processes” (Military 
Vaccine Agency [MILVAX], 2005, p. 3–4). The perpetrator’s e-mails in September of 
2001 confirmed that there were “no approved lots currently available.” Failed potency 
tests previously prevented FDA approval. The scientist wrote, “Apparently Gore (and 
maybe even Bush) is considering making the anthrax vaccine for the military voluntary, 
or even stopping the program.” The scientist knew that if the vaccine “isn’t passing the 
potency test,” the program would end. He detailed the implications, stating, “If it doesn’t 
pass, then there are no more lots to test, and the program will come to a halt. That’s bad 
for everyone concerned, including us.” 
FBI analysis also documented that Dr. Ivins directly worked on the vaccine’s 
problematic potency testing from 2000 to 2001 in his duties for the Anthrax Potency 
Integrated Product Team. The DoD awarded Dr. Ivins the highest honor for “getting the 
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anthrax vaccine back into production” (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15). USAMRIID documented 
how Dr. Ivins worked to get “the anthrax vaccine back into production … to determine 
where the problems were and resolve them so the vaccine would pass the potency test” 
(United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command [USAMRMC], 2003, 
p. 14). Dr. Ivins said at the time, “Awards are nice. But the real satisfaction is knowing 
the vaccine is back on-line” (Vander Linden, 2003). In conclusion, well-documented 
anthrax vaccine production problems related to DoD involvement in the manufacturing 
process (root cause) possibly motivated an Army scientist to launch the anthrax attacks 
(emergency occurrence) in order to restore confidence in the anthrax vaccine (direct 
cause). The scientist’s actions led to FDA validation of the anthrax vaccine’s 
manufacturing process, resumption of the DoD anthrax vaccine program, relaxation of 
regulatory oversight, and significant expansion of anthrax vaccine procurement 
(problematic events). This causal chain qualifies as highly significant due to the nature of 
the crimes, processes, and actors involved. 
Perhaps more disconcerting in the event and causal factor analysis, we discover 
that inquiry and oversight into the core problems apparently evaporated after the crimes 
occurred throughout all levels of the government, prolonging these problematic events. 
DHS endorsement of further expansions to the vaccine’s stockpiling in the DHHS SNS 
illustrates the final problematic, but correctable, event. Specific examples of abandoned 
oversight and inquiry reside in the next section, detailing the event timeline of the root 
cause analysis. Ideas on correcting such events with renewed oversight appear in the next 
chapter’s recommendations as suggested future courses of action. 
3. Identify the Problem’s Causes and Conditions 
A time-tested government-advocated analysis offers six methods for determining 
the causes and conditions surrounding a problem (DOE, 1992, p. 9–14). The thesis 
exercises the “Events and Causal Factor Analysis” tool due to multifaceted problems 
across lengthy time frames and the complex causal processes involved. Normally, the 
serious nature of an occurrence dictates use of “all applicable analytical models” for root 
cause analysis. The complex aspects of the anthrax letter attacks and problems related to 
the anthrax vaccine issue dictate use of all alternative tools in a successive formal 
governmental analysis. The “change analysis tool” allows discovery of organizational 
behavior breakdowns. Procedural and administrative problems require the “barrier 
analysis tool.” Personnel problems call for the “human performance evaluation method.” 
Thorough analysis of all phases of the problematic occurrences, as well as causes and 
corrective actions, might utilize the “Kepner-Tregoe model” (DOE, 1992, p. 10, Fig. 2). 
Subsequent government-directed inquiry should accomplish the more comprehensive 
reviews. This thesis focuses only on the Events and Causal Factor Analysis. 
a. Events and Causal Factor Relationships 
Establishing an illustration of causal factor relationships and relevant 
chains of events serves as the first step in the Events and Causal Factor Analysis (DOE, 













































































Figure 1.   Events and Causal Factor Relationships Illustration 
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The circles represent the “conditions” precipitating the root cause 
(continuous DoD involvement), the contributing causes (regulatory, medical, and legal 
complications), and the direct causes (the U.S. Army scientist’s frustrations over the 
“failing” status of the vaccine and its potency problems). The squares represent the 
“events,” including the emergency occurrence (the anthrax letter attacks) and the 
subsequent problematic events (the potential relaxation of regulatory controls that 
allowed for the resumption of the DoD program and anthrax vaccine procurement 
expansion in the SNS). 
The Events and Causal Factor Relationships illustration documents the 
root cause for the problem. The illustration portrays continuous involvement in anthrax 
vaccine manufacturing by the DoD as the core cause. The DoD’s seemingly under 
regulated involvement precipitated the contributing causes. These contributing conditions 
included safety questions, efficacy issues, lack of a finalized licensure for anthrax 
vaccine, unapproved alterations to the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process leading to 
potency problems and adverse reactions, and finally, the illegal experimental use of 
anthrax vaccine for inhaled anthrax. The direct cause, Dr. Ivins’s letter attacks, occurred 
to some extent due to each of these root and contributing causes. Each of these causes in 
turn precipitated the problematic events, which included expedited anthrax vaccine 
licensure, resumption of the DoD anthrax vaccine immunization program, DHS and 
DHHS anthrax vaccine procurement, and the apparent abandonment of inquiry and 
oversight. The regulatory problems, for the purposes of the case-study assessment phase 
serve as “conditions,” or an “as-found state,” which could present “adverse safety, health, 
quality assurance, security, operational, or environmental implications.” The regulatory 
deviations frustrating the scientist fit the programmatic “conditions,” errors or anomalies 
that, when identified but left uncorrected, potentially lead to a “Causal Factor Chain” 
(DOE, 1992, p. 9). In this case, the regulatory conditions, based on multiple contributing 
causes, apparently motivated the anthrax letter attacks. As the FBI surmised, the scientist 
“creates a situation, a scenario, where people all of a sudden realize the need to have this 
vaccine” (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15), thus generating a “cause and effect sequence” (DOE, 
1992, p. 9). In effect, the primary problematic event, the letter attacks, scared the 
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government and the FDA into a subsequent event in the causal factor chain. Thus, the 
FDA approved the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process potentially despite the known 
regulatory problems. The DoD then leveraged the attacks in the next problematic event 
by resurrecting the anthrax vaccine program, literally making a reality of the attacker’s 
motive. Significantly, the DoD subsequently rewarded the scientist for repairing the 
problems underlying the motive for his crime. Throughout the event and cause factor 
chain, Dr. Ivins effectively participated firsthand in the root, contributing, and direct 
causes of the problematic events. 
As the illustration suggests, the root cause of the illegal activities related 
to anthrax vaccine directly or indirectly lies in continuous involvement by DoD 
personnel. Consequent “contributing causes” or “conditions” resulting from this 
involvement included reports of high adverse reaction rates and safety problems, perhaps 
due to increased potency; increased potency, potentially due to unapproved 
manufacturing changes; failure to finalize the vaccine’s license; and illegal use of the 
vaccine for an unapproved purpose due to unproven efficacy. Tolerance of the extralegal 
occurrences, or conditions, precipitated the direct cause and subsequent problematic 
events—offensive use of weaponized anthrax spores against American citizens in a 
scenario that resuscitated the DoD anthrax vaccine program and spurred SNS 
procurement. A lack of oversight regarding DoD involvement in turn continued the 
causal chain with further problematic events including vaccine licensure by the FDA and 
the appearance of abandonment of previous critical inquiry at all levels of government. 
The case study analysis moves forward with a more detailed Events and 
Causal Factor Analysis timeline. Each chronological example places a historical 
perspective on the depth of DoD involvement in the anthrax vaccine (root cause) leading 
up to, and following, the anthrax letter attacks (direct cause). The historical review traces 
myriad processes and provides perspective on the vaccine’s safety problems, illegal 
experimental use, unapproved manufacturing alterations, and the nonfinalized license (all 
contributing causes). Following the Events and Causal Factor Analysis timeline, the 
thesis further details the problematic events in the remaining thesis methodologies: a 
program evaluation in Chapter IV, a gap analysis in Chapter V, and a proposal for future 
courses of action and recommendations in Chapter VI. 
b. Event and Causal Factor Analysis:  Timeline 
The following detailed event and causal factor chain analysis divides 
chronologically across three time frames. The first, the 1950s to 1980s, involved the 
development of root causes. The second time frame, the 1990s to late 2001, became the 
contributory cause years. Finally, following the anthrax letter attacks in 2001, the 
problematic events began in the post-emergency occurrence years. Figure 2 illustrates 
these three separate timelines and illuminates the root cause, contributory cause, and 
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Figure 2.   Timeline Illustration of Causes and Events 
(1) Early Years Defining the Root Cause (1950s to 1980s). 
Beginning in January of 1955, at a wool mill in Manchester, New Hampshire, the anthrax 
vaccine developed by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps underwent a field trial. In the 
summer of 1957, an unexpected outbreak of inhalational anthrax occurred, killing four 
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Americans (Belluck, 2001).11 DoD researchers, Dr. Brachman and Dr. Plotkin, 
characterized the outbreak as the first inhalation anthrax epidemic in a century for the 
United States (Brachman et al., 1966; Brachman, Plotkin, Bumford & Atchison, 1960; 
Plotkin, 1960). By 1962, as an amendment to the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 
the Harris-Kefauver Act added the legal requirement for proof of effectiveness for all 
vaccine licenses (FDA, 1962). The “efficacy” requirement for a “well-controlled” field 
trial would later become pivotal in the anthrax vaccine legal debate. In 1965, the U.S. 
Army patented the vaccine used in the 1957 epidemic (Wright & Milton, 1965). Initially, 
the DoD contracted with Merck, Sharpe, & Dohme for vaccine production (FDA, 2005b, 
pp. 75180, 75192). Later, the state of Michigan’s plant, MDPH, applied for a license on 
April 14, 1966 for the U.S. Army (Elengold, 2000b). 
Curiously, the licensing data did not include the Manchester, New 
Hampshire mill epidemic, instead using a Talladega, Alabama test for efficacy 
justification. On February 6, 1969, government regulators questioned the data, writing, 
“The lack of cases of anthrax in an uncontrolled population of approximately 600 persons 
in the Talladega mill can hardly be accepted as scientific evidence for efficacy of the 
vaccine” (see Appendix 1) (Pittman, 1969a). The CDC challenged the license application 
stating, “There have been no controlled evaluation studies with the Michigan anthrax 
product as was done by Dr. Phillip Brachman” (see Appendix 1) (Kokko, 1969, p. 2). In 
summary, the manufacturer did not submit Dr. Brachman’s study data used to justify the 
vaccine today. Despite the questions over efficacy, the government recommended 
licensure, but provided a caveat, writing, “It was noted also that clinical data establishing 
efficacy of the product had not been submitted.” The recommendation commented that 
the license application appeared complete, “except the results of an adequately controlled 
 
11 The first “epidemic” of inhalational anthrax in the past 150 years occurred in Manchester, New 
Hampshire, while the U.S. Army conducted the original anthrax vaccine clinical trial. Dr. Phillip 
Brachman’s observations at the time found insufficient proof for the efficacy of the vaccine for inhalation 
anthrax (Brachman et al., 1966; Brachman et al., 1962; Brachman & Friedlander, 1994; Brachman & 
Friedlander, 1998). The historic study became central to the later court cases. Based on the IOM report and 
subsequent license in 2006, Brachman, et al., in the 2008 medical textbook Vaccines, cite the proven 
efficacy of the vaccine. In the latest text, Brachman’s chapter on anthrax vaccine states, “There have been 
no controlled clinical trials in humans of the efficacy of the currently licensed U.S. vaccine, although the 
differences between the U.S. licensed vaccine and the PA-based vaccine used in the Brachman et al. study 
are minor from a regulatory perspective” (Brachman, Friedlander, & Grabenstein, 2008, p. 119). 
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clinical investigation that establishes efficacy” (see Appendix 1) (Pittman, 1969a). 
Therefore, the anthrax vaccine apparently received licensure at the time “without 
conclusive evidence of efficacy” (see Appendix 1) (Pittman, 1969b). The National 
Institute of Health (NIH), which regulated biologics (vaccines) prior to the FDA’s 
assumption of these responsibilities in 1972, licensed anthrax vaccine on November 2, 
1970 (FDA, 2005b, p. 75193). Many years went by, and the vaccine’s extremely limited 
use by scientists in military laboratories allowed this first regulatory oversight condition, 
a contributing cause, to go unnoticed. 
DoD awareness of the problems presumably resulted in the 
solicitation for a new anthrax vaccine through a formal procurement request in 1985. The 
proposal stated, “There is an operational requirement to develop a safe and effective 
product which will protect U.S. troops against exposure from virulent strains of Bacillus 
anthracis.” The request explained, “There is no vaccine in current use which will safely 
and effectively protect military personnel against exposure to this hazardous bacterial 
agent” (see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, p. 4). The DoD clarified, “a licensed vaccine 
against anthrax … is currently available for human use.... The vaccine is, however, highly 
reactogenic, requires multiple boosters to maintain immunity and may not be protective 
against all strains of the anthrax bacillus.” The same year the anthrax vaccine issue also 
reemerged on the FDA’s radar in the form of a Proposed Rule in the Federal Register to 
finalize the current vaccine’s license. The Proposed Rule, published on December 13, 
1985, noted the “efficacy against inhalation anthrax is not well documented,” and that 
“the vaccine manufactured by the Michigan Department of Public Health has not been 
employed in a controlled field trial.” The Proposed Rule referenced the U.S. Army’s 
Manchester, New Hampshire 1957 vaccine study by Dr. Brachman, which the FDA 
leverages today to justify licensure of the current anthrax vaccine (FDA, 2005). The 
government’s Advisory Panel that formulated the Proposed Rule stated, “Brachman 
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employed a similar vaccine,” but clarified, “No meaningful assessment of its value 
against inhalation anthrax is possible due to its low incidence”12 (FDA, 1985, p. 51058). 
The Proposed Rule languished without finalization for another 
twenty years, conceivably due to the lack of proper efficacy data. In the ensuing years, 
the DoD continued to highlight the vaccine’s inadequacies. In a 1989 letter to Senator 
John Glenn, the DoD gave the situation report: 
Current vaccines, particularly the anthrax vaccine, do not readily lend 
themselves to use in mass troop immunization. [DoD’s reasons included] 
… higher than desirable rate of reactogenicity, and, in some cases, lack of 
strong enough efficacy against infection by the aerosol route of exposure. 
(United States Senate, 1989, p. 480)13 
In nontechnical language, the vaccine made soldiers sick and did 
not work well enough. The question and answers also clearly explain the understandable 
goal of the DoD to acquire a satisfactory vaccine based on the logistics limitations related 
to antibiotic therapies. 
 
12 The “proposed” rule aspect of the Federal Register entry is omitted from the DoD transcribed 
version on its anthrax vaccine Web site. The fact that the rule was proposed, yet never finalized for 20 more 
years, until December 19, 2005, became the basis for the federal court rulings determining the vaccine 
mandate violated the law. The original 1985 Federal Register “Proposed Rule” is available on request from 
the author: tlrempfe@nps.edu. 
13 Excerpt: Question 14—“The 1986 DoD report on the Biological Defense Program states that as a 
result of the neglect of the program in the 1970s, the U.S. cannot adequately defend itself against 
‘conventional’ biological agents such as anthrax. Do you agree with that assessment? If therapies in the 
form of vaccines and antibiotics are available for treating anthrax, how do you explain DoD’s assessment 
that the U.S. cannot adequately defend its service personnel against anthrax?”  Answer: “The assessment in 
the 1986 report is accurate. Current vaccines, particularly the anthrax vaccine, do not readily lend 
themselves to use in mass troop immunization for a variety of reasons: the requirement in many cases for 
multiple immunizations to accomplish protective immunity, a higher than desirable rate of reactogenicity, 
and, in some cases, lack of strong enough efficacy against infection by the aerosol route of exposure. 
Antibiotics could not be delivered fast enough to mass treatment in the event of a BW attack with anthrax. 
Such an attack, most likely in the form of an aerosol, would cause pulmonary anthrax, which is difficult to 
diagnose and has an extremely rapid time course leading to death. Current efforts in vaccine development 
are directed to addressing the deficiencies in existing vaccines outlined above.” 
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(2) Core Years of Contributory Causes (1990s to 2001).  U.S. 
Army physicians at the time acknowledged the vaccine as a “limited use vaccine ... 
unlicensed experimental vaccine” (Takafuji & Russell, p. 156).14 These revelations, just 
prior to the first Persian Gulf War, reflect incongruously with the subsequent 1990 use of 
the vaccine by the DoD as fully licensed. Additionally, the anthrax vaccine producer at 
the time, MDPH, reengineered its production capabilities in the early 1990 time frame to 
provide anthrax for the conflict in the Middle East. DoD officials were involved to some 
extent with changes to the vaccine manufacturing process. Changes occurred to the 
filtration and fermentation systems, as well as the sterilization procedures and chill tanks. 
The manufacturer or the DoD notified the FDA about some of these changes after the 
fact. The FDA was unaware of several alterations until congressional and GAO inquiries 
brought the lack of approvals to the FDA’s attention in 2000 (GAO, 2001b). DoD 
involvement in the manufacturing changes to an unknown degree is apparent from a 
review of declassified Medical Plans and Operations Division (MPOD) chronology 
documents. Segments of the record reveal the DoD referenced a “need for an additional 
fermentor,” which DoD officials documented had ultimately been “installed” (DoD, 
1996, items 47, 52). FDA officials discovered changes to fermentors based on the 
manufacturer’s forthrightness. FDA records show the company was reminded that the 
alterations constituted “a major change and should be submitted in the form of an 
Establishment License Amendment which should include validation data” (Devine, 
1990). Later mid-1990 fermentor alterations failed to garner approval until 1999. 
Specifically, the GAO recording of the regulatory missteps reveal that the pre-Gulf War 
early 1990s filter changes were never reported until the GAO brought them to FDA’s 
attention. The FDA approved those changes in July 2001 (GAO, 2001b, pp. 4, 5, nn. 8–
10). 
After the first Persian Gulf conflict, due to concerns over Gulf War 
illness, the FDA initiated a series of inspections of the anthrax vaccine manufacturer in 
Michigan. The FDA inspections resulted in findings of “significant deviations” from 
 
14 The authors, Colonel Takafuji and Russell, worked for the Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon 
General. 
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current good manufacturing practices (cGMP’s) (FDA, 1997; FDA, 1998). During this 
time frame, ownership of the anthrax vaccine manufacturing facility transferred from the 
state of Michigan to a private company known as Michigan Biologic Products Institute 
(MBPI), and later to BioPort Corporation. BioPort later rebranded itself as Emergent 
BioSolutions. Transfers of ownership did not halt FDA oversight. The FDA transmitted a 
letter of concern on December 22, 1993, followed by a warning letter dated August 31, 
1995. Warning letters as FDA enforcement actions “are issued only for violations of 
regulatory significance.” Ultimately, the FDA filed a Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR) 
the manufacturer’s license on March 11, 1997 (FDA, 1997). The notice led to inspections 
in 1998 and 1999 finding the manufacturing process:  “not validated” (see Appendix 6) 
(FDA, 1998). The FDA “Inspectional Observations” specifically noted on line 1 that the 
“manufacturing process for anthrax vaccine is not validated.” 
Legislative inquiry also ensued. Citing February 1994 testimony 
by Army Surgeon General Ronald Blanck, the Senate Veteran Affairs Committee 
determined a possible link between the anthrax vaccine and the maladies associated with 
Gulf War illness. The Surgeon General’s testimony conceded, “Anthrax vaccine should 
continue to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf 
military personnel” (United States Senate, 1994, p. 35, n. 143). The Committee 
concluded, “The vaccine’s effectiveness against inhaled anthrax is unknown.” The Senate 
staff report described anthrax as a “biological weapon,” assessing “it is likely to be 
aerosolized and thus inhaled. Therefore, the efficacy of the vaccine against biological 
warfare is unknown.” The Committee determined, “The vaccine should therefore be 
considered investigational when used as a protection against biological warfare” (United 
States Senate, 1994, p. 15). Fort Detrick scientists also critically evaluated the vaccine in 
a 1999 version of the medical text Vaccines, writing, “The current vaccine against 
anthrax is unsatisfactory for several reasons.” The scientists documented that the “degree 
of purity is unknown.” They detailed the potency problems and noted that the “undefined 
nature of the vaccine and the presence of constituents that may be undesirable may 
account for the level of reactogenicity observed.” Finally, the scientists found that “there 
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is also evidence in experimental animals that the vaccine may be less effective against 
some strains of anthrax” (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994, p. 737). 
During this time, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the DoD 
appeared to assess the anthrax vaccine’s limitations in a methodical and scientifically 
forthright manner, precluding the later conditions leading to the problematic events. A 
high point in the methodical, process-oriented approach occurred in the 1996 time frame 
when questions about the vaccine led to a critical internal DoD acquisitions review when 
weighing the issues of efficacy, safety, legality, and product reliability (Graham, 1996).15 
Ultimately, a study contracted to Scientific Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC) pursued a plan to obtain proper FDA approval for the anthrax vaccine for 
inhalation anthrax expected from aerosolized exposure in wartime. SAIC’s conclusions 
stated, “This vaccine is not licensed for aerosol exposure expected in a biological warfare 
environment” (Johnson-Winegar, 1995). The DoD office seeking the review, the JPOBD, 
acknowledged the nature of the meeting in formally transcribed meeting minutes later 
obtained via congressional subpoena. The minutes detailed that a “meeting was held on 
20 Oct 1995 to discuss the process for modifying the MDPH anthrax vaccine license to 
… expand the indication to include protection against aerosol challenge of spores.” In 
discussing the previous clinical trials, the Defense Department working group 
 
15 The background on the military debate over biodefense doctrine included an article from the 
Washington Post titled “Military Chiefs Back Anthrax Inoculations, Initiative Would Affect All of Nation’s 
Forces.” Internal DoD debate in the 1996 time frame over how to protect troops revealed the doctrinal 
debate and departures represented by mandatory force-wide inoculations. 
Excerpts: “Reversing earlier opposition, the nation’s military chiefs have endorsed a plan to vaccinate 
all U.S. forces against anthrax.” … “The about-face by senior commanders removes the principal obstacle 
to the plan and reflects heightened Pentagon concern about the prospect of biological attack.” … “Military 
leaders initially were dubious about the need for the anthrax vaccine.” … “In addition, some commanders 
thought that the United States could deter an enemy from launching an anthrax attack simply by threatening 
massive retaliation—an approach that worked in the Persian Gulf War.” … “But some senior civilian 
Defense Department officials, who ardently support the vaccination plan, ultimately convinced the military 
leaders.” … “ ‘The whole area of biological warfare was one not very familiar to the chiefs,’ a senior 
defense official said” … “It’s been a gradual process for the military to recognize the seriousness of the 
threat and understand the kind of protection that vaccination provides.” … “Military leaders also raised 
questions about safety of the anthrax vaccine given speculation that some of the ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ 
maladies suffered by U.S. troops may have been caused by one or a combination of several vaccines 
administered.” … “Senior defense officials, eager to institute a broad vaccination program, departed from 
normal departmental practice this spring and organized two meetings that included vice chiefs of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and civilian experts” … “The meetings were unusual in that we were 
starting at the top instead of trying to staff an issue, from the bottom up” (Graham, 1996). 
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acknowledged, “there was insufficient data to demonstrate protection against inhalation 
disease” (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 1995). 
Ultimately, a complicated internal process promulgated an 
Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the FDA by the manufacturer in 1996. 
The DoD’s USAMRIID held responsibility for the clinical trial to test for new indications 
based on an indication for “inhalation anthrax,” as well as a change in route of 
administration and the schedule of dosage. A federal court later noted that the application 
stated, “The ultimate purpose of this IND is to obtain a specific indication for inhalation 
anthrax and a reduced vaccination schedule” (see Appendix 4) (Myers, 1996; Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 25). Updated applications were filed after the DoD announced its 
mandatory program (see Appendix 5) (DoD, 1999b). DoD meeting minutes confirmed 
the awareness of the need for FDA approval for the vaccine’s use for inhalation anthrax 
prior to commencement of any large-scale vaccinations (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 
1995). 
The official record also uncovered a less methodical, more 
expedient, parallel, informal political appeal directly to the FDA by the DoD outside the 
realms of formal regulatory processes. A letter to the FDA Commissioner documented 
the DoD goal. The letter stated, “We wish to obtain an indication for protection against 
inhalation anthrax.” The letter added, “DoD has long interpreted the scope of the license 
to include inhalation exposure, including that which would occur in a biological warfare 
context” (Joseph, 1997). Subsequent responsive letters by the FDA acquiesced to the 
personal communications and circumvented the ongoing regulatory process. The FDA 
informal response stated, “While there is a paucity of data regarding the effectiveness of 
Anthrax Vaccine for prevention of inhalation anthrax, the current package insert does not 
preclude this use” (Friedman, 1997). Courts later captured the “does not preclude”16 
double negative nature of the terminology in affirming that the anthrax vaccine lacked 
approval for such a purpose at the time (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 24). The CDC also 
 
16 Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2003). “The apparent change in position from the 
December 1985 proposed rule and the use of a double negative (i.e. “it is not inconsistent”), fail to persuade 
this Court that the view expressed in the 1997 letter is the FDA’s formal opinion,” Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, 
p. 24. 
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weighed in through an Advisory Committee in public comments, confirming, “We do not 
have specific information on the efficacy of the existing vaccine for the prevention of 
inhalational anthrax and we probably never will”17 (Bussey, 2000). To the outside 
observer, including the court, political attempts to shortcut the regulatory processes 
epitomized the contributory events during this time frame. 
A Defense Secretary–mandated “independent” expert review also 
revealed apparently more politically than scientifically oriented efforts to make the 
vaccine program appear properly approved. The DoD utilized review recommendations 
by Dr. Gerard Burrow of Yale University. Dr. Burrow determined, “The anthrax vaccine 
appears to be safe and offers the best available protection against wild-type anthrax as a 
biological warfare agent” (Burrow, 1998). Later, the expert placed his recommendations 
in perspective when asked to testify about the program and his review. In a letter to 
Congress, Dr. Burrow explained, “I was very clear that I had no expertise in Anthrax and 
they were very clear they were looking for a general oversight of the vaccination 
program.” Dr. Burrow clarified in telephone interviews for congressional investigators 
that “he has little experience with vaccines,” and his “charge” included a “general 
review” aimed at “communication strategies” (HR 106-556, 2000, pp. 17–18). The 
information campaign paralleled the political approval efforts, versus a regulatory 
compliant scientific review. 
Simultaneously, the actual risks for the recipients of the vaccine, 
and the corresponding lack of legal responsibility for the manufacturer, resulted in a DoD 
indemnification to protect from liability associated with mass inoculations of the troops. 
Indemnification documents revealed the language omitted from the public 
communications such as, “The obligation assumed by MBPI under this contract involves 
unusually hazardous risks associated with the potential for adverse reactions in some 
recipients and the possibility that the desired immunological effect will not be obtained 
 
17 Quote by Dr. David Ashford, co-author of a December 2000 CDC Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices regarding use of the anthrax vaccine. The report was referenced by the Centers for 
Disease Control: Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the United States, Recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (CDC, 2000). 
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by all recipients” (see Appendix 7) (Caldera, 1998).18 In other words, the behind-the-
scenes legal cover provided to the manufacturer defied the public messages of safety and 
efficacy. The ultimately successful efforts at political circumvention of the normal 
regulatory and legal processes marked a turning point where the DoD’s “continuous 
involvement” set in motion a slippery slope of contributing causes which would 
ultimately lead to violations of the law. 
Aside from the informal memo from the FDA employee, the FDA 
actually stood firm in 1998, not joining the DoD contributing cause actions. The DoD’s 
new message to the troops of proven vaccine safety and efficacy contrasted with the 
FDA’s regulatory oversight. The FDA repeatedly found in 1998 and 1999 that “the 
manufacturing process for the production of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed is not validated” 
(see Appendix 6) (FDA, 1998, p. 1, ln. 1). The lack of validation for the manufacturer led 
to the suspension of the anthrax vaccine program. The FDA investigations also revealed 
potency problems related to the vaccine that Dr. Ivins attempted to solve but apparently 
did not until after the letter attacks (FBI, 2008; FDA, 1997; GAO, 2001b; Little, 1998; 
USAMRMC, 2003; Vander Linden, 2003, p. 12). Congressional investigators also 
obtained documents through congressional subpoenas that showed the DoD knew as 
early as May 1998 that vaccine potency testing was “all over the board.” Documents 
confirmed that DoD officials and the manufacturer suspended testing to preclude 
reporting these results to the FDA (see Appendix 8) (Little, 1998). The DoD originally 
made successful supplemental testing of the vaccine a prerequisite for launching 
mandatory mass immunizations (MILVAX, 2005).19  Based on the problems with the 
supplemental testing, one DoD official wrote: 
 
18 The DoD Indemnification history for anthrax vaccine is also available in Congressional Report 106-
556 (HR, 2000, p. 13). 
19 “On December 15, 1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen announced a plan to immunize military 
personnel against anthrax, contingent on four conditions: (1) supplemental testing of vaccine lots in the 
stockpile to assure potency, purity, sterility, and safety, consistent with Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) standards; (2) approval of the Services’ implementation plans for execution and communication; (3) 
implementation of a system for fully tracking anthrax vaccinations; and (4) review of the health and 
medical aspects of the program by an independent expert (former dean of medicine of Yale University and 
member of the prestigious National Academy of Sciences)” (MILVAX, 2005, p. 3). 
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I’m not prepared to defend going forward with the SECDEF’s plan if I 
can’t be reasonably sure there will be vaccine available to continue any 
force immunization. … I will forward a recommendation through BG 
Doesburg to the SECDEF to either delay the immunization of the force or 
recommend that the action be terminated because of confidence that the 
manufacturer will be able to meet vaccine dose requirements is in question 
(DoD-JPOBD, 1999). 
Ultimately, a report by the congressional House of Representatives 
Government Reform Committee published on the anthrax vaccine, titled “Unproven 
Force Protection,” determined that the DoD program violated FDA regulations due to the 
vaccine’s “investigational” status. The report recommended, “While an improved vaccine 
is being developed, use of the current anthrax vaccine for force protection against 
biological warfare should be considered experimental and undertaken only pursuant to 
FDA regulations governing investigational testing for a new indication” (HR 106-556, 
2000, p. 4).20 Congressional investigations also revealed DoD awareness that the 
“potency test required for the present vaccine has not been well correlated to efficacy in 
humans and it is doubtful that it can be” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 62. fn. 269). GAO reports 
also confirmed that the “long-term safety of the vaccine has not yet been studied;” the 
“vaccine and the manufacturing process were changed;” the “ingredients used to make 
vaccine were changed from the original vaccine,” and “prior to the time of licensing, no 
human efficacy testing of the MDPH vaccine was performed” (GAO, 1999a, p. 1–3). As 
discussed previously, all these problems led to the “failing” status of the DoD 
immunization program and motivated the U.S. Army anthrax vaccine scientist to commit 
the anthrax letter attacks later in 2001. In this case, the positive contributing cause of 
FDA, congressional and GAO oversight effectively led to the direct cause of the attacks. 
Adding to the pressure on those implementing the anthrax vaccine 
program, the political leadership of presidential candidates at the time mirrored the 
congressional oversight. Presidential candidate George W. Bush stated, “I don’t feel the 
administration’s anthrax immunization program has taken into account the effect of this 
 
20 Excerpts from the “Findings in Brief” stated, “Efficacy of the vaccine against biological warfare is 
uncertain. The vaccine was approved for protection against cutaneous (under the skin) infection in an 
occupational setting, not for use as mass protection against weaponized, aerosolized anthrax” (HR 106-556, 
2000, p. 4). 
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program on the soldiers in our military and their families … Under my administration, 
soldiers and their families will be taken into consideration” (U.S. Medicine, 2000; Katz, 
2001, p. 1855, fn. 133). Candidate Senator John McCain also weighed in saying, “I think 
that there should be a pause. I think that they have not done the job in educating the 
members of the military, and I would pause and I would get the best scientific and 
medical people together and make a better argument than they’ve made” (Marelius, 
2000). Al Gore joined the call, explaining, “Based on the concerns I have heard, from 
military personnel directly, I think we are justified in taking a closer look—I think that 
some increased sensitivity to the kinds of questions that are being raised is needed” 
(Sobieraj, 2000). Beyond the political candidates, additional inquiries from Democratic 
leaders Senator Tom Daschle and Representative Dick Gephardt expressed their “interest 
in and concern about reports regarding the Pentagon’s continued use of an anthrax 
vaccine.” The Democratic leaders wrote Rumsfeld on June 21, 2001 questioning the 
“safety and effectiveness of the anthrax vaccination” and queried the Defense Secretary 
about the “punishments already meted out” (Daschle & Gephardt, 2001). 
Even state involvement resulted in the Connecticut Attorney 
General, Richard Blumenthal, investigating the program. The state’s top lawmaker sent 
inquiries in 2001 to the DoD and the FDA recommending that the federal government 
“cease and desist” its illegal administration of the anthrax vaccine immunization 
program. The Attorney General frankly stated, “In effect, the military is forcing its 
personnel to serve as human guinea pigs for an unlicensed drug that has not been proven 
to be safe or effective.” He captured the fact that previously the DoD actually concurred 
at one time about the experimental nature of the vaccine. He therefore questioned why: 
Suddenly in 1997, DoD and the FDA, with no change in the facts or the 
law, reversed themselves and with the stroke of a pen wiped out the 
protections afforded our members of the Armed Services by clearing the 
way for DoD’s mandatory mass inoculations (Blumenthal, 2001). 
The state Attorney General called upon the DoD and the FDA to 
“cease and desist from their illegal conduct and to abandon plans for Anthrax Vaccine 
inoculation of the Armed Forces.” He specifically commented on the informal memo by 
the FDA, which he claimed, “Wiped out ten years of DoD analysis and 25 years of FDA 
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law designed to protect the safety and well being of the citizens of the United States.” 
The Attorney General asserted that, “Mandatory vaccination of troops with a biologic 
product not licensed for its current use violates the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
and 10 U.S.C. § 1107” (Blumenthal, 2001). Years later, federal courts echoed these very 
arguments in the injunctions against the vaccine program (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003; Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). The Attorney General later provided an amicus 
curiae (friend of the court) brief opposing the DoD’s attempt to vacate the original federal 
court injunctive decisions. In the end, a federal appeals court declined to vacate or 
overturn the lower court rulings (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). 
Top government advisors also reacted to the questions and 
concerns. Based on research materials delivered to the White House on March 22, 2001, 
pertaining to Gulf War illness, presidential Senior Advisor Karl Rove tasked DoD 
Undersecretaries of Defense (USD) Dr. David Chu and Edward Aldridge to review the 
“political problems” associated with the anthrax vaccine and Gulf War illness (see 
Appendix 9) (Rove, 2001).21 Veteran’s advocate H. Ross Perot energized Rove, and the 
undersecretaries promptly studied the controversy and presented recommendations to 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on August 10, 2001. The undersecretaries 
recommended an effective halt to the anthrax vaccine program. Highlights of the 
undersecretaries’ recommendations included continuing the program only “at a minimum 
level.” They advocated implementing “an acquisition strategy to purchase additional bio-
detectors and stockpiles of antibiotics to augment force protection in the absence of an 
anthrax vaccine.” They suggested that the Defense Secretary develop a “coherent 
institutional process to assess and prioritize biological threats and approve the use of 
associated countermeasures.” Finally, they recommended the development of a “national 
long-range vaccine that will address the full range of requirements of the DoD, DHHS, 
and other stakeholders” (see Appendix 10) (Chu & Aldridge, 2001).22 
 
21 Reported in the New York Daily News in an article titled “Anthrax mailer feared his life’s work was 
doomed, prosecutors say.” The article references presidential Senior Advisor Karl Rove’s memo to Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (Meek, 2008). 
22 Reported in the Washington Post in an article titled “Demand Growing for Anthrax Vaccine, Fear 
of Bioterrorism Attack Spurs Requests for Controversial Shot.” The article references the Chu and Aldridge 
memo to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (R. Weiss, 2001). 
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The chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), General Henry H. 
Shelton, responded to the Defense Secretary review on August 30, 2001. General Shelton 
reaffirmed that “Service and combatant commanders are unanimous in their continued 
support for the military requirement to vaccinate our forces against anthrax, and view the 
vaccine as the centerpiece of our defense against the most likely biological threat agent” 
(Shelton, 2001).23 Placing General Shelton’s appeal in perspective, at the time the DoD 
anthrax vaccine immunization program had exhausted FDA-approved vaccine due to 
potency testing problems. The DoD “centerpiece” program was “failing” according to the 
FBI, using a vaccine from a manufacturer invalidated by the FDA since 1998. In line 
with General Shelton’s disagreement with the internal DoD undersecretaries’ 
conclusions, DoD officials had previously similarly rebuffed congressional cautions and 
conclusions. Regarding the congressional report that previously found the program in 
violation of FDA regulations, and the vaccine’s use experimental, DoD officials appeared 
to consistently express their disagreement and disappointment with conclusions that 
challenged the anthrax vaccine policy (Quigley, Bailey & West, 2000). 
Clearly, the months preceding the anthrax letter attacks in 2001 
marked high stakes. The DoD immunization program had exhausted its supply of 
approved vaccine based on FDA license revocation warnings and unwillingness to 
validate the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process (FDA, 1997; FDA, 1998). Top 
administration officials recognized anthrax vaccine and Gulf War illness as “political 
problems” (Rove, 2001) and essentially recommended courses of action similar to the 
positions that earlier DoD leadership, and DoD’s historic documents, had held prior to 
1998. Those civilian leaders, and their recommendations, recognized and methodically 
dealt with the problems associated with the anthrax vaccine forthrightly prior to the 2001 
letter attack emergency events. After the emergency occurrence, the earlier systematic 
civilian oversight apparently gave way to the policy inertia created by the attacks and 
instead facilitated more problematic events. 
 
 
23 Reported in the Washington Post in an article titled “Demand Growing for Anthrax Vaccine, Fear 
of Bioterrorism Attack Spurs Requests for Controversial Shot.” The article references Shelton’s memo to 
Rumsfeld, prepared by LTG John P. Abizaid, Director J-5 (Weiss, 2001). 
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(3) Post Emergency Occurrence Events (2001 to Present). The 
FDA invalidation of the anthrax vaccine manufacturer quickly reversed, and the resulting 
program “slowdowns” ceased, after the anthrax letter attacks. The FDA expedited 
approval of the manufacturing process (MILVAX, 2005, pp. 3–4). Prior to the attacks the 
DoD “involvement,” the identified root cause in this analysis, contrasted with FDA and 
congressional oversight. Both FDA and congressional oversight effectively served as 
contributing causes to the emergency occurrence of the later anthrax letter attacks. After 
the attacks, though, the FDA’s causal contribution transformed from one that helped 
contribute to the first problematic event of the attacks based on haphazard oversight to 
one that contributed to the resultant problematic events. Examples of the resultant 
problematic events include the vaccine’s expedited approvals, expanded procurement for 
the SNS, and diminished oversight by the FDA. While seeds of the FDA’s transformation 
began with the Friedman memo in 1997 to the DoD (Friedman, 1997), the agency fully 
adopted, and even championed, the DoD’s position from a regulatory perspective after 
the anthrax letter attack emergency occurrence. 
The GAO also concluded key investigations pertaining to the 
unapproved alterations of the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process during this pivotal 
time frame. A 2001 report by GAO confirmed, “DoD found up to a hundredfold increase 
in the protective antigen [potency] levels in lots produced after the filter change that 
year.” The GAO also reported on a 1994 medical journal article, which “hypothesized 
that the filter change altered the composition of the vaccine by increasing the level of 
protective antigen in the finished product.” GAO found that DoD scientists attributed the 
increases to the “change in the filter” (GAO, 2001b, p. 5). Dr. Ivins, the presumed 
anthrax murderer, authored the 1994 article (GAO, 2001b, p. 5, fn. 12).24 The GAO also 
confirmed that “any changes to the manufacturing [process] that have the potential to 
affect the safety, purity, or potency of a biologic must be submitted and approved … 
prior to implementation” (GAO, 2001b, p. 4, fn. 9). The GAO found that the “FDA 
reviewed and accepted the data and approved the filter changes in July 2001.” Awareness 
 
24 The GAO report cited Dr. B.E. Ivens [sic] and referenced the Ivins et al. article titled, “Efficacy of a 
Standard Human Anthrax Vaccine Against Bacillus anthracis Spore Challenge in Guinea Pigs,” published 
in Vaccines (Ivins, Fellows, & Nelson, 1994, pp. 872–74). 
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of the manufacturing alterations occurred only after the GAO reported them to the FDA 
(GAO, 2001b, p. 4).25 The DoD acknowledged the advanced requirement for such 
approvals (DoD, 2009c, p. 46),26 though according to the GAO report, none occurred for 
over ten years after the original manufacturing alterations. The lapses could have 
rendered the vaccine “adulterated” during the interim time frame in accordance with 
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act requirements pertaining to potency, manufacturing 
changes, and noncompliance with current good manufacturing practices (21 U.S.C. §351, 
1997). The GAO report also alluded to the timing of the manufacturing changes 
potentially impacting veterans’ health stating, “Published and unpublished data on 
anthrax vaccine use during the Gulf War and since 1998 show a significantly greater 
incidence of … adverse reactions” (GAO, 2001b, p. 6). Over the years, each of 16 
follow-on GAO reports assessed critical findings, adding credence to the contributing 
causes of vaccine safety concerns, potency problems, and unapproved manufacturing 
alterations by the DoD. 
After the anthrax letter attacks by the scientist involved with many 
of these anomalies, the root, contributing, and direct causes resulted in the problematic 
events. The anthrax letter attacks silenced high-level government inquiry by the fall of 
2001, despite the fact that the government quickly determined that the anthrax attacks 
 
25 “Because we could find no evidence in BioPort or FDA records that the filter changes had been 
reported to FDA, we contacted FDA officials in December 2000 to discuss the filter changes. They told us 
that they had not been notified and were not aware of changes to any filters used to produce anthrax 
vaccine. In February 2001, FDA wrote to BioPort, raising questions about the changes to the filters. In 
April 2001, BioPort submitted documentation, primarily in-process tests and lot release data, to FDA to 
demonstrate that the filter changes had not had a significant impact on vaccine quality. FDA reviewed and 
accepted the data and approved the filter changes in July 2001” (GAO, 2001b, p. 4). 
26 The DoD’s acknowledgment of licensing amendments for major manufacturing changes stated:  
“Emergent BioSolutions ceased manufacturing to renovate its vaccine production facility in February 1998. 
When the manufacturing process or equipment in a renovated facility or establishment differs materially, 
from that in the former facility or establishment (CFR 21.314.70), a Biologics License Application (BLA) 
Supplement must be submitted for Agency approval before production can be resumed. Emergent 
BioSolutions’ BLA Supplement consisted of many parts. Included in the BLA supplement were data 
validating an updated potency test, process validation test results, and information concerning the 
qualification and testing of three fermentation systems, raw material quality and acceptance criteria and 
updated procedures for operating the new facility” (DoD, 2009c, p. 46). 
 57
                                                
originated from “domestic” sources.27 No apparent investigation of the reason why the 
product was “failing” occurred. Instead, the government rapidly approved anthrax 
vaccine in response to the manufactured emergency occurrence. The GAO also 
documented the IOM and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) joining as 
contributing cause actors as well. According to the GAO, initially the IOM reviewed 
anthrax vaccine potency and efficacy writing, “The licensed anthrax vaccine has several 
additional disadvantages.” The IOM explained to the GAO that the “amount of protective 
antigen in the vaccine varies from lot to lot, because the manufacturing process cannot 
precisely quantify the antigen” (GAO-NSIAD, 1999c, p. 10). The IOM added, “There is 
some evidence that the current anthrax vaccine may have diminished efficacy against 
certain virulent strains of anthrax” GAO, 2006, p. 16). At first glance, it appears that the 
IOM’s DoD sponsored report in 2002 endorsed the safety and efficacy. Yet, the truth in 
the fine print actually stated, “Despite recent FDA approval of the license … relying on 
AVA and the current specifications for its use is far from satisfactory. There is a need for 
research toward the development of a different and better anthrax vaccine” (IOM, 2002, 
p. 15). The earlier March 2000 IOM findings, inserted in the final appendix of the 2002 
IOM report, also included the statement, “There is a paucity of published peer-reviewed 
literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine.” Though the IOM explicitly avoided 
judging the propriety of past FDA regulatory approval processes, the record also shows 
the IOM studies’ primary author, Dr. Lois Joellenbeck, indeed had previously inquired of 
the DHHS and FDA about the anthrax vaccine manufacturing changes. Dr. Joellenbeck 
received a reply one year prior to publication of the IOM report referencing the 
manufacturer’s requirement to report the filter changes. Dr. Ivins described the filtration 
changes in a 1994 journal article (Ivins et al., 1994). The GAO reported Dr. Ivins’s article 
and the unapproved manufacturing alterations in a report shortly after the letter attacks 
(GAO, 2001b). In contrast, the IOM’s reticence to explore the filter changes may lie with 
the FDA’s assertion that it was unaware of evidence showing a detrimental effect on the 
 
27 During a White House press briefing a reporter asked if the U.S. Army laboratories at Fort Detrick 
were the source, and Ari Fleischer responded, “All indications are that the source of the anthrax is 
domestic. And I can’t give you any more specific information than that. That’s part of what the FBI is 
actively reviewing. And I just can’t go beyond that” (Fleischer, 2002). 
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vaccine. Regardless, both the GAO analysis and FDA requirements confirmed that any 
such changes require approval prior to implementation and only after proving the absence 
of deleterious impact (GAO, 2001b, p. 4, fn. 8–9).28 
Overall, the IOM’s causal contributions to the problematic event of 
oversight breakdowns appear as either inept or willfully blind. No logical explanation 
exists to clarify why the IOM failed to investigate the central issue of manufacturing 
changes. If the IOM had analyzed the regulatory and medical implication of the 
manufacturing changes, the report could have potentially revealed “show stoppers” for 
the anthrax vaccine program. Though the IOM and NAS possess no statutory authority in 
the regulatory realm, the FDA ultimately leveraged IOM’s report to justify licensure. In 
turn, the courts accepted the IOM analysis. Dr. Brachman even used the report to imply 
substantiation of the vaccine’s efficacy against inhalation anthrax for his own study. In 
comparison, the DoD’s participation in the manufacturing changes and its scientists’ 
studies suggesting significant potency changes, as well as the manufacturer’s overt failure 
to comply with FDA rules, traverse into the regulatory noncompliance realm, one both 
the FDA and the IOM ultimately used, or potentially abused, their discretion to not 
pursue. 
Beyond political inquiries, internal reviews and government 
reports, a parallel path of judicial review from the courts commenced after the 2001 letter 
attacks, based on mounting concern over the contributing causes. Citizens filed a formal 
petition highlighting the manufacturing changes and investigational status of the vaccine 
in accordance with the requirements of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (Dingle et al., 
2001).29 The petition later served as a cited foundation and basis for the preliminary 
 
28 “When implementing changes in manufacturing, the manufacturer is required to submit evidence, 
using available technology appropriate to the product, that provides assurance that the change does not 
adversely effect the identity, strength, quality, purity, and potency of the product (21 CFR § 601.12). The 
specific evidence required is determined by the FDA review team assigned to evaluate this change. In the 
case of a filter change, FDA would have required the manufacturer to show by available and appropriate 
technology, that AVA [anthrax vaccine adsorbed] manufactured using a new filter was comparable to the 
AVA using the previously approved filter” (Clifford, 2001, p. 1). 
29 FDA citizen petitions are authorized under 21 U.S.C. § 10.30, and the referenced petition was filed 
as Docket # 01P-0471 (Dingle et al., 2001) on the same day that the anthrax vaccine manufacturer filed its 
request for expedited approval of its manufacturing process. 
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injunction by the D.C. federal district court in December 2003. That injunction 
temporarily halted the program (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 7). The court deemed the 
anthrax vaccine “an investigational drug and a drug being used for an unapproved 
purpose. As a result of this status, the DoD is in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 1107, Executive 
Order 13139, and DoD Directive 6200.2” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 32). The court cited 
the “Citizen Petition,” confirming that the proposed rule for the anthrax vaccine license in 
the “Federal Register has never been finalized” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 4). In the 
opinion, the judge addressed the DoD’s political maneuvering, finding the “personal 
opinions of FDA officials as expressed in a series of letters are not entitled to any 
particular deference” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 24). Instead, the court upheld the notion 
that “the right to bodily integrity and the importance of complying with legal 
requirements … are among the highest public policy concerns one could articulate” (Doe 
v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 30). The judge concluded, “The women and men of our armed 
forces put their lives on the line every day to preserve and safeguard the freedoms that all 
Americans cherish and enjoy” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 33). The judge addressed the 
DoD’s contention that the vaccine was properly licensed opining, “the documents 
submitted to this Court under seal suggest otherwise.” The judge added that the 
“statements made by DoD officials suggest that the agency itself has, at some point at 
least, considered AVA [anthrax vaccine] experimental with respect to inhalation 
anthrax.” The ruling held, “The Court would be remiss to conclude that the original 
license included inhalation anthrax.” The court concluded, “The DoD’s administration of 
the inoculation without consent of those vaccinated amounts to arbitrary action” (Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004, pp. 28–29). The court essentially addressed the root and contributing 
causal conditions leading up to the core problematic event, the emergency occurrence of 
the anthrax letter attacks. 
After the letter attacks, the conditions created by the crime 
produced an imperative for anthrax vaccine. The FDA initially made the vaccine 
available, only to be halted by the aforementioned judicial review in late 2003. At that 
point, the FDA hurriedly filed a “final rule” for anthrax vaccine one week after the court 
injunction. The court, unwilling to join as a contributing cause to the problematic 
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oversight events, reviewed the new license and ordered a permanent injunction in 
October 2004 on summary judgment.30 The court again affirmed the anthrax vaccine as 
“an investigational drug being used for an unapproved purpose,” and that the 
“involuntary anthrax vaccination program, as applied to all persons, is rendered illegal 
absent informed consent or a Presidential waiver (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, pp. 12, 40). 
The court clarified the proper procedures for the FDA and the DoD for ordering the 
troops to submit to experimental inoculations: 
If the Executive branch determines that this is truly an exigent situation, 
then obtaining a presidential waiver would be an expeditious end to this 
controversy. ... Absent an informed consent or presidential waiver, the 
United States cannot demand that members of the armed forces also serve 
as guinea pigs for experimental drugs (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, pp. 31, 33). 
In response to the ruling, the FDA continued the causal event chain 
by licensing the vaccine again two years later, in December 2005, after following the 
court-directed rule-making procedures. The new FDA licensure in the Federal Register 
referenced the potency questions and multiple efficacy studies by Dr. Ivins, the direct 
cause of and the actor who had committed the emergency occurrence letter attacks (FDA, 
2005b, p. 75183). Ultimately, the DoD and the FDA, through an appeal spearheaded by 
the DOJ, moved the court to vacate or overturn the 2003 and 2004 injunctions. Where the 
DOJ appeared to exonerate the causal contributions by the DoD and FDA, the federal 
appeals court declined to do so, instead mooting the case in 2006 based on the FDA’s 
licensing.31 By 2007 the courts affirmed that the anthrax vaccine immunization program 
was “not substantially justified” prior to the FDA licensure and requisite rule making 
(Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). The Court ultimately granted “prevailing party” status for the 
 
30 “Summary judgment” means “there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 16). 
31 See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 127 Federal Appendix 327 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cited in 538 F. Supp. 2d 200 
(D.D.C. 2008) (Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force Bd., 2008, p. 8). 
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plaintiffs against defendants DoD and FDA.32 As recently as 2008, another federal court 
upheld the prior court ruling in an opinion regarding correction of records. The court 
affirmed the “undisturbed factual and legal findings” of the previous ruling and clarified 
that: 
Prior to the FDA’s December 2005 rulemaking, it was a violation of 
federal law for military personnel to be subjected to involuntary AVA 
[anthrax vaccine] inoculation because the vaccine was neither the subject 
of a presidential waiver nor licensed for use against inhalation anthrax. 
(Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force Bd., 2008, pp. 18–19) 
Despite the action by the courts and the revelations by the FBI, the 
“controversial” (CRS, 2007) anthrax vaccine and the mandatory DoD program appear to 
survive as vigilantly as anthrax spores themselves. While Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
acknowledged, “Things have not been going swimmingly,” he also expressed the DoD 
intention that they were “going to try and save it”33 (DoD, 2001). The creation of “a 
scenario where people all of a sudden realize the need to have this vaccine” (see 
Appendix 11) (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15) succeeded beyond all expectations based on the 
revival of the DoD anthrax program and SNS procurement. 
 
32 The ultimate status of the Doe v. Rumsfeld litigation cost the U.S. taxpayers considerable sums of 
money when the attorneys were reimbursed for their professional contributions and successful litigation as 
the “prevailing party” based on the Administrative Procedures Act and the Equal Access for Justice Act. 
The court’s conclusion determined: “The Court concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs for 
litigating this action, including on appeal, because plaintiffs are the prevailing party and the government’s 
position was not substantially justified” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). 
33 DefenseLink News transcript excerpt of a DoD News briefing by Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. 
Myers, answering questions about the status of the anthrax vaccine:  
Q: “Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you can give us an update on the Pentagon’s anthrax vaccine program? 
The sole manufacturer in Michigan hasn’t produced vaccine for quite some time, and it could be months 
before they can start producing again. You have a minimal amount of vaccine, and you’re only doing a 
certain number of troops, small numbers of troops. And finally, last week there was a petition sent to FDA 
by military officers, and others, calling for them to pull the license and destroy the stockpiles of the 
vaccine. Can this program be saved, do you think, or are you going to look at alternatives to the vaccine?” 
A: (Sec. Rumsfeld) “We’re going to try and save it. There have been other efforts that have failed over 
a period of years. And it may or may not be savable, but I met this morning with Pete Aldridge and David 
Chu, and we discussed this at some length. And they or their representatives are going to be meeting with 
people from HHS and Secretary Thompson’s office and try to fashion some sort of an arrangement 
whereby we give one more crack at getting the job done with that outfit. It’s the only outfit that—in this 
country that has anything underway, and it’s not very well underway, as you point out. We’re trying to 
fashion a way that the—it’s a combination of things, but they have not been approved by the FDA, as I 
understand it. They do not have what looks to be—well, I shouldn’t be characterizing a private entity that 
way, but things have not been going swimmingly for them. And what we’re trying to do is figure out a way 
where we might get some help so that they might improve their performance” (DoD, 2001). 
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Some contend that following the attacks the U.S. government 
“spent extravagantly and wastefully on a perishable (and, as it happened, utterly 
unnecessary) anthrax vaccine.” The “overblown” reaction to the anthrax attacks cost $5 
billion, or “$1 billion for every fatality inflicted by the terrorist.” According to renowned 
terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, the attacks proved “quite effective at unnerving an 
entire nation” (Mueller, 2006, pp. 32, 31, 149), not to mention successfully rekindling the 
anthrax vaccine program and additional procurements for the SNS. After the 2008 federal 
law enforcement revelations about the connections between the anthrax attacks and the 
vaccine, the DHS Secretary confirmed, “There is not currently a heightened risk of an 
anthrax attack,” and reported “no credible information indicating an imminent threat of 
an attack involving Bacillus anthracis” (Chertoff, 2008, p. 1). Regardless, the 
government declared an “anthrax emergency” (DHHS, 2008b) through 2015 in order to 
provide product liability protection for the manufacturer, and it simultaneously purchased 
vast additional quantities of the old controversial anthrax vaccine for the SNS (FBO, 
2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008).34 
C. SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDY 
For argument sake, future analysts could contend the less than satisfactory 
vaccine more appropriately served as the root cause, although this thesis reaffirms the 
central role of the DoD in those factors as a de facto manufacturer for the vaccine. As 
Figure 1 depicts, the root cause of continuous DoD involvement with the anthrax vaccine 
created an environment lacking apparent adherence to the normal scientific and 
regulatory processes. The process breakdowns appear to demonstrate causal connections 
to unapproved manufacturing changes and in turn the increased adverse reactions, testing 
problems, and ultimately increased regulatory oversight due to noncompliance. In 
addition, the resulting “failing” status of the DoD anthrax vaccine program possibly 
served as the primary stated motive according to the FBI and precipitated the direct 
cause, the anthrax letter attack emergency occurrence perpetrated by the frustrated Army 
 
34 Since the anthrax letter attacks almost $57 billion (Clark, 2009) has been allocated for biodefense, 
with over $1.2 billion spent on anthrax vaccine procurement (FBO, 2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 
2008). 
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scientist. The subsequent causal chain of problematic events found FDA oversight 
potentially curtailed or expedited with the validation of the vaccine’s previously 
noncompliant manufacturing process in January 2002 and the 20-year overdue 
finalization of the vaccine vaccine’s license in 2005. Prospective relaxation of regulatory 
controls allowed the DoD anthrax vaccine program to get back on track. Approvals also 
allowed for significant expansions in procurement by the DHS and DHHS for the SNS. 
The preceding case study timeline demonstrates that many government officials 
yielded to, or collaborated in, the identified contributing causes and causal events. In 
comparison, some courts and the GAO resisted acquiescing to the inertia to disregard the 
known problems inherent with the vaccine. As well, the FBI’s eventual illumination of 
the anthrax attacker’s motive highlighted an opportunity to resurvey the problematic 
events accurately. The timeline reveals the motive of anthrax letter attacks, to revive the 
“failing” anthrax vaccine program, synchronized with institutional DoD efforts to save 
the program. The FDA joined the resumption effort after the problematic letter attack 
event, thereby joining the root, contributing, and direct causes, while facilitating the 
subsequent problematic events related to failed oversight. 
The present thesis reminds readers of the DoD and FDA official positions in the 
years preceding the DoD’s troubled employment of the vaccine and the letter attacks. 
Both entities critically evaluated the vaccine or invalidated its use. This analysis contends 
that the emergency occurrence itself potentially provides insufficient weight to overcome 
the earlier deficiencies. Moreover, disturbingly missing from the case study timeline is an 
intellectually honest attempt after the letter attack emergency occurrence to make the 
connection to the anthrax vaccine, something it took the FBI almost seven years to report. 
Equally alarming, the failure of the U.S. government to analyze the causal chain and 
problematic events after the FBI revelations in August of 2008 warrants future executive, 
legislative, and judicial level review. Instead, to date the government has dramatically 
increased anthrax vaccine purchases and declared an “anthrax emergency” to provide 
product liability protection for the manufacturer in actions certain to generate critical 
review in the years to come. 
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The foregoing analysis illustrates how continuous DoD involvement with the 
anthrax vaccine evolved. The DoD’s contributions to violations of FDA law progressed 
from participating in illegally changing the vaccine to violating soldiers’ health rights 
with an experimental product based on its known investigational status. Illegally 
employing an immunization that lacked a finalized FDA license then degenerated into the 
exceedingly more egregious crimes of the letter attacks by a lone, rogue actor in an effort 
to successfully save and expand the vaccine program. The next chapter of this thesis 
offers a program evaluation to further explore the quantitative, qualitative, and 
summative facets of the DoD anthrax vaccine experience, as well as a formative review 
to analyze the vaccine’s current state. A subsequent gap analysis chapter presents 
plausible explanations for the problematic events, violations of the law, and breaches of 
normal governmental conduct outlined in this chapter. Chapter VI, Recommendations, 
offers the final steps of the case study with suggested future courses of action and 
corrective measures. The DHS may find the corrective measures fundamentally necessary 
in order to reinstitute oversight in the realm of bioterrorism countermeasure development 
and procurement for the SNS. 
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IV. PROGRAM EVALUATION 
The program evaluation attempts to summarize quantitatively measurable factors 
such as the safety and efficacy of the anthrax vaccine, as well as technological aspects 
and alternatives. Qualitative analysis follows in order to review regulatory mechanisms 
designed to ensure the quality of biologic products, as well as to evaluate intelligence 
issues related to the threat. Summative breakdowns include historical doctrinal issues, 
comparative government approaches to biodefense policy, and an examination of 
biosecurity matters. Finally, a formative approach offers a glimpse of the current state 
and future directions for the anthrax vaccine in light of executive, judicial, and legislative 
review mechanisms. The entire program evaluation provides process tracing to compare 
the “theory of action,” or original plan for success behind military and civilian anthrax 
vaccine programs, as opposed to the thesis’s retrospective analysis of the realities 
encountered. 
A. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The quantitative portion of the program evaluation includes the quantifiable issues 
related to the anthrax vaccine. We begin by discussing historic safety assessments, 
followed by efficacy evaluations, and finally we analyze the current anthrax vaccine as 
compared to alternative technologies. 
1. Safety 
Prior to DoD’s anthrax vaccine immunization program, the immunization “was 
rarely used,” considered “investigational,” and deemed as “a potential cause for 
undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military personnel” (United States Senate, 1994, 
p. 35). A later congressional report found the DoD mandatory inoculation program 
“heavy handed,” suffering from “one-sided informational materials,” and determined this 
“only fuel suspicions the program understates adverse reaction risks in order to magnify 
the relative, admittedly marginal, benefits of the vaccine.” The report concluded the 
vaccine status as “experimental” (HR 106-556, 2000, pp. 2, 4). Other government and 
U.S. Army scientists critically evaluated the vaccine writing, “The current vaccine 
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against anthrax is unsatisfactory for several reasons,” including highlighting the fact that 
the “degree of purity is unknown.” They detailed that the “undefined nature of the 
vaccine and the presence of constituents that may be undesirable may account for the 
level of reactogenicity observed” (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994; Brachman & 
Friedlander, 1998, p. 636). 
Additional oversight reports cited Pentagon studies acknowledging that up to 35% 
of soldiers had adverse reactions to the anthrax vaccine, and that 6% of recipients 
reported serious complications after vaccination (CRS, 2007, pp. 12–14). The military 
studies caused authorities to raise the previously low adverse reaction rates, changing 
warnings listed on the officially approved product labeling (FDA, 2002a, p. 6). The 
courts also noted that the “product insert, which originally stated that the adverse reaction 
rate to the vaccine was 0.2 percent, was recently revised to reflect an adverse reaction 
rate between 5.0 percent and 35.0 percent (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 7). Earlier the GAO 
had found, “The systemic reaction rate reported through the survey represents a level 
more than a hundred times higher than the 0.2 percent published in the product insert.” 
The GAO commented, “We were unable to determine why the AVIP reaction rates so 
exceeded the product insert rates for the vaccine as approved in 1970” (GAO, 2002a, 
p. 5). Despite the changes to the product label, due to the higher adverse reaction rates, 
the military continued to insist on the safety of the vaccine, while the GAO persistently 
disclosed that “a significantly large number of vaccine recipients reported experiencing 
adverse events” (GAO, 2002a, p. 23). Government oversight reports confirmed that the 
long-term safety of the vaccine remained undetermined, while raising questions about 
ingredient alterations and problems with human efficacy testing of the vaccine (GAO-
NSIAD, 1999a, pp. 2–3). Recent Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory 
Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses scientific findings and recommendations 
validated concerns that “studies have indicated that the current anthrax vaccine is 
associated with high rates of acute adverse reactions” (DVA-RACGWVI, 2008, p. 125). 
Though the report ostensibly dismissed anthrax vaccine as a possible cause of veterans’ 
illnesses, the study acknowledged the need for further research to “analyze associations 
between Gulf War illness and individual vaccines,” and to evaluate “diagnosed diseases 
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in personnel known to have received the anthrax vaccine” (DVA-RACGWVI, 2008, 
p. 127). Other esteemed medical professionals, such as Dr. Vinh Cam, who served on the 
Presidential Special Oversight Board for DoD Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and 
Biological Incidents, objected to that board’s conclusion. The doctor provided dissenting 
remarks to the panel due to the fact that she believed that the committee had 
manufactured a stress theory to dismiss Gulf War illness (Cam, 2000). Ross Perot 
testified to Congress with the same concerns about the “stress team” and a concerted 
government effort to dismiss the maladies associated with the first Persian Gulf War with 
diverting allegations related to “stress theories” (HR 107–137, 2002). 
An early IOM report corroborated the need for more data, stating, “There is a 
paucity of published peer-reviewed literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine” (IOM, 
2002, p. 259). A later IOM report included additional findings that the “current anthrax 
vaccine is difficult to standardize, is incompletely characterized, and is relatively 
reactogenic [reactive].” The Institute acknowledged the “long and challenging” dose 
regimen, and determined a “new vaccine, developed according to more modern principles 
of vaccinology, is urgently needed” (IOM, 2002, pp. 200, 208). The conclusions comport 
with pre-2001 cautions from a former Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research 
and Development Command at Fort Detrick concerning multiple doses and purification 
issues, which “argue strongly against procuring large amounts for civilian use” (Russell, 
1999, p. 643). This concept of “multiple inoculations” presenting the “difficulties of 
implementing an anthrax vaccination program” stands as a constant theme from the 
earliest evaluations of the vaccine. These conclusions repeatedly led to the call for an 
“improved vaccine” which would “prove more potent,” and therefore would call for “a 
less strenuous immunization schedule” (Brachman et al., 1962, p. 643). 
Independent civilian medical and scientific community assessments consistently 
conflicted as well with the continuous DoD position that the vaccine was “safe” after the 
department began mass mandatory inoculations in 1998 (Cohen, 1998b; DoD, 2009b). 
Reports of resulting problems included gastrointestinal adverse reactions (Geier & Geier, 
2004, p. 762), joint problems (Geier & Geier, 2002, p. 217), lymphocytic vasculitis issues 
(Muniz, 2003, p. 271), and potential birth defects in infants of females vaccinated during 
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pregnancy (Ryan et al., 2008, p. 434). Other researchers specifically noted a “significant 
association” for U.S. veterans from the first Persian Gulf War subjected to anthrax 
vaccine and declines in health (Schumm et al., 2002; Schumm, 2007, p. 649). Another 
safety issue involved a rash of hypersensitivity pneumonitis cases following anthrax 
vaccination (Oransky, 2003; Timmer et al., 2002, p. 543). 
Beyond the historic military assessments, legislative critiques, and oversight 
conclusions, military members spoke out despite the “politically sensitive” nature of 
deviating from the mantra of vaccine safety. A military health care advocate from Dover 
Air Force Base in Delaware specifically reported a swath of adverse reactions (Rovet, 
1999). The FDA documented several of the severe adverse reaction cases as a part of the 
license review in 2005 (Levine, 2005). Meeting transcripts related to those illnesses 
found a DoD physician addressing this particular “pocket” of sickness at the First Annual 
Department of Defense Conference for Biological Warfare Defense Immunizations. The 
doctor confirmed that the Dover Air Force Base cohort attributed their illnesses to the 
anthrax vaccine. The doctor discussed the difficultly in assessing the safety impact of the 
vaccine since most of the aircrew had not “gone in to see anybody because they are afraid 
of being grounded.” Regarding the illnesses, the doctor captured the propensity for 
negative attribution bias by military physicians saying, “One of the docs I talked to said it 
couldn’t be anthrax.” The doctor commented on the difficulty of making such 
assumptions and concluded, “There are things that as I get older, as an immunologist, I 
am humbled ever more about the things we don’t understand … I think we cannot make a 
presumption; we should just report and then the cards fall where they may” (Engler, 
1999, pp. 15–16). 
Clearly, questions over the safety of the anthrax vaccine still exist. The 
government’s most prominent IOM appraisal of the vaccine upholds it merely as 
“reasonably safe,” but with an important quantifying “caveat that the studies reviewed 
were carried out in populations of healthy adults only” (IOM, 2002). Unfortunately, use 
of the vaccine through the SNS would not enjoy distribution to only a strictly healthy 
adult population. Overall, the tepid “reasonably safe” endorsement does not appear to 
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match up to the DoD script touting the vaccination as a “very safe force protection 
measure” and the initiative as an “extremely successful program” (DoD, 1999a). 
2. Efficacy 
The scientific history on efficacy contravenes the DoD assertion that an “anthrax 
attack is fatal if you are not inoculated” (HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, 
p. 22). Therefore, since this contention is not actually true, a policy predicated on the 
“unequivocal” need to “take these steps,” the mass inoculation of the armed forces, 
warrants review at a minimum (HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, p. 43). 
Additionally, the earliest assessments of the current vaccine documented significant 
survival rates without vaccination, even due to inhalation anthrax (Albrink & Goodlow, 
1959; Albrink & Goodlow, 1960; Brachman et al., 1966). While the statistical analysis of 
the data from the original clinical trial indicates vaccine efficacy in protecting against 
cutaneous anthrax infections, “when inhalation anthrax is considered, the limited 
experience with this form of the disease makes the data less significant in showing 
effectiveness of the vaccine” (Brachman et al., 1962, p. 642). As a result, the first FDA 
proposed rule noted the “efficacy against inhalation anthrax is not well documented,” and 
that “no meaningful assessment of its value against inhalation anthrax is possible due to 
its low incidence” (FDA, 1985, pp. 51058–59). Each of these facts casts doubt on the 
repeated imperatives by officials who promoted the vaccine. 
Legislative inquiry appeared to uphold this conclusion. A Senate Report analyzed 
post–Desert Storm use of the vaccine concluding, “The vaccine’s effectiveness against 
inhaled anthrax is unknown,” and that the vaccine was “considered investigational when 
used as a protection against biological warfare.” The committee added a concern that the 
vaccine’s “safety, particularly when given to thousands of soldiers in conjunction with 
other vaccines, is not well established.” It concluded, “Anthrax vaccine should continue 
to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military 
personnel” (United States Senate, 1994, p. 35). The DoD JPOBD also recognized the 
anthrax vaccine as “not licensed for a biological defense indication” based on the fact that 
efficacy remained unproven (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 1997, p. 5.5). The DoD 
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scientist suspected of the anthrax attacks, Dr. Ivins, confirmed for a memo by fellow U.S. 
Army scientist Colonel Arthur Friedlander that “no data on MDPH-PA efficacy in 
humans” existed, and he published the same conclusions. Dr. Ivins chronicled the 
vaccine’s “drawbacks, including the need for frequent boosters, the apparent inability to 
protect adequately against certain strains of B. anthracis, and occasional local 
reactogenicity” (Ivins, 1988; Ivins, 1992; Ivins et al., 1988). Other military medical 
professionals repeated their official assessment that the “actual efficacy for the 
prevention of inhalation anthrax [was] not known but presumed, based on existing data 
for prevention of disease (e.g., primate data)” (Engler, 1999, p. 1 & slide). Early 
scientists involved with the original clinical trials added concerns about effectiveness 
issues dependent on strains encountered. Dr. Brachman found, “There is also evidence in 
experimental animals that the vaccine may be less effective against some strains of 
anthrax” (Brachman & Friedlander, 1998, p. 636). The GAO’s multiple studies of the 
vaccine also uniformly reported problems with DoD immunizations, finding scientists 
could “not provide information to determine its effectiveness against inhalation anthrax” 
except in animals, but that the “level of protection varied for different species and the 
results cannot be extrapolated to humans” (GAO-NSIAD, 1999d, p. 2). As a result, Army 
scientists’ early appraisals of the vaccine deemed it as an “experimental limited use 
vaccine” (Takafuji & Russell, 1990). 
Drs. Brachman, Friedlander, and Grabenstein updated their review of the current 
immunization used by the military and stockpiled in the SNS in the 2008 edition of 
Vaccines. The scientists acknowledge the current anthrax vaccine license is based on a 
“less potent” but “similar” vaccine. They added that the “strain differed slightly,” as did 
the manufacturing process. The vaccine used as a basis for licensure exhibited no implicit 
proof of efficacy for inhaled anthrax. The scientists explained, “No isolated assessment of 
the effectiveness of the vaccine against inhalational anthrax could be made because there 
were too few cases, although the only inhalational cases observed occurred in non-
vaccinated individuals” (Brachman et al., 2008, p. 119). In maintaining the vaccine’s 
proof of efficacy through “various animal models and routes of challenge,” they 
disclosed that no clinical field trial had occurred for the current licensed product. Instead, 
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the researchers cited a “comprehensive, peer-reviewed evaluation by the National 
Academy of Sciences” [IOM], as well as FDA affirmations of the current vaccine’s 
efficacy “regardless of route of exposure.” According to the IOM: 
The committee finds that the available evidence from studies with humans 
and animals, coupled with reasonable assumptions of analogy, shows that 
AVA [anthrax vaccine] as licensed is an effective vaccine for the 
protection of humans against anthrax, including inhalation anthrax, caused 
by all known or plausible engineered strains of B. anthracis. (Brachman et 
al., 2008) 
It remains interesting to note that the Brachman study does not explicitly contend 
either efficacy for inhalation anthrax, or efficacy against all strains but instead appears to 
rely on the FDA’s and the IOM’s findings. Reasonably, these assertions emerge as a leap 
for the scientists when their previous scientific assessments contradicted FDA and IOM 
judgments. In an early edition of Vaccines, Drs. Brachman and Friedlander asserted, 
based on “evidence in experimental animals,” that the vaccine “may be less effective 
against some strains of anthrax” (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994). In another publication 
they found that “when inhalation anthrax is considered, the limited experience with this 
form of the disease makes the data less significant in showing effectiveness of the 
vaccine” (Brachman et al., 1962, p. 642). In the 1998 edition of Vaccines, they described 
the “unsatisfactory” nature of the current product due to its unknown purity, undefined 
nature, undesirable constituents, and efficacy issues (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994; 
Brachman & Friedlander, 1998, pp. 629–636). For the unobserving reader to realize Dr. 
Brachman’s contention of efficacy cites FDA and IOM, and that those entities in turn 
previously cited Brachman’s study, seems less than seriously scientific and methodical 
taken as a whole. The scientists provided the caveat about the “differences between the 
U.S. licensed vaccine and the PA-based vaccine used in the Brachman et al study.” They 
also contended that the lack of a field study and differences were “minor from a 
regulatory perspective” (Brachman et al., 2008, p. 119). To the contrary, this thesis 
contends that the circular attribution of efficacy for inhalation and against all strains 
based on FDA and IOM pronouncements warrants attention. 
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An overall review of efficacy points out that a bioterrorism scenario most likely 
necessitates the employment of the vaccine after an event. Unlike with armed forces 
personnel a pre-exposure vaccination is not practical. Therefore, the fact that the “safety 
and efficacy of BioThrax® in a post-exposure setting has not been established” also 
emerges as an important factor for first responders contemplating use of the vaccine from 
the SNS (FDA, 2002a, p. 3).35 
3. Technology 
A logical aspect of the program evaluation involves an analysis of the alternative 
technological solutions available to decision makers in their effort to create robust 
capabilities in the biological response arena. The analysis begins with considering the 
directive driving the need to procure protections and the technological problems posed by 
anthrax in the SNS (CDC, n.d.). Use of the vaccine falls under the “preparedness” pillar 
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, and pertains to the “equipment” to 
“respond to, and recover from major events” (POTUS, 2003c). Based on the foregoing 
critiques of anthrax vaccine as a valid biological prophylaxis alternative, more modern 
strategies and alternate technologies may equate to more coherent, credible, and efficient 
solutions for the preparedness pillar. 
Behind the scenes of DoD laboratories, top scientists knew the current anthrax 
suffered from seemingly irrevocable problems. The DoD documented the outdated 
technology as “not ideal.” The DoD wrote about the fact that the vaccine was “developed 
in the 1950s and 1960s” prior to “advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering,” 
which could now “enable improvements in the vaccine that allow fewer doses or use of 
highly purified protective antigen” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 48). To date an improved 
vaccine remains elusively on the drawing boards, and therefore the government 
stockpiles the established vaccine, BioThrax® (CDC, 2000, p. 5). Invented and patented 
by the U.S. Army in 1965 (Wright & Milton, 1965, p. 1), problems were foreseen years 
ago and led to congressional calls for the DoD to “accelerate research and testing on a 
second-generation, recombinant anthrax vaccine” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 47). The DoD 
 
35 The 2008 package insert reiterates a lack of approval in a post-exposure setting (FDA, 2008b, p. 1). 
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itself acknowledged the need in the department’s 1985 proposal soliciting an improved 
product. The DoD proposal expressed the “operational requirement to develop a safe and 
effective product which will protect US troops against exposure from virulent strains of 
Bacillus anthracis.” The DoD confirmed, “There is no vaccine in current use which will 
safely and effectively protect military personnel against exposure to this hazardous 
bacterial agent.” The DoD acknowledged that the vaccine was “highly reactogenic, 
requires multiple boosters to maintain immunity and may not be protective against all 
strains of anthrax bacillus” (see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, p. 4). Technological barriers 
aside, the concerns about “Gulf War Syndrome and Anthrax Vaccine” as “political 
problems” troubled leaders in the top offices of government (see Appendix 9) (Rove, 
2001). The DoD reviews recommended minimizing use of the old anthrax vaccine and 
procurement of technological alternatives, including “bio-detectors and stockpiles of 
antibiotics to augment force protection in the absence of an anthrax vaccine” (see 
Appendix 10) (Chu & Aldridge, 2001). 
Despite long-term recognition of technological problems, and the calls for a new 
vaccine by top government officials, others held tightly to the old vaccine as “the 
centerpiece of our defense against the most likely biological threat” (Shelton, 2001). Such 
proclamations by non-scientists conflicted with the fact that use of the vaccine at the time 
was effectively halted due to an FDA-imposed Notice of Intent to Revoke the 
manufacturer’s license based on manufacturing deviations (see Appendix 6) (FDA, 
1997). In the end, the anthrax letter attacks successfully rekindled demand for the 
technologically questionable vaccine and resulted in an expedited validation of the 
previously deviant manufacturing process. The FBI revealed that the motive for the 
anthrax letter attacks related to anthrax vaccine potency testing problems, and the desire 
to create “a scenario where people all of a sudden realize the need to have this vaccine” 
in order to revive the “failing” program (see Appendix 11) (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15). Of 
course, the attacks, the subsequent approval of the vaccine, the restoration of the DoD 
program and the expansion to the SNS by means of DHS endorsement did not resolve the 
technological troubles. These pivotal events highlight the problems confronted while 
attempting to pursue a coherent procurement policy for biodefense. Although the 
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development of a new vaccine continued, the DoD capitalized on the “scenario” to justify 
continued use of the anthrax vaccine stating, “The anthrax attacks in October 2001 
illustrated the risk of an unprotected population in an environment contaminated with a 
biological warfare agent” (Keys & Taylor, 2005). The DoD partially justified resumption 
of the suspended anthrax vaccine immunization program by referencing the cases of 
anthrax that “resulted from attacks with anthrax spores” (DoD, 2009a). The momentum 
for a return to use of the old known inadequate technology flourished, with both the DoD 
and DHHS procuring over $1.2 billion in the years that followed (FBO, 2004; FBO, 
2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the historical realities, technology offers more alternatives than 
the original anthrax vaccine. More financially efficient options range from not reacting to 
what might be a minimal threat, based on the technological limitations of an adversary, to 
investing in other layers of defense preparedness and response. Biodetection technologies 
exist, as do alternative methods of protection. Pointing out the deficiencies in considering 
the current anthrax vaccine as a “centerpiece” for biodefense presents an opportunity to 
highlight potential avenues to create savings for the U.S. taxpayer when compared to the 
ten-fold increases in price for the countermeasure over the past decade (GAO-NSIAD, 
2000a, p. 3). The old anthrax vaccine technology price increased contrasted with the 
GAO’s reported expectation that the price would decrease as production increased (GAO 
T-NSIAD, 1999b, p. 4). The GAO also identified additional cost-efficiency issues related 
to anthrax vaccine’s use in the SNS, including inevitable expiration of the product that 
would waste “over $100 million per year.” To address this problem the GAO 
recommended a single inventory system, which both the DoD and DHHS adopted. The 
GAO also questioned the government’s intention to use expired vaccine because this 
practice violated FDA rules and would “undermine public confidence since the vaccine’s 
potency could not be guaranteed” (GAO, 2007c, pp. 2, 5). 
In the face of the technological hurdles on the part of the U.S. with the old anthrax 
vaccine, and in fielding a new vaccine, an important awareness of adversary 
technological limitations warrants discussion. The GAO questioned whether terrorist 
entities could “overcome the major technological and operational challenges to 
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effectively and successfully weaponize and deliver a biological warfare agent to cause 
mass casualties” (GAO, 2002b, p. 3). A practical example from a United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) report confirmed 
technological barriers prohibited Iraq from successfully producing a “dry agent” for 
distribution in anthrax weapons (United Nations, 2007, p. 1156). A recent Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) committee report, sponsored by Congress, continued to 
generically deem the threat significant due to the “biotechnology revolution … raising the 
specter of a modern day plague, spawned from a back room or garage anywhere in the 
world (Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission [WMD], 2005, p. 502). Countering 
this scenario, a scientist, Dr. Milton Leitenberg, described the reality of “unsuccessful 
attempts to procure, produce and disperse anthrax” by the Aum Shinrikyo group. He 
added that al-Qaida was also “unsuccessful” in their objective to “obtain anthrax and to 
prepare a facility in which to do microbiological work.” Dr. Leitenberg reminds us that 
the 2001 “Amerithrax” letter attacks remain the only successful “distribution of a high-
quality dry-powder preparation.” Yet, as the FBI determined, this single data point 
originated from inside the U.S. biodefense community (Leitenberg, 2005, p. 22). Dr. 
Leitenberg also placed the threat in perspective with a statement by terrorist Al-Zawahiri 
about how Defense Secretary William Cohen “drew our attention” in his 1997 television 
warning (DoD, 1997a) with a five-pound bag of sugar to simulate anthrax. The photo in 
Figure 3 captures Secretary Cohen’s television performance. In contrast, Dr. Leitenberg 
described the threat as “greatly exaggerated” (Leitenberg, 2005, p. 35). The GAO 
remains one of the few watchdog agencies to quantify the “attendant publicity” lavished 
on the threat by DoD leaders (GAO, 2002b, p. 3). Ultimately, the GAO leveraged the 
DoD’s estimates to place the debate in perspective. The GAO wrote, “In the context of 
the conventional battlefield, the nature and magnitude of the military BW threat has not 
changed materially since 1990 in terms of the number of countries suspected of 
developing BW capability, the types of BW agents they possess, or their ability to 
weaponize and deliver BW agents” (GAO, 2002a, p. 3). 
In Figure 3, Defense Secretary William Cohen holds a five-pound bag of sugar to 
show the amount of the biological weapon anthrax that could destroy half the population 
of Washington, D.C. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Defense Secretary Cohen and  the Five-pound Bag of Sugar36 
Conservatively conceding to the prospect of the threat, the WMD Commission 
report alluded to moving away from a “reactive biological weapons posture,” while 
funding other strategies and alternative technologies, such as those recommended by 
DoD undersecretaries in 2001 (WMD, 2005, p. 508). Proactive strategies include fielding 
the next-generation recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) vaccine. The IOM found the 
old anthrax vaccine was “far from optimal,” and that a “new vaccine, developed 
according to more modern principles of vaccinology, is urgently needed.” The IOM 
repeated previous findings that the current “anthrax vaccine is difficult to standardize, is 
incompletely characterized, and is relatively reactogenic … and the dose schedule is long 
and challenging,” and determined that an “anthrax vaccine free of these drawbacks is 
needed, and such improvements are feasible” (IOM, 2002, pp. 207, 208).  
                                                 
36 Secretary of Defense Cohen later described this event as “crowning moment”—“We have chemical 
and biological weapons that can be used as terrorist devices. If you may recall, one of my crowning 
moments on television was to hold up a five-pound bag of sugar, and say, ‘Imagine that this is filled not 
with Domino’s sugar but with Anthrax, and properly released, it could in fact destroy a city the size of 
Washington, D.C., and eliminate about 80 percent of its population, with a small five-pound bag.’ And 
there are tons of this available in many parts of the world” (Cohen, 2000). 
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In an attempt to overcome the current vaccine’s limits, scientists such as Drs. 
Brachman, Friedlander and Grabenstein all acknowledged the “ideal anthrax vaccine 
would be more completely defined and less reactogenic, and able to produce long-lasting 
immunity within 30 days” (Brachman et al., 2008, p. 123). As well, Nareen Abboud, 
PhD, from Albert Einstein College of Medicine, recently revealed the identification of 
protein fragments that might translate into new technologies for an anthrax vaccine 
causing “fewer side effects than the current vaccine.” The Albert Einstein College 
research attempts to overcome the “significant limitations” of the present vaccine caused 
by the “extraneous protein material that triggers the adverse reactions” (Abboud, 
2009).The rPA vaccine is expected to move in this positive direction by resolving these 
problems. Legislative reports concurred with the advantages that a new product offers in 
terms of a “more consistently characterized … PA content” versus the old anthrax 
vaccine. The superior consistency equates to a “more uniform level of protection” (HR 
106-556, 2000, p. 48). According to research by the Congressional Research Service, 
DHHS officials believe the rPA vaccine “will address many of the shortcomings of … 
anthrax vaccine adsorbed [AVA].” According to the CRS, the past problems involved 
federal court injunctions that “ordered the DoD to stop mandatory vaccinations pending 
FDA review.” The CRS also documented that “AVA vaccine cost per dose is twice the 
cost per dose of rPA.” The CRS highlighted another alternative, ABthrax, “an antibody-
based treatment that works in a manner similar to anti-venom treatments for snake bites.” 
Still another alternative therapy includes the Anthrax Immune Globulin, which involves 
collecting and using the blood of recipients of the anthrax vaccine as an “antibody based 
therapeutic.”  
The high costs associated with both ABthrax and an Immune Globulin alternative 
led the CRS to assess their value most practically for post-exposure treatments (CRS, 
2007, p. 12–14). An additional antibody-based product, Valortim, uses a “fully 
monoclonal antibody” and appears to be safe and “well tolerated.” The advantages earned 
the product “fast-track and orphan drug designations from the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration” (OneMedPlace, 2009). Costs allocated for buying alternative 
technologies all at once is prohibitive. Fortunately, at least in regards to natural or 
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weaponized anthrax, the CDC confirms that antibiotics, such as penicillin, ciprofloxacin, 
and doxycycline, remain the preferred proven “first line of defense” for treatment of 
inhaled, cutaneous, and gastrointestinal anthrax in lieu of the old anthrax vaccine (CDC, 
2001; CDC, 2002; CDC, 2000; HR, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology (HR 110-23), 2007, p. 48–
50). 
Other non-reactive strategies include biological detection systems. If prevention 
fails, or policies change, detection systems may warn of a biological threat, as well as 
promote accelerated treatment. One means of identifying pathogens before citizens or 
soldiers become ill utilizes antibodies to identify pathogens (Frauenfelder, 2003). Others 
employ “strips” which react to specific biotoxins, including anthrax (Alexeter 
Technologies, n.d.). Micro electro-mechanical systems, or “MEMS,” present another 
option to detect biohazards through nanotechnologies (CombiMatrix, n.d.) as would be 
the case with the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) (General Dynamics, 
n.d.) and the Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS) (DOE, n.d.). The U.S. 
Postal Service also purchased the Biohazard Detection System (BDS) (National 
Association of Letter Carriers [NALC], 2008) for mail screening. JBPDS, CBMS, and 
BDS all employ varying techniques from spectral analysis to DNA detection 
technologies. Overall, biodetection processes involve tradeoffs between “sensitivity, 
specificity and speed of detection” (Mason, 2005). Experts maintain sensitivity and 
specificity emerge as inversely proportional, and speed reigns paramount in any response 
and treatment contingency. Future procurement decisions must prudently weigh these 
factors in addition to their costs. 
A recent report by the congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommended “oral antibiotics” for the 
anthrax threat, as well as “new classes of antibiotics” against “genetically modified” 
anthrax. Additionally, the report called upon the next president to “enhance the nation’s 
capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass 
casualties,” and cautioned us to the reality that biological activities, equipment, and 
technology can be used for good as well as harm.” The commission sagely reminded us 
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that the “globalization of the life sciences and technology has created new risks of misuse 
by states and terrorists,” but it significantly omitted any reference to the old anthrax 
vaccine in its report (Graham & Talent, 2008, pp. xviii, 32, 33, 109). Fresh oversight 
reports such as these, and the preceding review of the current anthrax vaccine option, 
balanced against alternative technologies, provides data points for consideration when 
weighing the future composition of the SNS. Future cost-benefit analysis by the DHS 
may support the elimination, or halt the replenishment, of the old anthrax vaccine 
technology from the SNS based on the significant problems documented in the above 
analysis. The vaccine’s documented “unsatisfactory” status and lengthy protocol, 
weighed against the proven efficacy of promptly applied antibiotics, supports at a 
minimum reviewing the nation’s preparedness approach. 
The United States possesses the resources to harness top-tier technologies, as the 
DoD proposed as early as 1985, and remains prepared to address the threat through the 
efficacy of antibiotics in the interim. Resorting to stockpiling of the old anthrax vaccine 
as a means to “appear” prepared may prove unnecessary and wasteful, while violating the 
confidence of the American people. 
B. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The qualitative portion of the program evaluation reviews more detailed aspects 
of the vaccine’s regulatory history than covered previously. The qualitative aspect of 
program evaluation also reviews intelligence estimates and the vaccine’s ability to 
address the threat of bacillus anthracis. 
1. Regulatory 
Evaluating the anthrax vaccine requires an analysis of the overarching regulatory 
scheme. Evaluation of the quality of a vaccine, related to purity, potency, sterility, and 
stability, falls under the auspices of the FDA. The U.S. experience with drug regulation 
began with the Food and Drugs Act in 1906. The revised Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) responded to the disastrous experience of an elixir that 
killed over 100 citizens. The 1938 legislation effectively added proof of safety as a 
requirement for new drugs. The next major milestone involved the Harris-Kefauver 
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amendments to the FDCA in 1962. A disaster in Europe motivated the law because of 
thalidomide that caused birth defects when used for a previously unapproved purpose. 
This legislation marked the requirement for manufacturers to demonstrate drug 
effectiveness (FDA, 1962). As previously discussed, the safety and efficacy of vaccines, 
or biologics, also fell under FDA control by 1972. Revamping of the regulatory scheme 
clarified FDA’s mission to “protect the public health as it may be impaired by drugs.”37 
Simultaneously 21 C.F.R. § 601.25 codified the procedures for review of drug safety, 
effectiveness, and labeling. As a result, FDA mandates required that the agency review 
and finalize the licenses of existing vaccines. The 1970 licensure of anthrax vaccine 
compelled the FDA to certify the anthrax vaccine license under its own letterhead. 
Although the FDA proposed such a license in 1985 (FDA, 1985), the agency did not 
effectively finalize the license order until 2005 and only in response to court orders to do 
so (FDA, 2005b). Following this pivotal early 1970s transition in vaccine regulation and 
FDA history, the anthrax inoculation languished in a questionable nonfinalized state. This 
oversight of oversight exemplifies the vaccine’s procedural conundrums. 
The historic involvement of the DoD with the anthrax vaccine further complicated 
the regulatory equation. The involvement began with the DoD’s patenting of the vaccine 
in 1965 (Wright & Milton, 1965). The product’s clinical trial for the DoD by Dr. 
Brachman occurred from 1954 to 1959. The resulting inhalation anthrax “epidemic” in 
1957 killed four workers at the Arms Mill in Manchester, New Hampshire (Brachman et 
al., 1966; Brachman et al., 1960; Plotkin, 1960). A state entity in Michigan then applied 
for a license in 1966 for the U.S. Army. That licensing data did not include Brachman 
clinical trial data but instead listed a Talladega, Alabama, test meant to justify proof of 
efficacy. On February 6, 1969, regulators questioned the data, writing, “The lack of cases 
of anthrax in an uncontrolled population of approximately 600 persons in the Talladega 
mill can hardly be accepted as scientific evidence for efficacy of the vaccine” (see 
Appendix 1) (Pittman, 1969a). The CDC challenged the license application, stating, 
“There have been no controlled evaluation studies with the Michigan anthrax product as 
 
37 21 C.F.R. § 601.25 was codified in 37 Federal Register 16679 and cited in the 2004 ruling on 
summary judgment and permanent injunction that required the FDA to finalize the anthrax vaccine license 
(Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004). 
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was done by Dr. Phillip Brachman” (see Appendix 1) (Kokko, 1969, p. 2). The 
previously responsible regulatory entity, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), licensed 
the vaccine in 1970, but explicitly noted the lack of resolution on the efficacy data issue. 
Government public health officers specifically noted that “clinical data establishing 
efficacy of the product had not been submitted,” but granted the license pending 
submission of “the results of an adequately controlled clinical investigation that 
establishes efficacy” (see Appendix 1) (Pittman, 1969a; Pittman, 1969b). 
Many years passed before the FDA proposed a ruling to finalize the anthrax 
vaccine’s license in 1985. That proposed license rule cited efficacy inadequacies with 
respect to inhalational anthrax effectiveness in particular. The proposed rule became a 
final order in the Federal Register twenty years later under court order (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 
2004). A 2001 citizen petition filed under Title 21 precipitated the legal process for the 
belated 2005 licensure. The petition specifically identified that the “December 1985 
proposal … had not been finalized” (FDA, 2005b, p. 75182). When the FDA did license 
the product, the agency added an indication for inhalation anthrax to the approval. The 
court had dissected the inconsistencies of the FDA’s “contradicting” an advisory panel’s 
earlier 1985 position regarding insufficient evidence of efficacy cited in the Brachman 
study absent a final license specifying route of exposure, cutaneous versus inhalation 
exposure (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 7). Once the FDA published this final ruling, the 
courts doubly deferred to FDA’s “scientific judgment” on the reliability of the Brachman 
study to provide proof of efficacy for inhaled anthrax and with regard to the FDA’s 
contention that it could prove the vaccine versions remained sufficiently similar despite 
multiple manufacturing changes (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009). The “considerable 
deference” exponentially granted to the FDA meant that the agency successfully avoided 
answering questions about why the Brachman study had not been submitted in the 1960s 
to justify efficacy, or how the FDA resolved the vaccine’s potency problems and 
“failing” status that preceded the anthrax letter attacks (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009, pp. 
13–14). The court granted the FDA similar deference on the issue of approving the 
potentially “adulterating” manufacturing changes ten years after the fact (21 U.S.C. §351, 
1997). With respect to the question of whether or not the vaccine was “similar,” after 
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multiple alterations and without additional clinical trials, the FDA weighed in by granting 
the DoD status as a de facto manufacturer. The FDA’s verdict that “DoD’s continuous 
involvement” and the department’s “intimate knowledge of … all of these versions of the 
anthrax vaccine” meant that the vaccine current product compared adequately to the 
“original DoD vaccine” (FDA, 2002b, p. 8). 
Previously, the GAO had highlighted specific differences between vaccine 
versions, including changes in the “manufacturing process,” the “strain,” the quantity or 
“yield of the protective antigen,” and finally the “ingredients used to make vaccine” 
(GAO-NSIAD, 1999a, p. 3). The GAO added to these known differences with a report 
titled “Anthrax Vaccine Changes to the Manufacturing Process” (GAO, 2001b, pp. 6–7). 
The manufacturer “did not notify FDA of several changes to the manufacturing process 
in the early 1990s, and no specific studies were done to confirm that vaccine quality was 
not affected.” The GAO cited that “FDA inspections found several deficiencies, many of 
which were not corrected in a timely manner.” The GAO revealed potential “potency” 
problems resulting from the unreported alterations. Moreover, according to DoD studies, 
the changes may have contributed to a “hundredfold increase in the protective antigen 
levels in lots produced after the filter change that year.” The GAO reported, “DoD 
researchers, referencing the earlier study, hypothesized that the filter change altered the 
composition of the vaccine by increasing the level of protective antigen in the finished 
product” (GAO, 2001b, p. 5). The watchdog group quoted FDA rules requiring “any 
changes to the manufacturing that have the potential to affect the safety, purity, or 
potency of a biologic must be submitted and approved by CBER [Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research] prior to implementation” (GAO, 2001b, pp. 2, 4, fn. 9).  
Potentially unprecedented in regulatory history, the FDA approved the changes 
after the GAO reported them and over a decade after implementation. The GAO found 
that the “FDA reviewed and accepted the data and approved the filter changes in July 
2001” (GAO, 2001b, p. 4). The IOM review of the anthrax vaccine explained that the 
“modifications were undertaken to incorporate more modern technology into the 
manufacturing process and to increase assurance of the consistency of the final product,” 
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but it passed on evaluating the propriety of the modifications or the regulatory process. 
The IOM concluded that the vaccine “remains a relatively crude vaccine by current 
standards” (IOM, 2002, p. 200). 
Beyond the regulatory controversy over proper approvals, the FDA had 
previously served the manufacturer with notices of deviating from quality control 
standards (see Appendix 6) (FDA, 1997). In addition to the explicit notice of license 
revocation, the FDA’s inspection reports noted the “manufacturing process for Anthrax 
Vaccine is not validated” in 1998 and 1999 (see Appendix 6) (FDA, 1998). The deviant 
status meant that FDA compliance policies supported nonapproval of contracts for 
anthrax vaccine. Technically, this policy also supported “disapproval of any pending drug 
marketing application,” such as the request for approval for using the vaccine against 
inhalation anthrax (FDA, 1981). The regulatory problems appeared to weigh heavily on 
the mind of the U.S. Army scientist suspected of mailing the 2001 anthrax letters. E-
mails released by the FBI revealed admissions that the vaccine “isn’t passing the potency 
test.” The scientist’s e-mail stated, “If it doesn’t pass … the program will come to a halt” 
(FBI, 2008). Eventually the anthrax letter attacks effectively reset the regulatory circuit 
breakers, because the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process received expedited approval 
soon after the crimes (FDA, 2002a). The government documented the bioterrorism 
architect’s role in the problematic potency testing prior to the attacks and then rewarded 
him for sequentially resolving the potency problems (see Appendix 11) (FBI, 2008, p. 
15). Despite the known and potentially unresolved pre-2001 problems, the letter attacks 
succeeded in reversing the suspected cancellation of the Defense Department’s 
mandatory program due to the manufacturer’s FDA noncompliance. In addition, by early 
2002 the manufacturer had evidently overcome the earlier regulatory impediments. The 
vaccine’s use resumed within DoD and significantly expanded with additional SNS 
stockpiling contracts. 
The FDA continued to work with the manufacturer in recent years to surmount 
additional known deficiencies such as the cumbersome dosage requirement. The FDA 
reduced the approved doses to five over 18 months, and altered the accepted route of 
administration, in an attempt to minimize “adverse events.” Though “routine 
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immunization is not recommended,” and the lengthy protocol seems incompatible with 
emergency response, the regulatory changes gained approval in late 2008 (FDA, 2008b). 
Additional license modifications, sanctioned in early 2009, extended the shelf life of 
BioThrax® from three to four years, and garnered added revenues of approximately $30 
million for the manufacturer due to existing contractual provisions covering prior 
deliveries to the SNS (Emergent BioSolutions [EBS], 2009).  
On the issue of shelf life and efficacy, e-mails released by the late U.S. Army 
scientist from Fort Detrick, Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, appeared to contradict FDA’s extensions. 
Dr. Ivins’s emails revealed potency data from animal tests that demonstrated significant 
survival rate decreases over time. Whereas anywhere from 11 to 15 of 16 guinea pigs 
survived with fresh vaccine in its first six months of shelf life, the survival rate when 
challenged with anthrax spores dropped to 8, or one-half, with one-year-old vaccine and 
5, or one-third, with 2.5-year-old product. Dr. Ivins’s data did not extrapolate out to four 
years to determine if the survival rates declined further (Ivins, 2000, p. 31). The FDA 
approval of shelf life extensions may have overlooked these scientific observations by 
Dr. Ivins. However, the FDA published three of Dr. Ivins’s efficacy studies in the 
Federal Register for the new anthrax vaccine licensing vetted in 2005. The FDA cited Dr. 
Ivins’s studies from animal models and Dr. Brachman’s in humans to “support the 
conclusion that [anthrax vaccine] is effective (FDA, 2005b, p. 75183, fn. p. 75197). The 
conclusions conflicted with FDA’s 1985 assessments precluding approval for inhalation 
anthrax based on Dr. Brachman’s 1962 analysis that confirmed “too few cases to evaluate 
the vaccine’s efficacy for the prevention of inhalational disease” (Brachman et al., 1962; 
FDA, 1985, p. 51058). The FDA scientific judgments relied on IOM findings that the 
studies, “coupled with reasonable assumptions of analogy” proved the vaccine worked 
against inhalational anthrax for “any known or plausible engineered strains” (IOM, 2002, 
p. 10). Reliance on the IOM as a regulatory arbiter appears unprecedented in FDA 
history, and “reasonable assumptions of analogy,” appear to be nonexistent in the legal 
frameworks guiding FDA law. 
Of note, Dr. Brachman, in subsequent literature evaluating the anthrax vaccine, 
never personally maintains vaccine efficaciousness against inhaled anthrax (Brachman et 
 85
al., 2008). Though Brachman’s original studies remain the basis for the FDA’s 2005 basis 
of efficacy and licensure of the vaccine, the scientist verified his own professional 
assessment shortly after the anthrax letter attacks. Dr. Brachman wrote, “Although five 
cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in one of the field trial mills …, the results were 
not statistically significant in view of the small number of events to address the efficacy 
of the vaccine in preventing inhalation anthrax” (Brachman, 2002, p. 984). Dr. Brachman 
and the other scientists almost exclusively involved with the vaccine’s literary history 
attempt to differentiate the original experimental PA-based vaccine from the present 
vaccine (Brachman et al., 2008, p. 119). However, this contention appears to conflict 
with the FDA’s assertion that the vaccine is “similar” to the original version to justify 
licensure (FDA, 2005b, p. 75184). This may provide perspective as to why the scientists 
do not assert that the current vaccine is efficacious against inhalation anthrax, instead 
deferring to the FDA’s and the IOM’s judgment on the matter. As previously noted, the 
FDA justifies its logic based on the FDA’s comparability guidance (FDA, 1996). It 
asserts that the DoD was “involved in developing the three versions of the anthrax 
vaccine and had knowledge of the manufacturing processes of each version.” They 
conclude, “DoD is thus similar to a manufacturer that made manufacturing changes to its 
product as contemplated by FDA’s Comparability Guidance” (FDA, 2002b, p. 8). 
Notably, the changes occurred prior to the mid-1990s when FDA “contemplated” and 
published the comparability guidance (FDA, 1996).  
In addition, the FDA appears to leverage its regulatory discretion, selectively 
choosing which guidance the agency enforces. In contrast to allowing FDA comparability 
policy guidance to substantiate the vaccine’s approval, even though these standards 
postdated the vaccine’s manufacturing changes, the FDA disregarded enforcement of its 
own compliance policy guidance when addressing “the issuance of a *warning* letter or 
initiation of other regulatory action.” According to that FDA guidance, such regulatory 
departures “must be accompanied by disapproval of any pending drug marketing 




DA, 2002a, pp. 3, 6, 7). 
                                                
deficiencies” must face disapproval (FDA, 1981). Yet in the case of the anthrax vaccine, 
the FDA maintains that compliance policy guidance “is not a regulation and thus does not 
legally bind FDA” (FDA, 2002b, p. 16). 
Beyond the FDA’s apparent qualitative regulatory shortcuts, the common theme 
of DoD involvement in these processes precipitated unapproved changes and “accelerated 
procurement actions,” according to declassified documents. Those documents revealed 
that DoD decisions related to the manufacturing alterations “were no longer ‘medical’ in 
origin; rather were political, social, and military/operational” (DoD, 1996).38 
Reasonably, although DoD involvement impacted the regulatory process by the FDA, 
that department’s “operational” objectives should not today hamper due diligence on 
behalf of the DHS in reviewing SNS composition. Though the FDA worked with the 
DoD to overcome the regulatory hurdles, the DHS must consider the practical reality of 
using the same product during an emergency occurrence on American citizens. Such 
cautions for the DHS are particularly relevant since the FDA confirms, “routine 
immunization is not recommended,” that a “patient’s medical immunization history 
should be reviewed for possible vaccine sensitivities,” and that the “law prohibits 
dispensing without a prescription.” Based on these facts, and the lengthy dosage series, 
the lack of approval for use of the vaccine in a post-bioterrorism incident scenario 
through the SNS appears highly problematic (F
Overall, a thorough evaluation of the regulatory experience with anthrax vaccine 
undoubtedly assists the DHS as the department charts the future of the current use of 
anthrax vaccine in the SNS, as well as with the formulation of follow-on programs. 
Although much of the documented regulatory landscape falls in the past, the DHS needs 
to digest the background prior to employing the anthrax vaccine through the SNS in 
response to a bioterrorism emergency occurrence. 
 
38 See the reference materials for detailed document analysis in order to help explain the DoD intimate 
involvement in the first Persian Gulf War time frame and to better understand how military and operational 
imperatives potentially outflanked regulatory requirements and the law (DoD, 1996). 
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2. Intelligence and Threat Assessments 
Reevaluation of DHS endorsement for anthrax vaccine inclusion in the SNS 
requires an evaluation of past and current threat assessments. This portion of the thesis 
outlines why historic threat estimates may not warrant continued reliance on BioThrax® 
use as a threat mitigation tool. Conflicting evidence pertaining to the vaccine’s safety and 
efficacy covered previously in the thesis, coupled with the remote conceivability of a 
viable threat, supports reappraisal of the anthrax vaccine’s feasibility as a sound 
countermeasure alternative. As well, the validity of using the vaccine after an attack 
weighs importantly in this debate based on the inefficacy of an onerous five-dose 
regimen across 18 months. Scientists, such as Dr. Ivins and Dr. Friedlander from the U.S. 
Army Ft. Detrick laboratory, understood the current vaccine proved inadequate and 
unnecessary outside of a bioterrorism or biowarfare environment. The scientists affirmed 
the need for a new vaccine to address the remote threat of deliberately dispersed anthrax: 
The only reason to develop a new vaccine is to protect against disease 
arising as a result of the intentional release of B. anthracis spores by a 
bioterrorist or in warfare, because the incidence of human disease, 
particularly inhalational anthrax, is extraordinarily low. (Schumm et al., 
2009, p. 597, fn. 44)39 
Therefore, while in agreement as to any anthrax vaccine’s purpose, resurveying 
current policy requires recognition of previous known inadequacies of the old anthrax 
vaccine in addressing this threat. The DoD acknowledged problems by 1985 when 
outlining the department’s “operational requirement to develop a safe and effective 
product which will protect US troops against exposure from virulent strains of Bacillus 
anthracis.” The DoD confirmed it had “no vaccine in current use which will safely and 
effectively protect military personnel against exposure to this hazardous bacterial agent” 
(see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, p. 4). Fort Detrick scientists also acknowledged the 
product as an “experimental limited use vaccine” (Takafuji & Russell, 1990, p. 156). 
Congressional reports corroborated “investigational” status with concerns about the 
vaccine’s connections as “a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf 
 
39 Reasons for employing an anthrax vaccine cite Friedlander, A., Welkos, S., and Ivins, B. in an 
article titled “Anthrax Vaccines,” Current Topics in Microbiology and Immunology (2002), p. 50. 
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military personnel” (United States Senate, 1994, p. 35). Others determined the “current 
anthrax vaccine for force protection against biological warfare should be considered 
experimental” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 4, 52). Therefore, the fact remains that the 
government and its scientists previously determined the inability of the vaccine to 
mitigate the threat. Regardless of the inconsistencies inherent in government conclusions 
compared to present procurement policy almost 25 years later, the threat itself deserves 
evaluation. 
Since 1990, and prior to the 1998 anthrax vaccine immunization program 
announcements by DoD (Cohen, 1998b), the GAO reported that “according to DoD … 
the nature and magnitude of the anthrax threat has been stable since 1990” (GAO, 2002a, 
p. 3, 9). Despite this assessment, many levels of the government emphasized the threat of 
anthrax after the 1998 initiation of the anthrax vaccine program, and especially after the 
2001 letter attacks. Examples included the DHS National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(DHS, 2002, pp. 1, 44) and the President’s State of the Union Address (POTUS, 2002a). 
Later, warnings waned entirely from the 2007 DHS Strategy (DHS, 2007) and the more 
recent State of the Union addresses. Most recently, the DHS Secretary announced, “There 
is not currently a domestic emergency involving anthrax,” adding “there is not currently a 
heightened risk of an anthrax attack,” and finally that there is “no credible information 
indicating an imminent threat of an attack involving Bacillus anthracis” (Chertoff, 2008, 
p. 1). Conversely, the DHHS declared an “anthrax emergency” (DHHS, 2008b) through 
2015 based on the “significant potential for a domestic emergency,” although this 
maneuver likely related to product liability indemnification (DHHS, 2005).40 
Additional assessments emerged from the WMD Commission Report. The 
congressionally sponsored report cited the five deaths from the 2001 anthrax letter attack, 
and an excess of $1 billion in cleanup costs. The report deemed the threat “deeply 
troubling,” documenting weaponized anthrax program evidence from both Iraq and the 
former Soviet Union. Most importantly, the commission captured the need for 
 
40 According to the 2005 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, the “Declaration [is] 
pursuant to section 319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §247d-6d) to provide targeted 
liability protections for anthrax countermeasures based on a credible risk that the threat of exposure to 
Bacillus anthracis and the resulting disease constitutes a public health emergency” (DHHS, 2005). 
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“resources” to apply to “funding new intelligence collection strategies” and alluded to the 
CDC’s calls for the “need to move upstream from the event” and away from a “reactive 
biological weapons posture” (WMD, 2005, pp. 34, 81–82, 284, 501–508, p. 533, fn. 1, 4, 
5). Similar less reactive and more “resilient” strategies appear to be gaining ground with 
the new administration (DHS, 2009c; Napolitano, 2009; Ramo, 2009, pp. 173–199). 
Another relevant intelligence resource evaluating the threat included Dr. Mark 
Lowenthal, former Assistant Director for the Central Intelligence Agency’s division of 
Analysis and Production, and former Vice Chair for Evaluation on the National 
Intelligence Council. He aptly points out “major shifts in U.S. nonproliferation policy” 
and a resulting heightened attention to biological weapons after the letter attacks. 
Lowenthal identified the difficulty “to detect this type of attack in advance or to stop it 
once under way,” and the health dimension, meaning the need to “differentiate between 
natural occurrences and terrorism” (Lowenthal, 2006, pp. 239, 242, 247). 
Another assessment worthy of mention includes a compendium by the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC. The 
commission confirmed the intended threat of weaponized anthrax from Iraq prior to the 
first Persian Gulf War. Iraq apparently eventually dismantled its biological warfare 
program because it suffered technological hurdles in fielding dry anthrax (United 
Nations, 2007, pp. 788, 890, 896, 976–77, 1153). Capabilities aside, other anonymous 
reports by U.S. counterterrorism officials highlighted the nefarious intentions of potential 
terrorists articulated in a video by an “al Qaeda recruiter threatening to smuggle a 
biological weapon into the United States via tunnels under the Mexico border.” Officials 
also verified, “There is no credible information that al Qaeda has acquired the capabilities 
to carry out a mass biological attack although its members have clearly sought the 
expertise” (Carter, 2009). 
In addition to threat assessments and reports of bona fide intentions to acquire 
anthrax, actual threat occurrences require review. According to the Monterey WMD 
Terrorism Database, between 1992 and September 2009, a total of 13 anthrax “incidents” 
and 498 “hoaxes” occurred in the U.S. (Monterey WMD Terrorism Database [Monterey], 
2009). The actual employment events primarily involved the 2001 FBI “Amerithrax” 
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case. Additionally, antibiotics, not vaccine, significantly mitigated the death rate. As a 
result, the CDC recommends antibiotics to combat inhalation anthrax (CDC, 2001; CDC, 
2002; CDC, 2000). The GAO also analyzed over 400 hoaxes in a report shortly after the 
letter attacks. The report reiterated the earlier GAO efforts, effectively challenging the 
DoD increased-threat assessments necessitating the anthrax vaccine immunization 
program. The report chronicled anthrax vaccine immunization program troubles and 
“attendant publicity” by DoD leaders, with added questioning of whether terrorists could 
“overcome the major technological and operational challenges to effectively and 
successfully [weaponize] and deliver a biological warfare agent” (GAO, 2002b, p. 3). 
In fairness, some evaluations continue to suggest, “If an aerosolized B. anthracis 
bioterror attack does occur, a combination of vaccination and antibiotic therapy provided 
the most health benefit at the lowest cost.” But even that study concludes that “until the 
individual probability of exposure reaches about 1 in 200, adverse effects of the vaccine 
outweigh potential benefit” (Fowler, Sanders, Bravata, Nouri, Gastwirth & Peterson, 
2005, p. 608). Considering that 13 actual events, documented over more than 25 years, 
created 22 illness and five deaths (DoD, 2009c, p. 4), for a present population of over 300 
million, the “probability of exposure” vastly outweighs consideration of anthrax vaccine 
when considering its “adverse effects.” 
The final evaluation of the threat remains uncertain. The facts of the matter show 
that the first anthrax epidemic for the United States in the twentieth century, during the 
1950s Army vaccine clinical trial, killed four citizens. The second epidemic, inflicted by 
the U.S. Army scientist, killed five Americans in 2001. Nine deaths across fifty years, 
when considering that prompt medical treatment with antibiotics may have saved all 
those lives, presents the possibility that anthrax vaccine procurement belies present DHS 
themes of resiliency and efficiency. The entire reevaluation process takes on added 
importance when assessing the origins of the threat and the commensurate problematic 
proximate issues associated with the old vaccine as a countermeasure. 
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C. SUMMATIVE ANALYSIS 
The summative account of the anthrax vaccine is an important aspect of a 
program evaluation from a historic perspective. Reflection on historic doctrinal debates, 
comparative policies of allied nations, and background of biosecurity issues will aid the 
DHS in better understanding how these core issues relate to their present and future 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive responsibilities regarding the SNS. 
1. Doctrinal Review 
Following the September 11, 2001, tragedies and the anthrax letter attacks a group 
of American scientists gathered in Washington, D.C. to explore the fundamental question 
of whether or not science and technology could combat terrorism, and bioterrorism in 
particular. One of those scientists, Dr. Simon Levin of Princeton University, concluded, 
“We could build up stocks of every known vaccine on the planet … but it wouldn’t 
matter. [An enemy] could just engineer something we had never seen before.” Interviews 
related to Dr. Levin’s experiences captured his conclusion about the complexities in 
countering “an adaptive enemy.” Dr. Levin believed, “Whatever you [the U.S.] did, they 
[the enemy] still had an ability to think around it and surprise you.” He added, “There 
was a limit to how much you could prepare” (Ramo, 2009, p. 42–44). Dr. Levin’s 
quandary defines the doctrinal dilemma the U.S. faces when responding to the threat of 
bioterrorism (DHS) or biological warfare (DoD).  
Evaluating biological threat response requires a review of past doctrinal 
viewpoints. For many years, “the moral ambiguity and legal uncertainty concerning the 
use of chemical/biological (CB) weapons” resulted in a “CB taboo” (Krickus, 1986, 
pp. 410, 422). Essentially, the nation’s strategic position relied on the credible 
willingness to resort to massive retaliation in the event that a traditional state actor 
resorted to the use of biological weapons. Though partially inhibited due to the uncertain 
nature of this type of abhorrent warfare, doctrine also calls for a “rigorous and 
dispassionate analysis of the military implications” of such weapons (Krickus, 1986, p. 
410). Therefore, retracing doctrinal history, in an attempt to rigorously analyze 
bioterrorism and biowarfare implications, requires reflection on past protocols. Examples 
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of such treaties and decrees include the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and 
President Richard Nixon’s 1969 decree to renounce first use and limit research to 
defensive measures (Biological and Toxin Weapons Committee [BTWC], 1975). 
Strategic doctrinal approaches alter over time. The Weinberger and Powell 
doctrines of limited force appear most methodical and conservative. In 1984, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger discussed the uses of military power at the National Press 
Club in Washington, D.C., Secretary Weinberger articulated six tests, or conditions, for 
the employment of military power. First, the United States would not employ forces in 
combat overseas unless deemed vital to national interests. Second, employment required 
the clear intention of winning. Third, the use of military power required clearly defined 
political-military objectives. Fourth, a continual reassessment of those objectives 
remained paramount. Fifth, the use of force required the support of the American people 
and their elected representatives in Congress. Finally, sixth, the United States considered 
the commitment of forces to combat strictly as a last resort (Weinberger, 2004). Those 
doctrinal approaches preceded the most recent George W. Bush administration’s 
preemptive war doctrine. Execution of President Bush’s preemptive war approach in the 
latest Persian Gulf War hinged on questionable intelligence (ABC News, 2008; Hersh, 
2003; United States Senate, Intelligence Committee, 2008). The Bush doctrine set a 
course of pursuing wars of choice, preemptive wars, based on a new paradigm of terrorist 
tactics that would likely employ asymmetric threats. The U.S. National Security 
Council’s 2002 National Security Strategy communicated the nation’s intention to 
“exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists.” The 
intended goal was “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,” where the 
United States would “if necessary, act preemptively” (POTUS, 2002b). 
Defensive posturing by DoD officials with vaccines paralleled the shift to a 
preemptive war doctrine based on the use of preemptive countermeasures against 
asymmetric WMD threats such as anthrax. The logic of force-wide immunizations stated 
that “by protecting against anthrax and other top priority BW threats, the vaccines also 
serve as a deterrent (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 1995, p. 5). This example of a 
doctrinal argument for the current anthrax vaccine’s role in biodefense precipitated the 
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DoD’s mandatory anthrax vaccine immunization program. A Washington Post article 
captured the controversial nature of the DoD mandate, one that represented a new 
direction despite “earlier opposition.” The article stated, “Military leaders initially were 
dubious about the need for the anthrax vaccine,” revealing an inverted policy process 
“starting at the top instead of trying to staff an issue from the bottom up” (Graham, 
1996). The upside-down decision-making process resulted in conceivably politically 
driven policy choices. Potential politicization at the program’s genesis potentially 
resulted in a lack of the normal vetting process associated with important doctrinal 
decisions. 
Beyond the viability of the threat, covered in detail in the previous qualitative 
analysis section on intelligence, considerable debate existed as to the doctrinal rationale 
for force-wide inoculations. The outgoing administration recognized the “problems” 
associated with the anthrax vaccine when George W. Bush took office. His appointees 
undertook an immediate review. A memo from Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the 
President, to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (see Appendix 9) (Rove, 
2001) resulted in recommendations from DoD undersecretaries Dr. David Chu and 
Edward Aldridge to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. They advocated continuing the 
program at a “minimum level,” while purchasing “bio-detectors and stockpiles of 
antibiotics to augment force protection in the absence of an anthrax vaccine,” and 
suggested a “comprehensive review of doctrinal positions.” The officials recommended 
development of a “coherent institutional process to assess and prioritize biological threats 
and approve the use of associated countermeasures,” while also calling for a “national 
long-range vaccine” (see Appendix 10) (Chu & Aldridge, 2001). In response, the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff challenged the recommendations by insisting to 
Secretary Rumsfeld that the vaccine was “the centerpiece of our defense against the most 
likely biological threat agent” (Shelton, 2001). At the time, the program in effect was 
halted due to a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) imposed Notice of Intent to Revoke 
the manufacturer’s license for prior deviations (see Appendix 6) (FDA, 1997). The 
“heated battle” was captured in news articles (Weiss, 2001), and the internal review 
became known recently due to FBI revelations. The FBI found the “failing” status of the 
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anthrax vaccine motivated the anthrax letter attacks to create the “scenario where people 
all of a sudden realize the need to have this vaccine” (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15; Meek, 
2008). 
From a doctrinal perspective, adding to the pressures motivating the anthrax letter 
attacks, congressional reports also documented questions about the “necessity of the 
program.” The legislative analysis asked, regarding mandatory inoculation programs 
against anthrax, “whether it betrays a lack of confidence in deterrence and other force 
protection elements.” The report also pondered whether “a vaccine program makes 
anthrax attack more, not less, likely” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 15, fn. 83). The 
congressional account simplified the DoD objective to “provide the best armor against 
biological dangers,” and the belief that the “armor is immunization’’ (HR 106-556, 2000, 
p. 23, fn. 118). The report also distinguished “an important difference between the 
physical body armor worn in battle, which can be removed, and medical prophylaxis, 
which cannot.” Some service members commented, ‘‘The body armor that our 
Department of Defense refers to is perceived by many service members as ‘tin foil 
armor’ ’’ (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 23, fn. 119). According to the report an important 
doctrinal issued that was raised implicated the possibility that “primary reliance on 
medical intervention may also undermine confidence in other elements of the force 
protection hierarchy.” The vital resultant question asked in testimonials was whether or 
not the vaccine could “ ‘create a facade of force protection’ provoking an adversary to 
even more lethal chem/bio or conventional attack” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 23, fn. 120). 
Harkening back to the contention that the “foundations of force protection rely on a 
credible willingness to use force,” witnesses question whether or not “abandoning this 
time tested doctrine and emphasizing the inevitability of biological attack to advocate a 
defensive anthrax vaccination policy may inadvertently result in legitimizing biological 
warfare” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 23 fn. 121). The congressional account concluded that 
while the DoD anthrax mandate was “well-intentioned,” it represented an “over-broad 
response to the anthrax threat,” and constituted a “doctrinal departure overemphasizing 
the role of pre-exposure medical intervention in force protection” (HR 106-556, 2000, 
p. 17). 
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The examination of the evolution of doctrinal debate suggests that one challenge 
the United States faces as a nation includes the potential “doctrinal departure” 
represented by preemptive biodefense doctrines related to bioterrorism and biowarfare. 
The doctrinal departure results in expensive, reactive attempts to counter the incalculable 
risks. The reluctance by DoD leaders to address thoughtful questions posed by some 
military members seems to perpetuate groupthink and silence rational objections. The 
threat to security involves the possibility that groupthink about threats and protections 
silenced a rational debate over doctrine. The dysfunctions of groupthink also apply as do 
the myriad processes involved in the proper approval of biologic products as covered in 
this section and the previous qualitative evaluation section. A thorough, renewed 
doctrinal review offers the possibility that a DHS evaluation of homeland security policy 
would serve to ensure sound and efficient biodefense doctrinal policy versus preemptive, 
nonresilient, reactionary, and wasteful strategies. 
2. Comparative Policy Review 
A comparative policy review begins by presenting a summary of accords related 
to biowarfare and by providing contrasting policies on biological prophylaxis for citizens 
or soldiers. This approach presents another interesting aspect of the multimethodological 
quadrangulation in order to understand the issues better. Biodefense policy benefits from 
dissecting allied biological defense strategies, both their successes and controversies. The 
comparative analysis reviews two fundamental arenas in the biological weapons (BW) 
debate:  Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) adherence and biodefense 
strategies, with a specific focus on anthrax vaccination. The review discovers a 
correlation for the nations adopting and internalizing BTWC language against the 
proliferation of biological weapons and their commensurate avoidance of mandatory 
biological prophylaxis strategies. For other nations, mandates for anthrax inoculations 
created significant controversy over time. 
For example, Canada suffered an initial controversy over its mandatory program 
until cancelling the mandate. Two other nations, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France, 
enjoyed a relatively controversy-free experience with their nation’s biological defense 
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strategies. Both countries readily accept the tenets of the BTWC. Other countries, such as 
Israel, reflect a rare example of countries with a nonparticipation status in the biological 
weapons protocol, along with a recent controversy related to anthrax vaccine 
experimentation. Russia, an original depository government for the BTWC, along with 
the United States and the U.K., remains “hesitant” as signatory of BTWC protocol, while 
simultaneously mandating biological defense prophylaxis on their armed forces. A 
concluding thought in the subsection on comparative analysis adds perspective on the 
“hesitant” Russian experience, but not as a specific allied case study. 
The analysis illustrates that signatory status by nations such as the U.K., Canada, 
and France may directly translate to the perception by other nations that those respective 
countries’ national defense policies are not threatening or destabilizing. Similarly, these 
nations’ lack of mandatory biological defense programs and prophylaxis policies may 
present more stabilizing influences on the international community and more efficient, 
less costly strategies to the nations themselves. To the contrary, the policies of the U.S. 
and Israel, with their ongoing controversial internal biological prophylaxis program 
challenges, and withdrawal or nonsignatory status to the BTWC, may create destabilizing 
influences vis-à-vis the international community. The approaches also carry significant 
costs in lost credibility as well as currency. The comparative government policy approach 
allows U.S. policymakers to reflect on the comparative successes, and lack of 
controversies, in the collective experiences of allied nations as our leaders contemplate 
future policy vectors. 
a. Background 
The changing face of warfare, driven by man’s ability to harness 
technologies for destructive means, caused pause within the international community 
before and after World War I. A series of treaties and conventions, the significance of 
which should not be lost in present times, resulted in important doctrinal commitments 
against offensive uses of chemical and biological weapons. As touched upon in the 
program evaluation chapter’s doctrinal review, academics coined the term “CB taboo” (or 
Chemical-Biological Taboo) to describe this abhorrent form of warfare (Krickus, 1986). 
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To codify the CB taboo, even before the twentieth century, leaders within the 
international community signed on to the Hague Convention, with the express purpose of 
establishing laws of war to prohibit the use of projectiles to disperse asphyxiating gases 
or chemical weapons (Hague Convention, 1899). Following World War I, the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 specifically added bacteriological materials to the list of weapons 
outlawed in warfare (United Nations, 1925). The U.S. complied with the spirit of these 
protocols during World War II, though the Cold-War era that followed resulted in 
significant escalation of biological weapons research, both offensive and defensive. This 
period culminated with a presidential directive in 1969 by Richard Nixon to stem BW 
escalation. The president’s National Security Decision Memorandum 35 (NSDM-35) 
specifically directed the destruction of all offensive biological weapon stockpiles 
(POTUS, 1969). By 1970, with NSDM-44, President Nixon reaffirmed commitments 
prohibiting offensive use of biological weapons, and committed to exclusively defense-
oriented research, such as development of immunizations as a prophylaxis against 
biological toxins (POTUS, 1970). By 1972, the United States formally signed the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 
Biological Weapons (BTWC, 1975). The convention codified the U.S. presidential 
national security memoranda into international agreements. The treaty, ratified by 1975, 
prohibited stockpiling of biological agents intended for any purpose other than peaceful 
prophylactic development. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States in 
particular expressed concerns about compliance and verification elements of the BTWC. 
The United States effectively withdrew from the protocol just prior to the anthrax letter 
attacks pending future agreements related to verification and monitoring in subsequent 
BTWC negotiations (BTWC, 1975).41 
Independent academic analysis adds perspective to the controversial U.S. 
withdrawal from the BTWC Protocol in early 2001. A report by the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) 
 
41 Initial reports reveal that the new administration of President Obama similarly expresses concerns 
about the verification mechanisms of the BTWC but supports increased international cooperation to prevent 
proliferation of WMDs (Landler, 2009; Sheridan, 2009). 
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detailed U.S. concerns over the protocol’s potential to compromise biodefense research, 
as well as proprietary industry secrets (Tucker, 2001). The United States framed the 
temporary withdrawal from the protocol as an objection to the protocol’s ineffectiveness 
in halting proliferation and as effectively compromising biodefense. As a depository 
government for the BTWC, the international community remains concerned about U.S. 
“opposition against the establishment of a monitoring and verification mechanism” 
(Bonin, 2007, p. 227). By 2006, the United States had resumed participation in the 
BTWC process, with well-articulated reservations about the protocol’s limitations on 
restricting proliferation, particularly amongst nonstate actors. The year 2011 marks the 
next scheduled review of the protocol (United States Department of State [DOS], 2006). 
b. Case #1:  U.S. Policy as a Baseline for Comparison 
The aforementioned background provides a glimpse of the U.S. and 
international experience with BW accords leading up to the domestic bioterrorism events 
of the 2001, the anthrax letter attacks. Notably, those attacks emanated from a lone actor 
within the U.S. military biodefense complex, motivated, according to federal 
investigators, by a desire to salvage the “failing” mandatory DoD anthrax vaccine 
program by creating “a scenario where people all of a sudden realize the need to have this 
vaccine” (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15). Although mandatory inoculations currently only apply 
to members affiliated with the armed forces, despite the “critical shortcomings in the U.S. 
anthrax vaccine program,” some recommend that the government “assume direct 
production of anthrax vaccine” and the “development of a capacity capable of preemptive 
immunization of the public against anthrax” (Weiss, Weiss, & Weiss, 2007). The 
prudence and potential success of such plans appear to disagree with empirical data 
points. For example, with respect to the anthrax letter attacks of 2001 and contaminated 
postal service centers, an “overwhelming majority of postal workers elected not to be 
vaccinated” due to disagreement amongst public health professionals on the necessity of 
the vaccine and workers’ fears of being “guinea pigs” (United Press International [UPI], 
2009). 
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Just prior to the anthrax letter attacks top government officials investigated 
their soldiers’ concerns regarding “Gulf War Syndrome and Anthrax Vaccine” as 
“political problems” (see Appendix 9) (Rove, 2001). DoD reviews of the vaccine 
program, and recommendations to reduce use to “minimum level” (see Appendix 10) 
(Chu & Aldridge, 2001), conceivably helped motivate the attacks against the backdrop of 
military officials insisting that the vaccine served as the “centerpiece”42 of U.S. 
biodefense. In the midst of the postal workers’ rejection of the vaccine, and DoD 
troubles, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed hesitation when answering 
questions about the anthrax vaccine program saying, “things have not been going 
swimmingly” (DoD, 2001). The Defense Secretary had several reasons to justify this 
concern. After all, “military leaders initially were dubious about the need for the anthrax 
vaccine” (Graham, 1996). Moreover, “according to DoD,” the “nature and magnitude of 
the anthrax threat has been stable since 1990” (GAO, 2002a, pp. 3, 9). In addition, the 
DoD was forced to slow, halt, and relaunch mandatory military inoculations from 1998 
through 2002 due to production problems. 
Indeed, the U.S. Defense Department appeared to be swimming against 
the stream based on internal acknowledgements that they possessed “no vaccine in 
current use which will safely and effectively protect military personnel” (see Appendix 2) 
(DoD, 1985, p. 4). Further, some military researchers and congressional reports 
concurred that the anthrax vaccine was “experimental” (Takafuji & Russell, 1990, p. 156; 
HR 106-556, 2000, p. 4, 52). Despite this tide of problems, the U.S. DoD persisted in 
emphasizing the need for the anthrax vaccine mandate (Shelton, 2001). Attempts to swim 
against that tide continue to reveal contradictions when the U.S. government accedes that 
“there is not currently a heightened risk,” and “no credible information indicating an 
imminent threat of an attack involving Bacillus anthracis” (Chertoff, 2008, p. 1). 
Regardless, the government simultaneously imposed an “anthrax emergency” (DHHS, 
2008b) through 2015 to provide liability immunities for the manufacturer (DHHS, 2005). 
 
42 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Henry H. Shelton, held tightly to the anthrax vaccine as “the 
centerpiece of our defense against the most likely biological threat” (Shelton, 2001). 
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From the international perspective, allies may observe these past events 
with trepidation, just as they likely did when witnessing the United States withdrawal 
from the BTWC in the midst of the ongoing controversies surrounding an anthrax 
vaccine and prior to the domestic anthrax bioterrorism attack. The chain of events 
necessitates a comparative policy review of other allied nations. The inconsistencies 
presented regarding U.S. adherence to past protocols, and the problems associated with 
the anthrax vaccine as a biodefense countermeasure, render the issues ripe for 
comparison through foreign case studies. 
c. Case #2:  Canada 
Canada maintains a firm commitment to the Geneva Protocol, as well as to 
the BTWC (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [CDFAIT], 
2008). Beyond mere participation and signatory status, Canadian disarmament 
representatives from the nation’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT) worked diligently as members of an ad hoc committee to develop a “legally 
binding instrument,” or LBI, in order to strengthen the BTWC through compliance 
mechanisms (BTWC, 2006). The goal for transparency in the process, as recommended 
by Canada and the ad hoc committee for legal enforcement, appears to be partially 
responsible for the U.S. reluctance to share burgeoning advances in biotechnology. 
Beyond Canada’s internalization of the value of the BTWC process, its 
own very brief experience with mandating the U.S. anthrax vaccine for its soldiers 
presented important revelations about the integrity of the program and the status of the 
vaccine. A solider that refused to accept the anthrax vaccine, Sergeant Michael Kipling, 
ultimately had all charges dropped on appeal in 2002. The Canadian military halted the 
court martial of Sergeant Kipling, finding administration of the vaccine in violation of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Canadian military continues to reserve 
the right to mandate biological defense inoculations, following proper risk analysis and 
“balancing of the rights of the individual” (Department of National Defence (Canada) 
[DND], 2002). The balancing of rights gained momentary consideration during early 
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debate over use of anthrax vaccine in the United States when top DoD officials reminded 
Pentagon colleagues that “soldiers are citizens first” (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 
1995, p. 3). 
In this particular Canadian court martial, the minutes of proceedings 
(Prober, 2000) captured U.S. Army Colonel Arthur Friedlander testifying for the 
prosecution. During the original March 2000 court martial, Colonel Friedlander testified 
that he was unaware of U.S. government licensing applications to obtain approval for the 
vaccine’s use against the inhaled form of the anthrax. The aerosolized form of the threat 
might occur on the battlefield, causing inhalation anthrax infection. The DoD knew the 
use of the vaccine for inhaled anthrax required a licensing application, an IND. The 
application meant that the vaccine was indeed experimental for use against biological 
warfare. This experimental status rendered the vaccine illegal to mandate in the United 
States absent a presidential order or simply allowing soldiers their informed consent. U.S. 
courts ruled on the experimental and illegal status of the vaccine several years after the 
Canadian forces determined that the mandatory vaccination program violated Sgt. 
Kipling’s rights and freedoms (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2007). Colonel Friedlander also served as an anthrax vaccine scientist at Fort 
Detrick, Maryland. The assertion by this Fort Detrick scientist that he was “not aware” of 
the purpose of the anthrax vaccine’s IND application for anthrax vaccine appeared to 
belie the facts (Prober, 2000). The U.S. Army participated in preparation of the IND 
submission for filing by the manufacturer in 1996, as well as the application’s update in 
1999 (see Appendix 5) (DoD, 1999b). Additionally, Colonel Friedlander was directly 
involved in joint FDA-DoD meetings related to the original application and its updates 
(see Appendixes 3–5) (DoD, 1999b; DoD-JPOBD, 1995, p. 3).43 The officer specifically 
briefed the reasons for the IND application, including the FDA license amendment’s 
intent to add an “indication,” or use, as a biological defense against inhalation anthrax. 
 
43 The meeting attendee list for the Investigational New Drug (IND), #BB-IND 6847, update meeting 
included Col Art Friedlander, USAMRIID, Room 1A09, Building 29B, 1300 hours, December 15, 1998; 
FDA Form 1571 includes block 7, “indications” for the Investigational New Drug Application as 
“Inhalation Anthrax.” 
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This was the nature of the questioning in the Kipling case.44 Concerning the application, 
U.S. federal court accounts also disclosed, “While the government states that the 
inhalation anthrax aspect of the IND is no longer active, the documents submitted to this 
Court under seal suggest otherwise (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 28, fn. 7). The 
inconsistencies and testimonial inaccuracies reflected poorly on the integrity of the 
anthrax vaccine program, and likely weighed in the Canadian Force’s decision ultimately 
not to sanction its soldier for refusing to accept the U.S. vaccine. 
The Canadian Forces also departed from U.S. policy direction during the 
latest conflict in Afghanistan. A news report quoted a Canadian Forces medical 
representative acknowledging that Canada did not follow the U.S.’s lead in mandating 
anthrax vaccine inoculations. The Canadians stated, “At this point in time, we are not 
requiring our people to have anthrax vaccinations nor are we considering it” (Moore, 
2007). The article disclosed that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration “declared the 
anthrax vaccine safe and effective,” in 2005 after the earlier safety and efficacy concerns 
and licensing problems. This subsequent regulatory action allowed resumption of the 
U.S. mandatory program after the anthrax letter crimes. U.S. military leaders also 
leveraged those attacks as justification for resumption of the shots (DoD, 2009a; Keys & 
Taylor, 2005). In contrast, according to the article, the Canadian Forces maintained that 
the anthrax threat in Afghanistan was an insufficient justification for mandatory 
vaccinations (Moore, 2007). 
The Canadian Forces do not possess an independently manufactured 
anthrax vaccine. For whatever reason, whether lack of confidence in the U.S. product or 
lack of concurrence about the threat, the Canadians have opted to avoid the less resilient 
path of reacting to the threat preemptively in mandating a problematic vaccine. It is 
possible that the Canadians’ additional experiences working on the ad hoc committee for 
the BTWC gave their nation added perspective on the doctrinal issues related to the 
 
44 Sergeant Michael Kipling’s Canadian Forces (CF) court martial proceedings transcript excerpt: 
CF Defense counsel: “If I’m going to suggest to you, sir, that the drug was licensed for cutaneous 
 anthrax only and that there has been a subsequent amendment for coverage for inhalation anthrax, 
 would you agree with me or disagree with me?” 
U.S. Army Officer, Col/Dr. Friedlander: “I’m not aware of that.” 
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threat, i.e., the pros and cons to pursuing singular disease specific defensive 
countermeasures against a potentially diverse array of BW threats. 
d. Case #3:  United Kingdom 
The U.K. also serves as an unwavering signatory of the BTWC. Like 
Canada, the U.K. never pursued an offensive biological weapons capability. On the other 
hand, they do possess an organic defensive biological prophylaxis program. However, the 
U.K.’s armed forces chose not to mandate anthrax vaccine on their troops based on the 
significant historic controversies with the U.S. anthrax vaccine program, as well as their 
own attempts with inoculations during the first Persian Gulf War (United Kingdom, 
Ministry of Defence [UK-MOD], 2007). One recent report revealed that over 150,000 
troops (mostly U.S.) received these inoculations during the 1990 Middle East conflict and 
that “recent studies have indicated that the current anthrax vaccine is associated with high 
rates of acute adverse reactions.” The study added that the “anthrax vaccine is highly 
reactogenic [reactive]” (DVA-RACGWVI, 2008, pp. 8, 125, 225). British medical 
journal articles in the years since the conflict’s use of anthrax vaccine to mitigate the 
anticipated threat of aerosolized anthrax by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reported that 
“vaccination against biological warfare and multiple routine vaccinations were associated 
with the … multi-symptom syndrome” from the Gulf War (Unwin, Blatchley, Coker, 
Ferry, Hotopf, & Hull, 1999, pp. 169–178). The U.S. GAO reported similar findings 
upon analyzing medical data related to the U.K.’s first Persian Gulf War cohort. The 
GAO stated, “Several studies in the U.S. and the U.K. now show a relationship between 
anthrax vaccine and Gulf War syndrome” (GAO, 2002a, pp. 25–26). 
Based on these conclusions the U.K. initiated a “Voluntary Immunization 
Program Against Anthrax” (UK-MOD, 2007) for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Bonin, 2007, p. 206). Analysis of the response to the voluntary anthrax program by 
almost 6,000 U.K. soldiers showed that 72% of those who accepted anthrax vaccination 
reported “adverse health.” The studies’ authors assessed the “reported side effects were 
related to whether acceptance of vaccination was perceived to be informed” (Murphy, 
Hull, Horn, Jones, Marteau, & Hotopf, 2007, pp. 3109–14). Discussion of the study 
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determined that an important missing element in the program was “trust,” i.e., many 
“respondents made it clear that they did not trust MoD [Ministry of Defense] on this 
issue.” The analysis concluded that soldiers continued to believe they were “coerced into 
accepting the vaccine,” even under the voluntary program, and that the MoD was 
“‘covering up’” evidence that the vaccine was in fact harmful” (Murphy et al., 2007, 
p. 3113). Coincidentally, medical reports about the U.S. mandatory program during the 
same time frame also found that the majority of soldiers surveyed questioned the ethics of 
the program, as well as the safety and efficacy of the anthrax vaccine (Pica-Branco & 
Hudak, 2008, pp. 429–33). Curiously, both studies insisted that more education would 
solve the fundamental concerns of trust in the countermeasure, with the medical 
community implementing the program. No analysis of the doctrinal necessity, 
programmatic integrity, or threat estimation controversy apparently existed in the 
research. 
e. Case #4:  France 
France provides an interesting example of a nation missing in recent years 
from the biological weapon debate. Considering France was the “depository” government 
of the earlier Geneva Protocol (United Nations, 1925), it is interesting to note that 
France’s primary concern with the BTWC is its potential to weaken the Geneva Protocol. 
It specifically cites concern about the BTWC’s insufficient controls. As a result, France 
promulgated legislation on the domestic level to prohibit biological weapons, in addition 
to their BTWC signatory status (Federation of American Scientists [FAS], 2008). 
In terms of biological weapon prophylaxis, France maintains a program of 
“strategic stockpiling of vaccines, antibiotics, and antidotes” (Bonin, 2007, p. 73). In the 
first Persian Gulf War, this ally implemented alternative policies based on differing 
assessments of the threat. France did not assess a valid biological warfare threat, but did 
assess a possible chemical threat. Therefore, the French military concentrated on 
protective gear and anti-nerve agents, but did not distribute biological warfare 
countermeasures (GAO, 2001a, pp. 6, 10, 19). Of the more than 25,000 troops deployed, 
the only ones subjected to biological warfare vaccines were those stationed alongside 
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U.S. troops. The French reported no cases of Gulf War syndrome per se, but reveal that 
the “lower rate of illnesses reported by French Gulf War veterans does not point 
unambiguously to any particular cause.” As such, the “differences in French veterans’ 
experience,” such as not supplying “troops with medical countermeasures against 
exposure to biological warfare agents” warrants review when compared to the U.S. or 
U.K. experience (GAO, 2001a, pp. 22, 23, fn. 19). 
Beyond the suspected illnesses caused by the vaccination policies, and 
regardless of whether threat-based assessments solely drove French protective posture, 
France’s military does not suffer the “recruitment, retention, readiness, and morale” 
problems that the alternative U.S. policies created and continue to pose (Corrigan, 2001, 
p. 40). As a result, French experiences provide valuable comparisons for this analysis. 
f. Case #5:  Israel 
A final case worthy of analysis includes the Israeli experience. Israel does 
not participate in the BTWC, and it encountered significant controversy related to its 
military anthrax vaccine experiments. In fact, a government-appointed expert panel 
reviewing the circumstances related to its anthrax vaccine experiments recently 
discovered “grave ethical failures” (Teibel, 2009). Soldiers uninformed of the risks 
reported classic Gulf War syndrome illnesses such as “headaches, dizziness and skin, 
respiratory and digestive problems.” The news report of the panel’s assessment detailed 
“no clear justification for the experiment,” and alleged “seriously flawed” methodologies 
in the protocols for the vaccine tests. 
Another article explained that the government-sponsored Israel Medical 
Association (IMA) report investigating the “Omer-2” experiment found that the study set 
out to determine the efficacy of an anthrax vaccine on over 700 Israeli Defense Force 
(IDF) soldiers. While the details about who ordered the experiment, and suspicions of 
foreign influence, remain unclear, the IDF apparently proceeded with the experiment 
without proper approvals for the testing or the production of the anthrax vaccine. 
According to the article, top governmental officials appeared to be aware of the 
experiment. The IMA report found that the experiments evidently deviated from the 
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requirements of the Helsinki Accords,45 and appeared unnecessary. Israel already 
possessed a stock of anthrax vaccine, raising additional concerns that the experimentation 
resulted from “external pressure” (Melman, 2009a). An alternative opinion article 
insisted that the experiment was necessary, that it was conducted in accordance with all 
medical protocols, and argued that its approval emanated from both Prime Ministers 
Yitzhak Rabin and his successor, Shimon Peres (Eldad, 2009). 
An additional article documenting the experimentation controversy 
reported that the military accepted “full responsibility” for the anthrax vaccine 
experiment. The commentary revealed, “A quarter of participants were given an 
American version of the vaccine” (Lappin, 2009). Those reports also divulged that the 
United States paid Israel upwards of $200 million to fund the experiments (Melman, 
2009b). Elements of the IMA report remain redacted, and assessments about which 
vaccine made the troops sick are undetermined. Conceivably, the IDF’s haphazard 
implementation of the clinical trials, allegedly outside medical or ethical standards, and 
their use of the problematic American vaccine and funding provides valuable lessons 
learned for the future of Israel’s biological defense efforts, as well as those of the U.S. 
g. Analysis 
Reviewing the case study synopsis in Table 2 may assist the United States 
in modifying its traditional posture of threat emphasis. Observers could reasonably 
perceive threat posturing as embellishment in order to justify the U.S. biowarfare 
countermeasures-centric policy. Reviewing comparative countermeasure policy postures 
allows a dispassionate and measured approach. Consequential reductions in threat 
emphasis, seen by some as threat embellishment, may also preclude unauthorized 
offensive releases, as represented by the 2001 anthrax letter attacks by a nonstate actor. 
Table 2 reviews the positions of the several nations discussed previously regarding their 
participation in the BTWC and their stance on mandatory or voluntary biological 
defensive countermeasure policies. 
 
45 The Helsinki Accords, signed by 35 nations in 1975, guarantee basic protections and respect for 
human rights, of which the right not to be subjected to medical experimentation  is included (Melman, 
2009a; Eldad, 2009). 
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The first column summarizes signatory status to the 1972 BTWC (Bonin, 
2007, p. 29). The second column attempts a best estimate of the voluntary or mandatory 
status of biological defense vaccination for a given country’s military or first responders, 
using anthrax vaccine as a basis when applicable. The International Biodefense 
Handbook, published by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zurich subjected four of the countries listed below to analysis. 
Additional countries, Canada and Israel, are included as primary allies and in line with 
the contents of the preceding comparative government analysis. The thesis analysis adds 
Russia for a supplementary perspective, particularly due to this nation’s recent 
“hesitancy” with the verification protocols established at the BTWC’s fifth conference in 
2001 (Bonin, 2007, p. 358). 
On one side of the spectrum of nations signing on to the BTWC, we find 
countries such as the U.K. and Canada that do not pursue offensive capabilities. They 
also do not force biological prophylaxis on their soldiers or citizens based on the historic 
controversies and doctrinal dilemmas such policies pose. In the middle, we find countries 
such as France and Israel quietly abstaining from the BTWC process and policies 
altogether. On the other extreme, we find the United States as a signatory of the BTWC 
but also suffering from documented unauthorized offensive releases of biological agents 
emanating from the operations under the purview of permissible defensive programs. 
As Table 2 depicts, the United States stands alone amid allied nations as 
the only one that compels its armed forces, and potentially its citizenry, to submit to 








Country/Policy BTWC Voluntary BW Shots? 
U.S. 
(Bonin, 2007, p. 227, 358) 
Signatory, but rejected fifth 
conference verification and 
monitoring protocol in 2001 
Mandatory DoD policy, 
with past legal and 
regulatory problems, plus 
history of 2001 attacks 
Canada 
(Prober 2000; DND, 2002) 
Signatory, plus active ad hoc 
Committee member 
Voluntary, declaring the 
U.S. anthrax vaccine in 
violation of Canadian 
Human Rights Charter 
U.K. 
(Bonin, 2007, p. 181) 
Signatory Voluntary 
France: 
(Bonin, 2007, p. 51) 
Signatory 
Not assessed as imminent 
threat 
(GAO, 2001a, pp. 6, 10, 
19) 
Israel: 
(Melman, 2009a; Melman, 




problems using U.S. 
anthrax vaccine 
Russia: 
(Bonin, 2007, p. 111, 121, 
358) 
Signatory, but hesitant over 
verification protocols in 2001 
Presumed mandatory, with 
prophylactic measures for 
armed forces 
Table 2.   BTWC and Countermeasure Policies 
A hypothetical output resulting from the comparisons includes the correlation or 
coincidence that “hesitancy,” “rejection” or nonsignatory status of the BTWC, primarily 
with respect to the verification and monitoring aspects of the protocol, corresponds to 
mandatory BW vaccination programs in those countries. The correlation of mandatory 
BW defensive vaccination programs, and reluctance toward or rejection of the BTWC 
tenets, may prove destabilizing and dangerous in the international arena. As detailed in 
the handbook, European Community partners appear reluctant to accept at face value the 
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U.S. reasons for withdrawal from the protocol. The U.S. ambassador to the convention 
argued that the protocol “runs the risk of providing a proliferator or terrorist with a 
roadmap to exploit our vulnerabilities … [and] would endanger not only the [U.S. 
biotechnology] industry.” The allied responses seemed disappointed with the U.S.-centric 
approach, versus a global commitment of compliance. Without naming the United States, 
the report suggested that intelligence reports suspected some of the nations analyzed in 
the study of violating the tenets of the BTWC (Bonin, 2007, p. 358–59). 
Current events may actually demonstrate progress, at least in the realm of 
securing domestic biodefense laboratories from security lapses. Recently DHS Secretary 
Janet Napolitano visited Kansas State University with the express purpose of checking on 
the progress of a $450 million lab meant to develop vaccines for biological threats 
(Associated Press, 2009a). Simultaneously the U.S. Army’s lab, USAMRIID, at Fort 
Detrick halted research activities in order to review the security of its pathogens based on 
inventory anomalies (Hernandez, 2009a). By the time the inventory finished, the Army 
had discovered significantly more egregious problems beyond the original encephalitis 
discrepancies (Hernandez, 2009b; Associated Press, 2009b). Ultimately, the Army 
discovered over 9,200 previously undocumented biological samples (Palk, 2009). While 
disturbing, the events demonstrate a diligent attempt by the U.S. to tighten security, as 
well as a potential emphasis to shift biodefense research responsibilities away from 
USAMRIID’s umbrella of military control. We address these issues in the program 
evaluation’s subsequent summative subsection on biosurety. 
h. Conclusion 
In the balancing of hard and soft power international dynamics with 
respect to biodefense research, U.S. credibility arguably falls into question due to the 
controversial attempts to create and promote defensive countermeasures. Attempts to 
“save” the vaccine as a countermeasure in particular directly resulted in the unauthorized 
release of anthrax by a nonstate actor of a pathogen that the international protocols 
forbid. This marks the dilemma for the United States and the challenge for the new 
administration—to find the right balance in devising future national courses of action to 
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regain credibility in the realm of biodefense, while ensuring that attempts to protect 
citizens and soldiers do not destabilize this delicate regime of arms control further. 
On the issue of biodefense with the anthrax vaccine in particular, the 
United States lacks credibility upon critical analysis. Due to FBI findings, court rulings, 
and the contradictory nature of DoD documentation, conduct from elements within the 
U.S. biodefense apparatus potentially violated U.S. law, presidential directives and 
international accords. Adding to the milieu, U.S. delays in refinement of the verification 
protocols for the BTWC protocol based on concern over the proliferation of these very 
capabilities by nonstate actors remain controversial. The reputation and credibility of the 
United States in this important sphere of international law apparently stands at risk with 
our allies and the BTWC cosigners. This risk may find mitigation through a humble and 
thorough analysis of domestic activities and allied nation policies. The analysis may lead 
to modification of current U.S. positions in the best interest of policy credibility and a 
more stabilized biological warfare arena. 
Ultimately, the costs to credibility are severe if allies perceive U.S. 
policies and practices as an obstacle and a destabilizing influence in the international 
sphere of BW and the BTWC. Domestically as well, the United States must seriously 
weigh the potential for another rogue offensive release of anthrax or other deadly toxins. 
For our citizens and soldiers the negative externalities related to illnesses resulting from 
the very countermeasures meant to protect them may also outweigh perceived 
advantages. In the end, the dangers of doctrinal departures and experimentation in the 
defensive biological arena may render these efforts imprudent without proper controls, 
and prohibitive if failures of those controls further destabilize the arms-control regime. 
3. Biosecurity 
The thesis addresses biosecurity in order to summarize guidelines and evaluate 
the scope of high containment laboratories that secure pathogens such as anthrax. The 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the CDC promulgated the Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) guidelines to accomplish the 
security task (GAO, 2009, p. 2). Both the DoD and the DHS operate biosafety level 4 
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(BSL-4) laboratories, but a vast majority of the biodefense activity, often involving the 
aerosolization of agents for animal challenge studies, occurs at the BSL-3 level (GAO, 
2009, p. 10). BSL-3 high containment laboratories deal with agents transmitted in an 
aerosol form, such as those that U.S. citizens might encounter due to bioterrorism. BSL-3 
containment operations guard toxins that cause “potentially lethal infection” and “pose a 
high individual risk of life-threatening disease.” BSL-4 facilities specifically apply to 
agents where a vaccine or therapeutic remedy does not exist (GAO, 2009, p. 5). Because 
the United States possesses multiple remedies against anthrax, the government 
categorizes this pathogen for containment in BSL-3 labs (GAO, 2009, p. 3). Additionally, 
agent categorization finds anthrax in the BSL-3 category due to its high transmissibility 
and the fact that it “would cause high mortality and social disruption, require special 
public health preparedness, and present the greatest bioterrorism danger” (GAO, 2007a, 
p. 4). Presently, no singularly identified governmental body maintains accountability for 
both BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories in the U.S. (GAO, 2008, p. 7). The DHS BSL-3 labs 
documented in government reports include the National Biodefense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the planned National Bio and 
Agro-Defense Facility (GAO, 2008, p. 12). The DHS BSL research facility locations also 
carry a BSL-4 rating, essentially dealing with pathogens for which there is no known 
countermeasure (GAO, 2009, p. 10, 12). 
Government reports evaluate the 2001 anthrax letter attacks as one of the 
incidents that demonstrate the security risks at high containment laboratories. A GAO 
report specifically refers to the second round of letters mailed to U.S. senators Thomas 
Daschle and Patrick Leahy. The “Amerithrax” case marked the first anthrax bioterrorism 
event in U.S. history. The attacks killed five Americans and infected 22 citizens. The first 
round of letters arrived at NBC News, the New York Post, and National Enquirer offices, 
specifically American Media, Inc., in Boca Raton, Florida. The first letters, postmarked 
September 18, 2001, and the second set of mailings, dated October 9, 2001, contained 
highly virulent anthrax powder. The contamination of postal workers in particular 
occurred due to cross contamination of letter processing through mail sorters. The FBI 
suspects that the spores originated from the Fort Detrick BSL-4 lab. According to the 
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government report, the Fort Detrick U.S. Army scientist suspected of the crimes 
committed suicide. The FBI believed that the scientist possessed the knowledge, 
capability, and access to the equipment required to weaponize dry powdered anthrax 
although normally the scientist only handled wet anthrax spores for animal challenge 
laboratory experiments (GAO, 2009, pp. 36–39, fn. 37–39). According to the report and 
the FBI, at the time of the fall 2001 security breach at Fort Detrick, “Ivins was under 
pressure at work to assist a private company that had lost its FDA approval to produce an 
anthrax vaccine the Army needed for U.S. troops” (GAO, 2009, p. 39). 
The GAO documented two lessons learned related to the crimes. First, that “an ill-
intentioned insider can pose a risk not only by passing on confidential information but 
also by removing dangerous material from a high-containment laboratory.” Second, the 
GAO contends the impossibility of the task to maintain “completely effective inventory 
control of biological material with currently available technologies.” The GAO also 
determined that “no one can conclusively determine what motivated his actions,” 
referring to Dr. Ivins as the perpetrator (GAO, 2009, p. 39). Slightly out of character for 
the GAO, the oversight office stops short of thoroughly evaluating the security 
implications of the FBI’s possible stated motive—the “failing” status of the anthrax 
vaccine. Instead, the GAO uncharacteristically appears dismissive about the statistical 
probability of a repeat occurrence based on this singular known data point across 60 
years. The GAO also points out that some experts in handling select agents worry about 
“highly intrusive personnel reliability programs, which rely on profiling to identify 
insider threats” due to the negative morale impact. They cite the National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity which believes “there is little evidence that personnel 
reliability measures are effective or have predictive value in identifying individuals who 
may pose an insider threat” and that the board recommends against “promulgation of a 
formal, national personnel reliability program [as] unnecessary at this time.” In spite of 
these recommendations, the DoD took action with DoD Directive 5210.88, 
“Safeguarding Biological Select Agents and Toxins” (BSAT), as well as DoD Instruction 
5210.89, “Minimum Security Standards for Safeguarding Select Agents and Toxins.” 
These directives emphasized security requirements, without consideration to morale, and 
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reaffirmed the need for the Biological Personnel Reliability Program (BPRP). The 
Congress also proactively passed legislation, including the USA Patriot Act and the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, in order to increase security and 
ensure that select agents do not fall into the wrong hands (GAO, 2009, pp. 40–42, fn. 45). 
Completing at least four reports on related issues, the GAO provided executive-
level recommendation for the National Security Advisor, in collaboration with the DHS, 
the DHHS, and the DoD, to determine a single entity accountable for the biosecurity and 
containment effort, while developing technologies to counter unauthorized proliferation 
or misuse (GAO, 2002b; GAO, 2007a; GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009, pp. 68–69). Possible 
additional emphasis items for the nation’s national security leaders involve distinguishing 
between what this thesis refers to as “impermeable deterrents” and “semi-permeable 
deterrents.” The GAO reports and legislation appear to address primarily semi-permeable 
deterrence through personnel reliability, which are “softer” programs as compared to the 
impermeable deterrents, such as gates, guards, and hardened security measures. The 
softer programs, relying on team work and requiring “two-man control,” found use in the 
military when dealing with dangerous substances such as nuclear material. The National 
Research Council recently made security suggestions including “two-man control” or 
two-person controls (National Research Council [NRC], 2009, p. 101). Even the 
teamwork approach with two-or-more-person chains of custody reflects semi-permeable 
deterrents or solutions. The semi-permeable deterrents only work based on “surety,” 
known as biosurety, or the reliability of the team members. Multidisciplined teams, while 
essential to ensure the sage storage and use of pathogens, cannot replace guns, gates and 
guards for a “multilayered” biosecurity umbrella. 
D. FORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
The formative analysis phase closes out the program evaluation and offers an 
opportunity to leverage lessons learned from past events and processes related to the 
anthrax vaccine and apply them to current and future policy decisions by the DHS. The 
formative issues provide a means to anticipate future events based on the current state, as 
 114
well as to foresee how the various arenas of executive, judicial, and legislative review 
may shape the policy during and beyond the current administration. 
1. Current State 
The current anthrax vaccine stockpiled in the SNS originates from government-
funded state of the art manufacturing facilities and equipment, despite the acknowledged 
crude formulation of the vaccine. As well, today the manufacturer enjoys significant 
advantages with a recently approved reduced vaccination schedule and shelf life 
extensions, despite the past scientific uncertainties about the vaccine in general and 
pending submissions related to these improvements. In addition to previous government 
sponsored renovations and extraordinary financial support, the manufacturer enjoys sole 
source contracts with the government and product liability protections (GAO-NSIAD, 
1999b, pp. 1–5). 
The initial chapters of this thesis framed these current state realties by applying 
the fundamental research questions through the context of the vaccine’s historic 
scientific, regulatory, and legal problems. Throughout this chapter’s program evaluation, 
the thesis synthesized that history against the laws and regulations for products such as 
anthrax vaccine. As revealed in the regulatory subsection, an analysis of the 
government’s selectively choosing comparative policy guidance over compliance policy 
guidance when evaluating unapproved manufacturing changes, does not represent an 
ideally synthesized current state. Moreover, disregarding investigational new drug laws 
and rule-making procedures when evaluating experimental indications, or uses, for the 
vaccine bodes ill for the FDA’s and the DoD’s essential respect for the controlling rules 
of law. Violations of those laws is a matter of fact, not debate. 
Extrapolating on the aforementioned analysis, the following formative subsection 
further evaluates additional executive, judicial, and legislative landscapes in order to 
anticipate the future courses of action offered in the recommendations chapter. Digesting 
the full breadth of arguments and history presented may help the DHS and the 
government to ensure current and future policies, programs, and procurements for the 
American people to uphold the highest standards. 
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2. Executive Review 
Executive review revolves around oversight actions by the president and officers 
in the executive branch departments. Evaluating executive level actions related to the 
approval of investigational drug products sets the stage for additional policy actions 
pertaining to the procurement of bioterrorism countermeasures. Highlights related to the 
DoD experience with anthrax vaccine serve as an important steppingstone to the policy 
frameworks impacting American citizens. Examples of executive branch mechanisms for 
ordering the use of investigational biowarfare and bioterrorism countermeasures include: 
a. Executive Order (EO) 13139: Improving health protection of military 
personnel participating in particular military operations (POTUS, 1999). 
b. DoD Directive 6200.2: Use of investigational new drugs for force health 
protection (DoD, 2000). 
c. Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) by the Food and Drug 
Administration: Authorization of emergency use of anthrax vaccine adsorbed for 
prevention of inhalation anthrax by individuals at heightened risk of exposure due to 
attack with anthrax (FDA, 2005a). 
The 1999 presidential enactment of EO 13139 effectively reiterated the 
requirements of U.S. law, 10 USC § 1107, formalized the previous year by Congress. The 
violation of that law was cited in rulings finding the DoD mandatory anthrax vaccine 
program illegal absent a finalized FDA licensure (10 U.S.C. §1107, 1998; Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2003; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007; Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Air Force Bd., 2008). The DoD directive articulated the same requirements. Court rulings 
cited violations of this directive as well. The issues remain highly relevant to American 
citizens. In the case of the anthrax vaccine, explicit violations of the law occurred. The 
succeeding EO and DoD directives spelled out the same demands that “before 
administering an investigational drug to members of the Armed Forces, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) must obtain informed consent from each individual” (POTUS, 1999, 
p. 3). Over the course of the legal machinations over anthrax vaccine, the DHHS 
sponsored legislation for a new mechanism to allow use of countermeasures. This 
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Emergency Use Authorization, or EUA, in effect provided the same informed consent 
protections for recipients as did the executive order and the DoD directive. The first 
implementation of an EUA occurred in 2005 as a means of continuing to provide anthrax 
vaccine “for prevention of inhalation anthrax by individuals at heightened risk of 
exposure due to attack with anthrax” (Chu, 2005). The FDA updated the EUA prior to the 
vaccine’s licensing in 2005 to “authorize the use of an unapproved medical product or an 
unapproved use of an approved medical product during a declared emergency involving a 
heightened risk of attack on the public or U.S. military forces.” The EUA specifically 
afforded military personnel a refusal option, which guaranteed that “individuals who 
refuse anthrax vaccination will not be punished.” The EUA also ensured that both 
military and civilian personnel would not be “considered non-deployable or processed for 
separation based on refusal of anthrax vaccination” (FDA, 2005a, pp. 44657–60). 
Discussion of EUA implementation also emerged most recently with the H1N1 pandemic 
fears. 
Several executive-level strategy pronouncements preceded the EO and EUA legal 
maneuverings in parallel with the court ordered halt to mandatory shots. Examples 
included: 
a. 2002 and 2003 State of the Union addresses (POTUS, 2002a; POTUS, 
2003a). 
b. 2002 and 2007 National Strategies for Homeland Security (DHS, 2002; 
DHS, 2007). 
The evolution of these executive actions demonstrated the seriousness of attention 
to the threat of anthrax and the vaccine on the nation’s radar scope, with the issue rising 
to the highest offices in the land. The later State of the Union address in 2007 omitted 
mention of anthrax vaccine altogether, as did the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security and the report by the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (Graham & Talent, 2008). Comparable 
inconsistencies in the executive-level message existed with other recent pronouncements 
by the executives in both the DHS and DHHS: 
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c. DHS Secretary memo on the threat of anthrax (Chertoff, 2008). 
d. DHHS Secretary declaration of an “anthrax emergency” through 2015 
(DHHS, 2008b). 
One DHS executive message confirmed that “there is not currently a heightened 
risk of an anthrax attack” and “no credible information indicating an imminent threat of 
an attack.” Alternatively, the DHHS directives declared an anthrax emergency in order to 
provide product liability protection for the manufacturer. DHHS simultaneously 
announced significant additional procurements. The prevention pillars articulated in 
Homeland Security presidential directives (HSPD) (DHS, 2008b) and the BioShield 
legislation (DHHS, 2008a) potentially drove such decisions. Some of these executive 
level directives included: 
a. HSPD-8, National Preparedness (POTUS, 2003c). 
b. HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century (POTUS, 2004). 
c. HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (POTUS, 2007a). 
d. HSPD-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness (POTUS, 2007b). 
Under the HSPDs, the DoD and the DHS share oversight responsibility for the 
“composition” of products included in the SNS. The directives require a biannual review, 
thus allowing the new president and executive-branch officers the opportunity to examine 
the technological assumptions behind continued procurement of the old anthrax vaccine. 
If the conclusions mirror the analysis and evaluation present in this thesis, prioritization 
of alternative technologies for the SNS and proactive detection devices deserve increased 
consideration. In addition, the new DHHS Secretary should review and consider 
rescission of the October 2008 aforementioned “anthrax emergency” PREP Act 
declaration providing liability protection to manufacturers. Raising future declaration 
authority to the level of the president warrants consideration. The Project BioShield 
initiative and a sage affirmation by President Bush supported overall attention to the 
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issues. President Bush avowed, “We refuse to remain idle when modern technology 
might be turned against us” (DHHS, 2008a). Of course, this is precisely what occurred 
with the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. 
The executive level HSPDs also dictate the development of Material Threat 
Determinations and an “unclassified briefing for non-health professionals that clearly 
outlines the scope of the risks to public health posed by relevant threats and catastrophic 
health events (including attacks involving weapons of mass destruction).” Research for 
this thesis could not locate such a product from the DHS. The HSPDs also require a 
process for extensive strategic level “all-CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear] risk assessment,” as well as DHS reporting requirements to the President, with 
updates every two years (POTUS, 2007b). The continual emphasis on facilitation of 
collaboration and “coordination across the intelligence community,” including the DOJ 
Office of the Attorney General and the law enforcement community, stand as extremely 
healthy prerequisites (POTUS, 2007a). Finally, HSPD obliges the DHHS to coordinate 
with the DHS on a “priority-setting process” for the acquisition of medical 
countermeasures and other critical medical materiel for the SNS in order to guarantee 
“transparent and risk-informed” decision-making. 
The brief formative review of executive-level authorities related to bioterrorism 
countermeasure procurement sets the stage for the next “annual review of SNS 
composition,” the first by the new administration. This process will permit analysis and 
modification as suggested in this thesis. Each of these executive actions holds judicial 
relevance. Therefore, the next section provides additional perspective on unique aspects 
of the judiciary’s role in the anthrax vaccine experience. 
3. Judicial Review 
Based on the documentary record showing the DoD acknowledged the anthrax 
vaccine lacked approval for use against inhaled infection anticipated in a biological 
warfare environment, a group of anonymous members of the armed forces brought legal 
action under the Administrative Procedures Act in 2003 (see Appendixes 2–5) (DoD, 
1985; DoD, 1999b; DoD-JPOBD, 1997; Myers, 1996). Citing violations of 10 U.S.C. 
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§ 1107, the D.C. district court granted a preliminary injunction in December of 2003 
(Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003) and a permanent injunction in 2004 (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 
40). Between the injunctions, the FDA attempted to finalize the 1985 proposed anthrax 
vaccine license rule to include the indication, or use, for “inhalation anthrax.” The 
permanent injunction vacated that attempted license ruling and directed the FDA to 
properly process a final order in accordance with the rule-making requirements under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553. The government appealed the ruling, 
while also filing a renewed proposed order, seeking comment from the public, in 
December 2004. Effectively the court ordered the FDA to seek public comment on the 
new final license order since the scope of the ruling exceeded that which the agency had 
previously proposed but never finalized in 1985, i.e., the inclusion of inhalation anthrax 
as an approved use of the vaccine. The FDA published a new final order on December 
19, 2005. The D.C. court of appeals declined to vacate or overturn the lower court rulings 
and determined that the final order mooted the appeal. Ultimately, that stage of judicial 
review terminated with the following determination: “The Court concludes that plaintiffs 
are entitled to fees and costs for litigating this action, including on appeal, because 
plaintiffs are the prevailing party and the government’s position was not substantially 
justified” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). 
Based on the December 2005 FDA final order, the DoD resumed the mandatory 
anthrax vaccine program for service members in October 2006. Revival of the program 
led to a new round of judicial review to scrutinize the propriety of the 2005 final order. 
The D.C. district and appellate courts dismissed the legal efforts in February 2008 and 
September 2009 respectively, upholding the propriety of the 2005 FDA anthrax vaccine 
court-ordered licensure. The ruling stated the obligation to “defer to the FDA’s judgment 
that [anthrax vaccine] is effective regardless of the route of exposure,” i.e., including 
inhalation anthrax. In addition, concerning the reliability of the Brachman study to 
provide proof of efficacy despite the manufacturing changes, the three-judge panel found 
this decision by FDA to be “a scientific judgment by the FDA to which we owe 
considerable deference.” On both issues the court “grant[ed] the premise but reject[ed] 
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the conclusion” of the arguments based on the high legal bar in questioning the discretion 
of a federal regulatory agency (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009; Lowe, 2009; Pickler, 2009, 
pp. 13–14). 
Additional legal filings related to attempts to secure record corrections for 
soldiers previously punished over the mandatory anthrax vaccine program prior to the 
2005 FDA licensure. A case addressing these concerns verified the “undisturbed factual 
and legal findings” declaring the DoD program unlawful prior to the FDA final order. 
The ruling upheld that “prior to the FDA’s December 2005 rulemaking, it was a violation 
of federal law for military personnel to be subjected to involuntary AVA inoculation 
because the vaccine was neither the subject of a presidential waiver nor licensed for use 
against inhalation anthrax” (Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force Bd., 2008, pp. 18–19). 
The ruling addressed earlier cases stating, “Other courts have affirmed the legality of pre-
2005 orders subjecting military personnel to involuntary anthrax vaccination, although 
they did so without giving detailed consideration to the implications of the FDA’s 
licensing requirements” (Rempfer v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force Bd., p. 19). Although not 
cited, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) (U.S. v. Kisala, 2006) had 
previously upheld the legality of the anthrax vaccine mandate, although it did not explore 
the depths of the issues as vetted in the D.C. district and appellate courts litigation. The 
military court determined that the service members had failed to demonstrate that FDA 
licensing interpretations suffered any fatal flaws since the FDA never revoked the anthrax 
vaccine license.46 Therefore, the military appeals court found that the soldiers could not 
overcome the “presumption of lawfulness” granted to the military order to mandate the 
vaccine. The DoD’s favorable military appeals court ruling followed the civilian orders 
for the FDA to finalize the anthrax vaccine proposed license rule and order and the 
subsequent licensing by the FDA. The military court’s apparent blindness to the prior 
rulings declaring the vaccine program illegal possibly exemplify intentional efforts to 
ignore the facts or simply a failure to comprehend the implications of the law and civilian 
judicial control over the military. 
 
46 U.S. v. Kisala occurred in the context of a criminal proceeding, as opposed to the civil court 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the D.C. federal district court (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). 
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Another case in point in the litigation history involved O’Neil v. Secretary of the 
Navy, litigated in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The court found the vaccine 
program properly approved in the 1999 through 2001 time frame.47 The O’Neil case 
highlighted the carefully phrased language choices by the testifying DoD officials. 
Testimony by the anthrax vaccine program manager for the Department of the Navy 
addressed a question by the judge related to the FDA license. The officer answered the 
judge that the “anthrax vaccine is not being used in a manner that is inconsistent with its 
approval by the Food & Drug Administration.” The officer had previously attended a 
conference earlier that year where DoD officials acknowledged “the actual efficacy for 
the prevention of inhalational anthrax [was] not known” (Engler, 1999). The language 
choice by the officer to the judge was reminiscent of the FDA informal opinions provided 
to the DoD in 1997 when the department asked about the vaccine’s approval for inhaled 
anthrax. The courts later noted that the FDA responded, “I believe your interpretation is 
not inconsistent with the current label” (Friedman, 1997; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 7). 
The court determined that this “apparent change in position from the December 1985 
proposed rule and the cryptic use of a double negative (i.e. ‘it is not inconsistent’), fail to 
persuade this Court that the view expressed in the 1997 letter is the FDA’s formal 
opinion.” Absent a “formal opinion vis-à-vis AVA’s investigational status” the court 
rejected the “inconsistencies” and pointed out that the FDA “did not do the in-depth 
analysis as would be appropriate to make that kind of a determination or to contradict the 
opinion it expressed concerning the Bachman study in 1985” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, 
pp. 24–25). The court found that the “term ‘investigational’ … is at the heart of the 
dispute” (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 23–24). The court summarized this logic: 
At bottom, this inquiry turns on whether the FDA has made a final 
decision on the investigational status of AVA; and if not (1) whether the 
1996 IND application establishes the vaccine’s status as an investigational 
drug and (2) whether the DoD is using AVA in a manner inconsistent with 
its license and intended use (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 22). 
The preliminary injunction, later affirmed by higher courts, called attention to 
orders, directives, and laws “enacted to protect soldiers from involuntarily serving as 
 
47 O’Neil v. Secretary of the Navy, 76 F. Supp. 2d 641 (W.D. Pa. 1999). 
 122
                                                
‘guinea pigs’ in a mass use of investigational medicine (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 29). 
Because the administrative record before the court was “devoid of an FDA decision on 
the investigational status” of anthrax vaccine, the court determined that anthrax vaccine 
was indeed “an investigational drug.” The court determined that the anthrax vaccine was 
“a drug being used for an unapproved purpose,” and therefore found the DoD “in 
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 1107, Executive Order 13139, and DoD Directive 6200.2 (Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 32). 
Another often-cited case to espouse the legality of the anthrax vaccine mandate 
involved Mazares v. Department of the Navy, which concluded in 2002. The Mazares 
case occurred before Judge Sullivan’s rulings on Doe v. Rumsfeld in the D.C. district 
court and without challenging the legality of the order based on the absence of a finalized 
anthrax vaccine license ruling (Mazares v. Dep’t of the Navy [Mazares], 2002). Another 
legal case relevant to civilian use of the vaccine involved a merchant mariner with a 
suspected disability due to anthrax or smallpox vaccines. That case, Francis v. Maersk, 
resulted in a settlement reported in the range of $2 million (Francis v. Maersk, 2004; 
Nass, 2007, p. 1512, fn. 21). Settlements of this magnitude, potentially paid by U.S. 
taxpayers based on indemnification and product liability protections, warrant 
consideration as the government evaluates wider use of the vaccine on the civilian 
population. In contrast to consideration of civilian use of the vaccine, service members 
face a Supreme Court precedent legal bar precluding suit in tort cases based on the Feres 
doctrine for injuries suffered incident to service.48 Alternatively, according to the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, service members qualify for disability ratings if 
“evidence establishes that an individual suffers from a disabling condition as a result of 
administration of an anthrax vaccination” (McClain, 2002).49 Either way, 
 
48 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Feres court determined that service members 
receive comprehensive compensatory relief if injured during their service in the form of disability pay. The 
court also determined that service members suing the government they serve could have a deleterious 
impact on military order and discipline. 
49 “QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a former member of the Army Reserve who received two 
anthrax inoculations during inactive duty training and who alleges suffering from chronic fatigue and 
chronic Lyme-like disease as a result of these inoculations may be considered to have been disabled by an 
injury in determining whether the member incurred disability due to active service. 
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indemnification and liability costs for civilian injuries or disability claims by service 
members could impose potentially significant costs on the government. 
An additional interesting aspect of judicial review over anthrax vaccine surfaced 
in a different 2003 district court case in Colorado. That case dealt with a U.S. Army 
soldier’s anthrax vaccine refusal. While dismissing the case the lower court noted: 
It is important for the parties and the public to understand exactly what the 
Court is ruling. The Court is not passing on the merits of the anthrax 
program. The plaintiff has raised significant questions about that program. 
If the Court were reviewing the program, the Court would be very 
concerned about the question that the plaintiff has raised. Title 10 United 
States Code Section 1107 provides that whenever the Secretary of Defense 
requests a member of the armed forces to receive an investigational new 
drug, the Secretary must provide a member with notice about the 
investigational nature of the drug and require the member’s consent prior 
to administration ... There have been no tests showing that the vaccine is 
effective at protecting human beings from exposure to inhalation anthrax, 
although animal studies by the Army exist. The Court will not substitute 
its opinion for that of the Army, but it will not review the matter. And its 
ruling today should not be understood as an approval of what the military 
is doing in this case. The military will be held accountable to the public if 
it is using its own soldiers as guinea pigs to determine whether the anthrax 
vaccine has long-term health consequences and whether it protects against 
airborne anthrax. Those decisions, are, as I said, decisions that are 
committed to the Executive Branch of the Government. The Court neither 
approves nor disapproves of those decisions, because it is not the function 
of the Court to do that. Those decisions will be debated, and ultimately the 
Executive Branch will be held accountable to the public for those 
decisions. And that is the way the system of government works. (Barber v. 
U.S. Army, 2003, pp. 16–17). 50 
 
Held: If evidence establishes that an individual suffers from a disabling condition as a result of 
administration of an anthrax vaccination during inactive duty training, the individual may be considered 
disabled by an “injury” incurred during such training as the term is used in 38 U.S.C. § 101 (24), which 
defines “active military, naval, or air service” to include any period of inactive duty training during which 
the individual was disabled or died from an injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty. Consequently, 
such an individual may be found to have incurred disability in active military, naval, or air service for 
purposes of disability compensation under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 or 1131” (McClain, 2002). 
50 The district court ruled in Barber on February, 2, 2003, writing, “The issues in this case are beyond 
the purview of the federal judiciary and … the Court must decline review because the Department of 
Defense has wide latitude over military personnel decisions. ... The courts have little competence in the 
complex decisions as to the control of a military force, and such professional military judgments are more 
properly subject to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” 
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In this case, the court chose not to interfere with the DoD program, but specified 
it was “not passing on the merits of the anthrax program.” Similar to the case dealing 
with the propriety of the final 2005 licensing of the anthrax vaccine, where the court 
granted “considerable deference” to the FDA, the court deferred to the military. Other 
courts similarly acquiesced to the DoD’s commonly accepted jurisdiction over internal 
affaires.51 Language demonstrating judicial deference in such matters is found in the 
following cases: 
a. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), noted that lawsuits “would 
call into question military discipline and decision making would itself require judicial 
inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.” 
b. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), affirmed that the “Courts are ill 
equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon 
military authority might have.” 
c. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), asserted, “Both Congress and this 
Court have found that the special character of the military requires civilian authorities to 
accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with matters that affect internal 
discipline and morale.” 
d. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), upheld that “complex subtle, and 
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping and control of a military 
force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control.”  
As the last case cited above references, the matters in dispute within the DoD are 
“subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches,” and 
ultimately the same exists for the FDA. Since the legal status of the anthrax vaccine and 
the government’s anthrax vaccine programs may face additional judicial review, if 
legislative and executive control fails, a worthwhile examination of potential use of the 
product involves mandatory inoculation policies for civilians. While some states possess 
 
51 Cases of judicial deference include United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); United States 
v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963); Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F. 2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971); and Parker v. Levy, 
417 U.S. 733, 743–44 (1974). 
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the authority to mandate inoculations, the federal government does not currently possess 
such broad power. The Public Health Service Act allows the federal government to pass 
regulations necessary “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one 
State or possession into any other State or possession.” While the states hold primary 
authority to protect the health of the public, including enactment of mandatory 
vaccination policies, federal government jurisdiction remains limited to supporting the 
states and enforcing quarantine policies (42 U.S.C. § 264; Welborn, 2005, p. 5). As 
emphasized in this thesis, the requirement for the products stockpiled to undergo proper 
review reigns as essential to ensure that countermeasures provided by the federal 
government to the states warrant inclusion in mandatory state public health vaccination 
policies. Equally, federal quarantine policies and state mandatory vaccination policies 
must withstand public legal scrutiny after the fact. The federal government, under a grant 
to Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and Georgetown University, 
proposed a Model Emergency Health Powers Act (MEHPA) to assist states in responding 
rapidly to public health threats and emergency occurrences (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health, 2001; Mientka, 2001a). It remains important to note that the 
threat of anthrax does not pose a “communicable” human-to-human risk as addressed 
above under the auspices of the Public Health Service Act. Instead, throughout the 
various analysis methodologies this thesis encourages readers to differentiate “person-to-
person transmission” from “noncommunicable infectious diseases” (Hamburg, 1999). In 
the case of anthrax, we deal with a noncommunicable infectious disease, treatable with 
antibiotics, and without risk of human-to-human exposure. 
Overall, the judicial review process captures an important aspect of the anthrax 
vaccine experience regarding checks and balances, civilian control of the military, and 
executive agency responses to this process. At times DoD officials reacted adversely 
when questioned about the federal judicial review. One reporter asked a DoD political 
appointee doctor if the federal judge was “factually wrong when he said that the vaccine 
is still in investigational drug.” The official, DoD Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs Dr. William Winkenwerder, responded, “Absolutely” (Winkenwerder, 
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2003). Within one week, the FDA filed a final rule in the federal register to finalize the 
proposed ruling first published in 1985. This allowed a lifting of the federal court 
injunction. In an official posting on the resumption of the program Dr. Winkenwerder 
expressed hope that the “inflammatory and inaccurate statements the litigation has 
spawned can be clearly put to rest” (Winkenwerder, n.d.). Later court rulings placed the 
responses in perspective. Ultimately, the court granted service members “prevailing 
party” status based on the illegal nature of the program due to the previously unfinalized 
license (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). The DoD’s reaction provides instructive lessons on how 
the DHS, or other federal executive agencies, respond to challenges of the legal 
suitability of bioterrorism countermeasures in the future. Government officials’ digestion 
of the outcomes of these oversight processes seems as important as the checks and 
balances themselves. When courts do rule, a process exists to appeal those findings. Just 
as the regulatory scheme related to the anthrax vaccine took years to sort out, ultimately 
the judicial review process and the laws will control the legacy of anthrax vaccine. The 
process of ensuring that checks and balances prevail over politics is long and arduous, but 
a fair one over time. 
The judicial review process related to anthrax vaccine summarized above is 
tightly interwoven with the legislative process and the formulation of the laws of the 
land. The next formative section of the program evaluation chapter covers aspects of the 
legislative review processes in relation to the anthrax vaccine. 
4. Legislative Review 
Legislative review, while seemingly unproductive in the near term due to political 
dynamics, proves far from futile. Controversial issues may stall due to lack of consensus, 
but progress results over time from the process and its byproducts. In the case of the 
anthrax vaccine controversy, congressional and GAO reports provide a wealth of 
perspective. The Congress allows national figures such as Ross Perot to express his 
concerns about the old anthrax vaccine and Gulf War illness. Congressional testimony 
also allows the voices of the privates and the sergeants to be heard (HR 107–137, 2002, 
p. 83; Cam, 2000; DVA-RACGWI, 2008; Schumm et al., 2007). The laws promulgated 
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by Congress provide guidance for executive implementation of programs, as well as the 
instruments for judicial review. 
Congress often legislates to fix problems after the fact. A valuable formative 
impact serves as the benefit. Historic government-influenced medical controversies, such 
as the Tuskegee experimentation with syphilis, radiation testing, and Agent Orange 
exposure serve as seminal examples (Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments [ACHRE], 1995; Clinton, 1997; DVA, n.d.). Because the executive, 
judicial, and legislative actions interlace, guiding laws are included with significant 
legislative events as detailed below: 
a. 10 USC § 1107, a law pertaining to requirements for informed consent, 
titled “Notice of use of an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied 
use (10 U.S.C. § 1107, 1998). 
b. BioShield Act52 (HR 110-23, 2007; Public Law 108–276, 2004; CRS-, 
2007; DHHS, 2008a; POTUS, 2008a). 
c. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP) Act53 
(DHHS
d. Senate Hearing confirming lack of sufficient efficacy of anthrax vaccine 
for aerosol exposure, titled “Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons” 
(United States Senate, 1989). 
e. Senate Report, deeming anthrax vaccine “investigational,” titled “Is 
military research hazardous to veterans’ health?: Lessons spanning half a century” 
(United States Senate, 1994). 
f. Senate Resolution seeking an expression of the “sense of the Senate” 
regarding anthrax, and requesting reconsideration of the mandatory program (United 
States Senate, 2003). 
 
52 The BioShield Act of 2004, promulgated under Public Law 108-276, evolved from the 2002 Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, and is pursuant to § 564 of the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3). 
53 The PREP Act, promulgated under Public Law 109-148, is pursuant to § 319F-3(b) of the Public 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d). 
 128
g. House Report, citing anthrax vaccine as “experimental,” titled “Unproven 
Force Protection” (HR 106-556, 2000). 
h. House Resolution to prohibit the DoD from mandating anthrax 
immunizations, and to correct the records of service members previously punished for 
refusing to take these vaccines (United States House of Representatives resolution [HR 
5166], 2004). 
i. Hearings supportive or neutral of the DoD anthrax vaccine program (HR 
106-28, 1999; HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999; HR, Committee on Armed 
Services, 2000; United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, 2000). 
j. Hearings critical of the DoD anthrax vaccine program (HR 106-17, 1999a; 
HR, Committee on Government Reform (HR 106-130), 1999e; HR 106-102, 1999; HR, 
Committee on Government Reform (HR 106-131), 1999d; HR, Committee on 
Government Reform (HR 106-249), 2000; HR, Committee on Government Reform (HR 
106-26), 1999b; HR, Committee on Government Reform (HR 106-36), 1999c; HR, 
Committee on Government Reform (HR 107–137), 2002). 
k. A single GAO report favorably evaluated the DoD anthrax vaccine 
program (GAO-NSIAD, 1998). 
l. GAO reports generally critical of the DoD anthrax vaccine program (GAO-
NSIAD, 1999d; GAO-NSIAD, 1999g; GAO-NSIAD, 2000a; GAO-NSIAD, 2000b; 
GAO-NSIAD, 1999e; GAO-NSIAD, 1999f; GAO-NSIAD, 1999a; GAO-NSIAD, 1999b; 
GAO-NSIAD, 1999c; GAO, 2001a; GAO, 2000b; GAO, 2000a; GAO, 2001b; GAO, 
2001c; GAO, 2002a; GAO, 2002b; GAO, 2006; GAO, 2007b; GAO, 2007d). 
The legislative inquiry process, while illustrative of a lack of consensus, also 
demonstrates that the vast majority of the congressional reports and initiatives generally 
questioned the DoD anthrax vaccine program. The supportive hearings, as opposed to 
those critical of the vaccine, appeared to fall across committee versus party lines. 
Alternatively, the GAO reports almost unanimously criticized the DoD’s anthrax vaccine 
experience, albeit for one report published at the outset of the program. The houses of 
Congress seemed similarly split in their opinions on the anthrax vaccine, with the 
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majority of inquiry emerging from the House Government Reform Committee. That 
committee also published the sole program committee report in the House of 
Representatives after almost one dozen hearings. The conclusions of the House’s 
“Unproven Force Protection” report mirrored conclusions by a Senate staff report the 
previous decade, preceding the anthrax force-wide mandatory anthrax vaccine program. 
Both reports deemed the vaccine either “investigational” or “experimental” (HR 106-556, 
2000; United States Senate, 1994). Both the Senate and the House proposed resolutions 
to halt mandatory immunizations (United States Senate, 2003; HR 5166, 2004). Both 
resolutions asked for record corrections for soldiers for prior punishments meted out, well 
prior to the federal court illegality rulings, but neither garnered consensus among 
congressional colleagues. 
As part of the legislative process, some lawmakers, such as Representatives 
Christopher Shays of Connecticut and Dan Burton of Indiana, vociferously advocated 
soldiers’ health rights. Representative Shays, as the chairperson for the Committee on 
Government Reform, published the sole committee report on the issue, “Unproven Force 
Protection” (HR 106-556, 2000). In contrast, Congressman Steve Buyer of Indiana 
provided comments in congressional hearings regarding the vaccine’s approval: 
If the anthrax is actually placed on your skin, then it is FDA approved. If it 
is airborne through air assault, it is not FDA approved … See how people 
get confused. It is FDA approved for one type but not for the other. (HR 
106-28, 1999, p. 57) 
Congressman Buyer also served as a reservist. He added to his testimony, stating, 
“But as a soldier, if I am going into the theater and I know they are going to drop anthrax 
on me, give me the vaccine. You know, give me the vaccine” (HR 106-28, 1999, p. 57). 
In another hearing Representative Buyer took exception to the attention the vaccine issue 
received (HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, p. 128). Significantly, the issues at 
play with the DoD anthrax vaccine controversy centered on laws pertaining to FDA 
approvals and revolved around the legally prescribed health rights afforded by the 
Congress of the United States for service members of all ranks and occupations. While 
the Congressmen acknowledged that anthrax exposure from “airborne … assault” was 
“not FDA approved,” echoing the conclusions of a later report (HR 106-556, 2000), the 
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Congress failed to call for enforcement of the laws that the legislative body had enacted 
regarding informed consent for experimental products. 
As a case in point, demonstrating the ongoing oversight by congressional 
officials, DHHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius recently responded to an inquiry from 
Representative Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona. While referencing the 2008 Commission 
on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, the DHHS Secretary ignored the 
fact that the report omitted reference to the current anthrax vaccine (Sebelius, 2009, p. 1; 
Graham, 2008). Similarly the update to that report details initiatives by the DHHS 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) to develop a new 
anthrax vaccine in citing the “development and stockpiling of the eight biodefense 
requirements laid out in HHS’s Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 
Enterprise” (PHEMCE) (Graham & Talent, 2009, p. 11). The DHHS response also 
specifically allayed congressional concerns about the current anthrax vaccine by 
reaffirming that while “vaccines are a key component of our strategy, antimicrobials are 
the first line of defense to protect the nation following an anthrax attack.” The letter 
confirmed the unapproved nature of utilizing the current anthrax vaccine after an anthrax 
attack without an Emergency Use Authorization, as well as BARDA’s objective to 
“award” a decision on the next generation anthrax vaccine “before the end of 2009.” The 
official DHHS response by the new administration’s officials effectively avoided 
countering the concerns relayed about the current anthrax vaccine but instead cited the 
IOM report’s recommendation about the urgent need for a new anthrax vaccine and 
BARDA’s corresponding efforts (Sebelius, 2009, pp. 1–3). 
Congress’s examination, like the parallel judicial and executive processes, 
exemplifies the formative nature of how the checks and balances continue. The 
continuum of the legislative inquiry process serves as an important pattern for current or 
future lawmakers to consider. The earliest hearings reveal DoD endorsement of the 
fundamental premise of this thesis through a letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Robert B. Barker to Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Senator 
John Glenn. Senate Report 101-744, an analysis of the global spread of chemical and 
biological weapons, included an assessment of the anthrax vaccine by DoD officials at 
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the time that affirmed a “higher than desirable rate of reactogenicity [adverse reactions].” 
The report added concerns about instances of a “lack of strong enough efficacy against 
infection by the aerosol route of exposure [inhalation anthrax]” (United States Senate, 
1989, p. 474). Senate Report 103-97, chronicling “military research hazardous to 
veterans’ health” and “lessons spanning half a century,” replicated the pattern (United 
States Senate, 1994) as did the House Report, “Unproven Force Protection,” in citing 
anthrax vaccine as “experimental” (HR 106-556, 2000). At first glance, legislative review 
may appear stymied by a lack of consensus, but a formative review conclusion suggests 
that future legislators, as with syphilis experimentation, radiation hazards, and Agent 
Orange, will resolve much of the divisiveness. The legislative process, though seemingly 
the most political due to difficulties in gaining consensus, ultimately emerges as a 
powerful instrument for checks and balances once the parties reach consensus. 
Summarizing the formative analysis within the program evaluation, the checks 
and balances designed by the founders sagely offer a healthy tension to ensure that we 
provide the best products to the American people through the SNS. While the political 
process remains a healthy aspect of the American form of government, the DHS must 
guard vigilantly to guarantee the political process does not have a “corrupting influence 
upon science in the biodefence arena,” one which subjugates the “truth, ethical practices 
and justice to a subordinate position” (Schumm et al., 2009, p. 597). 
E. SUMMARY OF THE PROGRAM EVALUATION 
The preceding program evaluation involved significant process tracing, starting 
with a quantitative analysis of safety, efficacy, and technological measurements related to 
the anthrax vaccine. The subsequent qualitative analysis reviewed regulatory constructs 
and intelligence forecasts regarding the threat, intended to guarantee quality protective 
products based on superior predictions by the intelligence community. The summative 
evaluation analyzed past doctrinal aspects of the program, in addition to a glimpse of how 
comparative governments approach biological prophylaxis. The formative evaluation 
sought to analyze anthrax vaccine from the lens of executive, judicial, and legislative 
review. Those avenues serve as the long-term arbiter for the propriety of the anthrax 
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vaccine and potentially for successful redress by those potentially impacted by its ill 
effects. The stark realities highlighted throughout the program evaluation continue to 
reveal controversial themes of shifts in professional judgments about the vaccine. The 
continuum of program evaluation serves as essential for reviewing a product not 
originally recommended for widespread use. The chasm between a lack of historic 
endorsement and commensurate programmatic troubles compares incongruously to recent 
expanded sole source countermeasure procurement of the vaccine. Therefore, the thesis 
requires one final methodology in order to help explain the “gap” between the 
recognition of past problems versus the current increased utilization of the vaccine. 
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V. GAP ANALYSIS 
The following gap analysis provides explanations derived from social 
psychological, business strategy, political, and multi-disciplinary viewpoints. The 
explanations provide perspective on the inconsistencies between past medical and policy 
recommendations, when the government agreed on the unsatisfactory status of the current 
anthrax vaccine, as compared to current policy using the same vaccine 25 years later as a 
principal component of the SNS. 
A. GAP EXPLANATIONS 
Until the late 1990s, the collective wisdom of government and medical 
communities concluded that the long-established anthrax vaccine required replacement. 
To this day calls for a new vaccine persist. While most concur that “there are critical 
shortcomings in the US anthrax vaccine program” (Weiss et al., 2007), the continued 
reliance on a product long held as inadequate defines the “gap.”  
The pivotal 2001 anthrax letter attacks occurred at the very time when the gap had 
almost closed. Afterward, the DoD seized upon the crime by the lone bioterroism actor to 
emphasize the authentic risk that anthrax poses to combat forces (Keys & Taylor, 2005; 
DoD, 2009c, p. 4). Since the inside source of the anthrax letter attack, and its motive to 
“save” the anthrax program, were not revealed until 2008, the DoD made the case that 
“the threat is real” based on the five deaths in 2001 (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15; DoD, 2009a). 
The sequence of events allowed the gap to widen, with DHS endorsement and DHHS 
procurement of significant additional quantities of the vaccine for the SNS. At that 
juncture, the previous review of the anthrax vaccine evaporated and analysis of the 
breaches escaped final examination and action to “minimize” its use (Chu & Aldridge, 
2001). Many military members, and perhaps other Americans as well in the years to 
come, find difficulty in accepting a corresponding shift in rhetoric and promotion of a 
countermeasure, which even the DoD previously critiqued. 
The Army Times Publishing Company published a cover story during the early 
years of the George W. Bush administration (Miller, 2001) depicting the gap between 
what the government espoused compared to what service members discovered in readily 
available medical literature and government reports. Published in all four of their military 
papers, the article, titled “What the government doesn’t want you to know about anthrax 
vaccine,” included a cover story with an illustration of a hand covering up discomforting 
facts about the vaccine. The Army Times Publishing Company laid out the facts on the 
front page, perhaps with the objective that senior leaders of the military and government 
could better understand the gaps created by the mantra of those who sold the anthrax 
vaccine program to the troops. Figure 4 illustrates the controversial anthrax vaccine issue 
as depicted on the front pages of the Marine Times, the Army Times, the Navy Times, and 
the Air Force Times. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Army Times Publishing Company, “Shots In The Dark” 
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1. Social Psychology Methodology Explains the “Gap” 
The social psychology methodology helps explain the “gap,” or the holes in logic 
perpetuating the stockpiling of a known unsatisfactory product for the SNS by the DHS 
and the DHHS. The story behind the currently licensed anthrax vaccine reveals an 
intriguing aspect of Homeland and National Security from a psychological and 
sociological lens. A thorough review of the anthrax vaccine issue, viewed through the 
earlier literature review, case study and program evaluation multiprism methodologies, 
unveiled numerous problematic tentacles. Whether literary dichotomies, technological 
limitations, risk management questions, possible fiscal irresponsibility, or problematic 
medical, scientific, regulatory, and legal processes, each examination offers unique 
perspectives. 
In the case of the psychological aspects, disclosure of intricate interactions and 
relationships helps us to deconstruct, and therefore better understand, continued support 
for procurement of the vaccine by the DHS today. The social psychology methodology 
assists us on the journey of discovering how “good people can be induced, seduced, and 
initiated into behaving in evil ways” (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 211). In this case, the DoD 
procured an experimental vaccine, with known problems, and illegally ordered the 
vaccine’s use on soldiers under the threat of punishment when many entities within the 
institution knew that the vaccine suffered significant limitations and the mandate violated 
the nation’s laws. Social psychologists studied such a phenomenon where, “with 
numbing regularity, good people were seen to knuckle under the demands of authority 
and perform actions that were callous and severe” (Milgram, 1974, p. 123). 
Today, although the FDA finalized the vaccine license, the DHS authorizes the 
same documented less-than-ideal product for citizens in emergencies. Despite 
government risk assessment awareness that the anthrax letter attacks “demonstrated [a] 
low correlation between environmental exposure and infection risk” (NRC, 2008), earlier 
projections of up to 13,000 fatalities appeared to propel a continuation of policy and 
procurements (DHS, 2009b). A logical question is why, particularly when simple 
antibiotics remain the recommended “first line of defense” for anthrax infection (HR, 
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Committee on Homeland Security, 2007, p. 48–50).54 This contradictory scenario 
requires the use of psychological and sociological methodologies to help explain the 
questions about the human behaviors and motivations that lie at the root of these 
questions. 
Psychology offers a means of better understanding why military and government 
leaders continued to procure the old known “unsatisfactory” (Brachman & Friedlander, 
1998, p. 636) and “inadequate” (FDA, 1997; IOM, 2000; Schumm, 2004) anthrax 
vaccine. The methodology offers a means for interpretation of the human behaviors 
involved, as well as an opportunity to derive lessons. The hermeneutic of psychology 
allows an evaluation of the ethical breaches associated with the anthrax vaccine, beyond 
individual sociopathic deviations, and instead permits a focusing on the institutional and 
situational contexts. To accomplish this objective for the social psychology section of the 
gap analysis chapter, we explore a sampling of several cognitive concepts, such as 
confirmation bias, probability neglect, availability heuristic, negativity bias, and social 
identity theory in order to provide perspective on the human behaviors that transcend the 
legal violations. 
a. Confirmation Bias 
The first cognitive concept involves that of “confirmation bias,” or the 
ability of humans to confirm what they want to believe or rationalize, while discounting 
evidence to the contrary. Nazi atrocities demonstrate the strength of collective 
confirmation bias as one of the strongest forces in human nature, particularly when 
combined with societal acceptance (Weiner, 2008). When placed into the context of the 
anthrax vaccine issue, military leaders needed a countermeasure to protect their troops 
 
54 Government officials testifying about the primacy of antibiotics and antimicrobials to address the 
anthrax threat, while also emphasizing the need for a next generation anthrax vaccine: 
Mr. PARKER. Well, first, I just want to say that antibiotics are the first line of defense and we do have 
a very significant stockpile of antibiotics and that is the first line of defense. 
Dr. FAUCI. The best approach towards anthrax is antimicrobial therapy.  
Mr. PARKER. We need to continue to develop and procure a second generation vaccine. But we also 
need to look forward to that third generation that has better characteristics that make it more 
deployable in an emergency, in a disaster situation. So we need that balanced approach for anthrax 
vaccines (HR, Committee on Homeland Security, 2007, p. 48–50). 
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against a biological threat, and therefore when presented with evidence “partial to 
existing beliefs” (Nickerson, 1998) and needs, the utility of contradictory information 
was not entertained. In the case of the DoD anthrax vaccine program, the mantra that the 
vaccine was “safe, effective, FDA-licensed and essential” (Cragin, 1999) did not allow 
room “to be tolerant of the beliefs or opinions of others” (Nickerson, 1998, p. 1328).  
The tendency to “look for evidence that is directly supportive of 
hypotheses” became the modus operandi of the DoD, while simultaneously 
“embarrassing” alternative hypotheses with maligning bylines such as “ignore the 
paranoiacs; the vaccine is safe” (Blanck, 1999; Nickerson, 1998). In the armed forces 
“simply being aware of the confirmation bias—of its pervasiveness and of the many 
guises in which it appears” (Nickerson, 1998)—ultimately did not comport with the 
requirement for good order, and therefore those pointing out inconsistencies, regardless 
of their veracity, were disciplined. One military officer testified about the “stark 
divergence of the medical community’s assessment of the safety and efficacy” of the 
vaccine, and the coincidence that this phenomenon occurred at the same time the DoD 
program began (Dingle, 2001). The officer was one of hundreds of soldiers removed 
from their service positions when unwilling to salute smartly in the face of confirmation 
bias. 
b. Probability Neglect 
Another directly applicable cognitive concept includes probability neglect, 
where people “subjectively overestimate the probability of highly undesirable but 
objectively rare outcomes.” Obviously, with an anthrax attack, “intense negative 
emotions are involved,” and our “attention is captured by the dreaded outcome,” 
regardless of the “relatively small chance of the threat actually occurring.” Such 
probability neglect “is an important contributor to sustaining disproportionate fears of 
terrorism,” (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 122), in this case that of anthrax based 
on attacks fomented by an Army scientist to perpetuate his vaccine program. Government 
scientists for years recognized that a “bioterrorist event is low probability and high 
consequence,” and also recognized that “new and better drugs for treatment or 
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prophylaxis, and new vaccines, especially against anthrax and smallpox, are needed” 
(Hamburg, 1999). The Army scientist, aware of the calls for a new vaccine, thus 
overcame the low probability component of probability neglect to surmount both the 
problems with his product and the statistical improbability of an anthrax epidemic. 
c. Availability Heuristic 
Experts in psychology also describe the notion of the availability heuristic, 
or a “tendency of people to assign a higher perceived probability (or risk) to vivid, easily 
imagined (available) events” (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 121). For years 
military and government proponents of the anthrax vaccine claimed that “the threat is 
real” (Cohen, 1998a; Cohen, 1998b; HR, Committee on Government Reform, 1999; 
DoD, 2009a, pp. 14–17). The anthrax letter attacks of 2001 not only overcame 
probability neglect but also created the data point to make the availability heuristic a 
reality. The attacks, which paralyzed the nation at a time when immense residual fear 
existed due to the World Trade Center tragedy, demonstrated the power of the “base rate 
fallacy” due to the “weight [of] recent, easily imagined, and highly arousing events” 
(Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 35). Government leaders then leveraged the 
commonly related “affect heuristic to make judgments,” with fear facilitating “decision 
making and risk appraisals.” In other words, the attacks directly affected present policy 
and procurement decisions because “ordinary people use their feelings to estimate risk” 
(Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 121).  
The attacks, and resultant paranoia, affected over $57 billion in biodefense 
expenditures (Clark, 2009; Drogin, 2009; FBO, 2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 
2008). The availability heuristic also became evident in post-facto scientific studies 
generated to justify the vaccine. The IOM documented the creation of the new science. 
Prior to 2001, there were “only a few published peer-reviewed studies examining the 
safety of the anthrax vaccine in humans.” Independent expert reviews found a “paucity of 
published peer-reviewed literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine”55 (IOM, 2000, 
 
55 According to the Institute of Medicine, “The committee located only one randomized peer-reviewed 
study of the type of anthrax vaccine used in the United States” (IOM, 2002, pp. 257, 259). 
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pp. 257, 259). Presently though, “twenty safety studies of various types [had] been 
performed to assess anthrax vaccine,” (DoD, 2009c, p. 31). The sudden availability of 
new medical literature, supportive of the vaccine, assisted in validating policy. 
Ultimately, when a “substantial number of service members disagreed with issues 
regarding the ethics, safety, and efficacy” of the vaccine, the rationalized conclusion was 
that an increased availability of “enhanced training and education” (Pica-Branco & 
Hudak, 2008, pp. 429–33) would solve the problem. 
As a parallel to the education and information campaigns, the vaccine 
manufacturer also ensured the “availability” of over $5 million to pay lobbyists to remind 
lawmakers about the vividness of the threat, which potentially influenced decision-
making in Washington (Associated Press, 2008; Willman, 2007). 
d. Negativity Bias 
Experts have also found that “human beings are much more powerfully 
influenced by negative than positive information” (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 
122). Within the anthrax vaccine quandary a fascinating psychological dilemma appears 
where negativity bias manifests itself in multidimensional forms of fear. Contrasting fears 
exist from fear of the immunization to fear of the threat. In addition, “military service 
members fear reprisal if they refuse to participate” (Pica-Branco & Hudak, 2008, p. 431). 
The negativity of the threat to create fear was exemplified by the Defense Secretary’s 
waving a five-pound bag of sugar in 1997, pretending that it was anthrax, and insisting 
that it would kill 50% of Washington’s population56 (DoD, 1997a; also illustrated in 
Figure 3). Top government officials also emphasized that the “anthrax attacks in October 
2001 illustrated the risk” (Keys & Taylor, 2005), while others warned of the uniformly 
lethal, “unequivocal,” and “incontrovertible” nature of the threat to justify the vaccine 
(HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, p. 56). 
Threat fears aside, military leaders attempted to counter soldiers’ concerns 
about vaccine safety problems with negativity tactics. For example, a top general 
 
56  Defense Secretary William Cohen held up a five-pound bag of sugar on TV to show the amount of 
the biological weapon anthrax that could destroy half the population of Washington, D.C. (DoD, 1997a). 
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humiliated soldiers by stating that soldiers opposed to the vaccine “are petrified that their 
penis is going to fall off” (Bacevich, 2000, p. 225). Other top generals negatively framed 
concerns over the vaccine as “fear of immunization” (HR, Committee on Government 
Reform, 1999, pp. 15–17) by “refuseniks.” In other words, they equated professional 
questions about the vaccine to cowardice by troublemakers “who don’t want to be in the 
military” (HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, pp. 33). Both negativity bias tactics 
successfully diverted attention away from legitimate medical, legal, and regulatory 
problems. Concerned soldiers were discharged, and just when the vaccine program was 
about to be stopped by a new administration, the anthrax letter attacks created a new 
spiral of negativity. 
As a result, the DoD revived and expanded the vaccination program, 
ostensibly confirming that the Congress, the people, and the media were swayed by 
“threatening” forecasts, possibly because “negative information is more contagious and 
‘stickier’ than positive information” (Weiner, 2008). The people’s fears57 effectively 
succumbed to negativity bias, versus positive reflection on the fact that “antibiotics alone, 
without the vaccine, are effective in killing anthrax bacteria” (HR, Committee on 
Homeland Security, 2007, p. 17). 
e. Social Identity Theory 
Concepts from social psychology may also assist us in understanding “in–
group bias,” which supports institutionalized policy directions (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, 
Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, pp. 358, 363). Social identity theory in particular 
provides a commonsense explanation of a member’s desire to belong to any 
organization.58 Manifestations of the desire to belong include examples such as the fact 
 
57 For additional references where fear and negativity was used to justify and perpetuate the anthrax 
vaccine program, see, e.g., Allison, 2002; Business Wire, 2007; Charatan, 2000; Clark, 2009; Corrigan, 
2001; Drogin, 2009; Eberhart, 2001a; Eberhart, 2001b; FDA, 2005b; GAO, 2000a; Graham, 1996; 
Grossman, 2000; Leitenberg, 2005; Mason, 2005; Mayo Clinic, 2009; Meek, 2008; Melman, 2009a; 
Melman, 2009b; Milbank, 2005; Stemp-Morlock, 2006; Teibel, 2009; UPI, 2009; Weiss, 2001. 
58 Western society emphasizes the need for a “positive and distinct” identity, and in a more global 
context some would suggest that “authenticity” in identity is also important. In the military context, though, 
only the “positive” identity attribute is required for success and in-group inclusion. Military service may in 
fact more narrowly shun both distinctiveness and authenticity in identity due to the need for the good order 
and discipline of the team (Moghaddam, 2006, pp. 27, 41). 
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that “many service members are afraid to report health problems associated with the 
vaccine for fear of being labeled as troublemakers” (Grossman, 2000). Further, 
opposition to the vaccine consistently found DoD leaders, the in-group, flanking 
“refuseniks” with accusations of failing to be a part of the “team effort” (HR, Committee 
on Armed Services, 1999). From the highest offices, the message was clear:  “Soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and Marines fight in teams and they need to know that all team members 
are protected from anthrax” (Cragin, 1999). 
As a result, those concerned about vaccine “adverse events,” or illnesses, 
faced “the risk of being labeled as a malingerer” (IOM, 2002, pp. 102, 108). All the 
while, government reports reported that “a new vaccine, developed according to more 
modern principles of vaccinology, is urgently needed,” that the current product is “far 
from satisfactory,” and acknowledged the immunization as “relatively crude vaccine by 
current standards” (IOM, 2002, pp. 20–21, 199–200). With respect to the military 
dynamics at play, esteemed social psychologist Dr. Stanley Milgram identified these very 
social identity concepts writing, “The soldier does not wish to appear a coward, disloyal, 
or un-American. The situation has been so defined that he can see himself as patriotic, 
courageous, and manly only through compliance” (Milgram, 1974, p. 182). The in-group 
knew the playbook, and apparently pitted the sociological realities against the ethical 
choices troops must make in order to evoke obedience and belong to the in-group. 
f. “Bad Apples” or “Bad Barrel”? 
The pursuit of an explanation brings us to a relevant military analysis of 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The prisoner abuse controversy from America’s earlier 
experience in Iraq highlighted perceptions regarding the institutional nature of the 
“psychological causes behind such disturbing metamorphoses” where people collectively 
commit wrongs. Without judging the case of the Abu Ghraib controversy, this analysis 
merely adopts the “premise that ordinary people, even good ones, can be seduced, 
recruited, initiated into behaving in evil ways under the sway of powerful systematic and 
situational forces” (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 443). The study of Abu Ghraib helps us to place 
the idiosyncratic social behaviors in perspective by altering the common notion of a “bad 
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apple.” More apropos is the prospect of a “bad barrel,” or “the idea that the social setting 
and the system contaminate the individual, rather than the other way around.” The “bad 
barrel” concept acknowledges the potentially “corrosive influence of powerful situational 
forces” (Zimbardo, 2007; Zimbardo, 2009, forward). 
Reflecting on the Stanford prison experiment and Dr. Zimbardo’s “bad 
barrel” metaphor as it relates to the anthrax vaccine program, we discover the possibility 
of DoD leaders being “caught up in the crucible of social forces” (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 
211). In contrast, concerned soldiers served as the situational subjects and, when 
noncompliant, found themselves labeled as “bad apples.” In line with a “truism in 
psychology,” an obedience-oriented military culture and a command-influence 
environment, dictating the mandatory vaccination policy emerged as a situational level 
“bad barrel” (Zimbardo, 2006; Zimbardo, 2009, pp. 18, 20–21) based on the program’s 
illegalities. Like the perception of situational missteps at Abu Ghraib, the anthrax vaccine 
dilemma potentially “represents the triumph of a mindless dispositional view” 
(Zimbardo, 2006, pp. 21–22). Indeed, the DoD levied disparagement and adverse actions 
against individual “bad apples” for not wanting to submit to a problematic vaccine and 
for refusing to participate in what turned out to be an illegal order. After the fact, the 
courts ruled the vaccine to be unlicensed, experimental, and illegal as some troops had 
originally cautioned. As with perceptions regarding the controversial attempts to extract 
accountability for Abu Ghraib, responsibility for the problems with the anthrax vaccine 
ultimately only occurred at the bottom rung of the chain of command. In effect, the 
institutional nature of the anthrax vaccine program fulfilled the “bad barrel” role, whereas 
the top leaders potentially and unwittingly served as the “bad barrel makers” (Zimbardo, 
2009). 
Following the federal court injunctions, neither the program nor the 
leaders faced accountability for the violations. Top DoD leaders, the original “makers” of 
both the anthrax vaccine and the mandatory policy, also constructed the mandate as a 
“Commander’s program,” effectively cancelling doctors and the Hippocratic Oath out of 
the equation (Chu, 2005, p. 3). Reducing the medical doctor’s role as an “ingredient” in 
the barrel complemented the “situationist recipe for behavioral transformations” 
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(Zimbardo, 2005, pp. 26–28). The “Commander’s program” emphasis dissected the 
medical professionals out of the operation. In doing so, the DoD effectively cut off 
military doctors from performing their intended duty to serve as the “bad barrel” vaccine 
industry regulators. 
g. Closing the Psychological Gap 
Globalization and asymmetric warfare place the nation in a predicament 
for the near future. Bioterrorism as a form of asymmetric warfare exemplifies this 
conundrum, as evidenced by the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. While some suggest 
“irresponsible coverage” by the media could “lead to chaos,” this thesis demonstrates that 
the government itself shares responsibility for setting the tone of the nation’s reaction to 
such events. An article written in 2000 and prior to the letter attacks embellished the 
threat, saying, but not citing, that “50 kilograms of anthrax released from an airplane 
could create a lethal cloud of anthrax spores that would extend more than 20 kilometers 
downwind.” The author added, parenthetically referencing a congressional source, that 
“130,000 to three million deaths could occur following the release of 100 kilograms of 
aerosolized anthrax over Washington, DC” (Wyatt, 2000, p. 63, 66). Yet government 
reports concluded, “Reactions to anthrax episodes were strongly conditioned—and 
exaggerated—by their occurrence so soon after September 11” (IOM, 2002, p.2). 
Confirmation bias, probability neglect, availability heuristics, and negativity bias all 
appear to apply. Ironically, in the case of the anthrax attacks, it was the government that 
hyped the threat to justify use of the vaccine before and after the attacks, and it was a 
government scientist that committed the terrorist attack to revive use of the vaccine when 
the program was about to fail. Regardless of the contributing bias and motives for the 
hype or the attacks, “the policy of self-policing and accurate, responsible reporting must 
be followed in the event of a bioterrorist attack and the time to prepare for such reporting 
is now” (Wyatt, 2000, p.66). 
Overcoming biases and surmounting the “evil of inaction” (Zimbardo, 
2005, p. 42) presents a challenge. Recently, a government report related to WMD 
recommended “whistleblower mechanisms” (Graham & Talent, 2008, p. 31). Others 
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advocate “integrity system heroes” where a dimension of humility exists in an 
environment that facilitates expressions of minority opinion. This environment replaces 
egocentrism with sociocentrism in order to overcome the “root causes” of inherent 
situational evils over time. “Chronicity” is a term used by Dr. Zimbardo to describe the 
healing power of time (Zimbardo, 2007; Zimbardo, 2009, p. 466). Historic examples of 
chronicity include presidential apologies for syphilis testing after 50 years (Clinton, 
1997), radiation testing 40 years after the fact (ACHRE, 1995), and government 
acknowledgment about the toxic effects of Agent Orange (DVA, n.d.). Notwithstanding 
the inherent injustices created due to untimely corrections, man’s dispositional ability to 
correct evil through the remedy of reflection serves as a belated counterweight to 
situational evils (Zimbardo, 2005, pp. 47, 210). Along with time, societies require system 
heroes and bad-barrel regulators to accelerate the process. Time, heroes, and regulators 
can compress chronicity and halt the patently wrong acts by those who would manipulate 
social biases in order to get their way. Heroes and regulators must heed the “call to action 
and to service when others fail to act”59 (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 461). In the case of the 
anthrax vaccine, the government must strive to enlist the confidence of the public in the 
medicines it stockpiles and always remember, “The public will not take the pill if it does 
not trust the doctor” (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002, p. 218). 
 
59 Dr. Phillip Zimbardo offers a four-dimensional model of heroism, called the motivational and 
decisional framework. The model grids the “engagement style” vs. “risk type/sacrifice.” The questioning of 
the anthrax vaccine occurs on the entire right side of the framework—both active (gallant) and passive 
(fortitude) across the full spectrum of the social sacrifice quadrants. Government leaders who go back and 
analyze the anthrax vaccine’s potential role in Gulf War illness, the “failing” status that resulted in the 
recommended cancellation of the program in the summer of 2001, and the vaccine’s suspected role as 
motive (per the FBI) in the anthrax letter attacks, will undoubtedly fill the void of civil-service heroes.  
A third dimension on the grid includes “quest,” i.e., whether or not a heroic quest serves to preserve 
life or preserve an ideal. The quest to challenge the anthrax vaccine program could be viewed as one of the 
preservation of life if one believes the vaccine to be unsafe or one of the preservation of an ideal if one 
focuses on the unethical or illegal aspects of the program. Clearly, it could also be a combination of the two 
as the illegalities could represent both unethical breaches, such as improper safety testing, which could lead 
to loss of life if left unchallenged. Dr. Zimbardo adds a fourth dimension to the model, that of “chronicity.” 
By adopting this dimension, he acknowledges, “heroism can accrue over time.” He adds that bravery in 
battle across time might be termed “valor,” but adds, “There are not yet comparable terms to denote 
duration in civil heroism.”  
The long-term struggle to challenge the problems with anthrax vaccine could qualify. Dr. Zimbardo 
adds the term “collective heroism,” which may likely serve as the best venue for success. Congressional 
leaders, judicial review across multiple jurisdictions, or members of a new executive branch team might 
represent “collective heroism” when applied to the anthrax vaccine example (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 480–82). 
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Over time, the DHS should choose the right course, steering clear of 
adopting potential sociopathic pathologies and biases in order to accomplish institutional 
objectives as appears to be the case with the DoD anthrax vaccine experience. Simply 
put, the DHS and the DHHS should do their own homework and avoid adopting the 
potentially flawed dogma of DoD policy. Internal systemic benefits will occur merely 
due to the independent inquiry of checks and balances. Clearly, a system that fails to do 
so defines unhealthy pathologies. Dr. Milgram cautioned, “The disappearance of a sense 
of responsibility is the most far-reaching consequence of submission to authority” 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 8). Awareness of social psychology factors, and their intrinsic biases, 
will help preclude such an eventuality and aid in checking the negative pathologies 
associated with anthrax vaccine over the long run. 
2. Anthrax Vaccine as a Model “Blue Ocean” Strategy 
The focus of the present thesis requests reflection on the DoD experience with 
anthrax vaccine to aid in a retrospective analysis by the DHS. We therefore borrow from 
the business concepts articulated in Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) in 
order to provide perspective and an explanation for the gaps existent with the anthrax 
vaccine’s market-value innovation. In essence, the outlier case represented by the anthrax 
vaccine also characterizes the attractive marketplace gaps, or the uncultivated business 
opportunities provided due to the vaccine’s cozy status of governmental support. 
As a result, the anthrax vaccine enterprise hails as a “benchmark” in strategic 
“Blue Ocean” business ventures. As revealed through the event-cause relationships 
described in the Chapter III’s case study, the DoD effectively served as an “intimate” 
business partner to the anthrax vaccine manufacturer based on “continuous involvement” 
in the manufacturing and procurement activities related to the vaccine. The business 
association with the DoD for procurement contracts of a biodefense countermeasure 
offered an uncontested market space when it came to anthrax vaccine. The competition 
was irrelevant based on “sole-source anthrax vaccine procurement” (HR, Committee on 
Government Reform (HR 106-36), 1999c). 
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The diagrams and narrative below retrospectively analyze and apply the “Blue 
Ocean” strategy as it relates to anthrax vaccine, both from the perspective of the first 
value-added proposition of sole source contracts with the DoD, but also in the second 
expanded value innovation market as a countermeasure component of the SNS for the 
DHS and the DHHS. In diagramming the market space, we compare classic “Red Ocean” 
strategies (i.e., bloody red, shark infested, waters) to that of traditional biopharma firms, 
such as Merck, Searle, and Pfizer. Prior to the 2001 bioterrorism crimes using anthrax 
letters, the absence of these traditional companies in the anthrax vaccine marketplace 
may be explained by their pursuit of classical medicine contracts and countermeasures for 
standard public-health threats, versus the more risky bioterrorism business. In 
comparison, the “Blue Ocean” strategy (i.e., no sharks or blood in the water), and value 
innovation for the anthrax vaccine manufacturer, with DoD as a de facto co-
manufacturer, presented an entirely new and uncontested market-value curve. 
The common denominator in the strategy entailed U.S. government or DoD 
subsidizing of myriad aspects of the anthrax vaccine business venture. Aspects included 
the patent, clinical trials, licensing, approved and unapproved manufacturing changes, 
renovations, price increases, extraordinary financial relief, supply of a captive market 
(soldiers within the DoD, or citizens with respect to the SNS), and indemnification or 
product liability protection. The FDA also facilitated the “Blue Ocean” before the letter 
attacks by ignoring compliance policy guidance to disapprove anthrax vaccine contracts 
due to the manufacturer’s quality control deviations (FDA, 1981), and again after the 
anthrax letter attacks by approving previously unreported and unapproved manufacturing 
changes (GAO, 2001b; FDA, 1996). Not imagined at the time, because federal 
investigators confirmed a DoD scientist committed crimes to realize the threat, the 
business relationship also benefited from the dramatic creation of market demand. 
Finally, lobbying, effectively funded by the contract financing, assured the current and 
future contracts. 
a. Eliminate, Reduce, Raise, Create Grid 
The “Blue Ocean” strategy concept asks for entrepreneurs to grid and act 
on a “four actions framework” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 29–37) in order to generate 
a new value curve as depicted in the subsequent strategy canvas. This aspect of the gap 
analysis offers in Table 3 an Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create grid that illustrates the 
factors intended to advance market value. 
Reduced:
- Controversy via PR
- Legal barriers via legislation
- Oversight via lobbying




- rPA next-gen vaccine
competitor product contracts
- Liability / FDA enforcement
Created:
- “a  scenario, where
people all of a sudden
realize the need to have
this vaccine”
(FBI, 2008, pp. 12-16)
Raised:
- Awareness of the threat
- Impression that the vaccine
will protect from the threat
- Inertia to maintain sole-
source contracts
 
Table 3.   Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid for Anthrax Vaccine 
 
As Table 3 depicts, in the case of the anthrax vaccine, the DoD eliminated 
and reduced problems while effectively raising threat levels, or in the case of the anthrax 
letter perpetrator, creating scenarios to emphasize the threat and the need for the vaccine. 
As a result, the problems associated with the program, such as informed consent, were 
eliminated by the mandatory nature of the DoD program. Elimination of more modern 
products resulted from those products suffering from a lack of FDA approval; whereas 
the government helped the old anthrax vaccine manufacturer create the impression that its 
product was “fully FDA-approved” (DoD, 1998). DoD indemnification solved liability 
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problems. Elimination, or resolution, of prior FDA oversight and invalidation of the 
manufacturing process coincided with the expedited approval of the manufacturing 
process following the anthrax letter attacks. Heavily funded DoD public relations 
“education campaigns” allowed for a reduction of the controversial nature of the 
mandatory inoculations with respect to Gulf War illness. Similarly, joint lobbying 
initiatives by the DoD and the manufacturer on Capitol Hill reduced the inquiries of 
legislators, whereas legal initiatives such as the Emergency Use Authorization allowed 
continuation of the vaccine mandate following federal court injunctions. As far as raising 
market potential, an emphasis on the “threat,” and the shift in scientific opinion about the 
vaccine’s efficacy against the disease, assisted to ensure the sole source contracts. 
Ultimately, the FBI’s revelations of the anthrax letter attack “scenario, where people all 
of a sudden realize the need to have this vaccine,” created the most important aspect of 
the grid to ensure restoration and expansion of demand. 
b. “Benchmark” Blue Ocean Strategy Canvas 
As a complement to Table 3’s grid for anthrax vaccine, Figure 5 
represents a “Blue Ocean” strategy canvas. The canvas illustration provides a graphical 
depiction of the product’s potential value in a market space against various factors of 
competition. Following Figure 5’s strategy canvas, we detail each of the factors listed on 
the horizontal axis of the illustration to aid in explaining the market-value synergies in 
detail. The “continuous involvement” of the DoD again emerges as a common theme in 
the value innovation factors due to the DoD’s institutional promotion of the product, 
extraordinary financial relief for the manufacturer, and significant assistance in 
renovating and modifying the manufacturing facilities and production processes. In the 
case of the DoD anthrax vaccine, success did not appear to be predicated on the superior 
nature of the product, but instead was based upon other innovative factors related to the 
relationships of the sole source manufacturer with the customer, as well as the customer’s 
shared status as a de facto manufacturer. 
In this case, the anthrax vaccine’s biopharma-defense countermeasure “Blue 
Ocean” is compared to classic public-health industry “Red Ocean” investment factors as 
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Figure 5.   “Benchmark” Blue Ocean Strategy Canvas for Anthrax Vaccine 
The notional graphic depictions reflect a significant market space between 
the classic “Red Ocean” and the “Blue Ocean” represented by the anthrax vaccine “value 
proposition and innovation” as compared to classic pharmaceutical products. The “value 
proposition” of government assistance makes the Blue Ocean attractive to the 
entrepreneur, with additional synergies provided based on minimal competition “value 
innovations” inherent in government-backed biodefense products. While not applauding 
the various iterations of anthrax vaccine manufacturers (MDPH, MBPI, BioPort, and 
presently Emergent BioSolutions), the methodological approaches advocated by this 
thesis do not seek accountability from the manufacturer, but instead the government for 
promoting such an environment. After all, who could blame a corporation for taking 
advantage of a lucrative business atmosphere? 
The “continuous involvement” of the government began with the anthrax 
vaccine patent, sponsored and paid for according to the government patent by the “United 
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States of America as represented by the Secretary of the Army.” The patent also detailed 
that the product of “invention described herein may be manufactured and used by or for 
the Government of the United States of America for government purposes” (Wright & 
Milton, 1965). Clinical trials were also coordinated and paid for by the government, as 
evidenced by the fact that the “investigation was supported by a contract with the U.S. 
Army Biological Center, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md” (Brachman et al., 1966, p. 656). 
The FDA also confirmed that the “DoD has been significantly involved in developing the 
formulation and manufacturing process of all three versions of the anthrax vaccine.” The 
FDA explained: 
DoD’s continuous involvement with, and intimate knowledge of, the 
formulation and manufacturing processes of all of these versions of the 
anthrax vaccine provide a foundation for a determination that BioPort’s 
anthrax vaccine is comparable to the original DoD vaccine. … DoD was 
involved in developing the three versions of the anthrax vaccine and had 
knowledge of the manufacturing processes of each version, DoD is thus 
similar to a manufacturer that made manufacturing changes to its product 
as contemplated by FDA’s Comparability Guidance. (FDA, 2002b, p. 8) 
As stated in the FDA quote above, the DoD effectively served as an 
anthrax vaccine producer, playing a key role in manufacturing changes, as well as the 
research and development of the product it invented and patented. As discussed in 
Chapter III’s case study event-cause analysis, the DoD and the manufacturer “did not 
notify FDA of several changes to the manufacturing process in the early 1990s, and no 
specific studies were done to confirm that vaccine quality was not affected. FDA 
inspections found several deficiencies, many of which were not corrected in a timely 
manner” (GAO, 2001b, pp. 2, 4, fn. 9). 
Ultimately, oversight of and accountability for the discrepancies appears 
lacking in the regulatory record, adding increased attractiveness to the “Blue Ocean” 
strategy potential to anthrax vaccine or similar market relationships. During the time 
frame of FDA oversight and nonvalidation of the anthrax vaccine manufacturing process, 
renovations paid for by the DoD, according to the GAO, enhanced the business value 
curve further. The GAO stated, “DoD has made a significant investment in renovating 
BioPort’s biologic facility to meet the military’s requirements for anthrax vaccine” 
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(GAO-NSIAD, 1999b, p. 3). The investment also entailed “significant” price increases 
according to the GAO, despite the fact that “the contractual price per dose was expected 
to decrease as production quantities increased” (GAO-NSIAD, 1999b, p. 4). Instead, the 
government supplied “extraordinary contractual relief to help the company with its cash 
flow problems and ensure continued production of the anthrax vaccine” and benefited 
from an “interest-free advance payment of $18.7 million” (GAO-NSIAD, 2000a, p. 3). 
The manufacturer enjoyed further price increases through present day equating to a 
1,235% price increase for the vaccine from $2.26 to the current cost of $29.91 per dose 
(FBO, 2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008). 
Guaranteed or captive market scenarios also existed. Researchers 
documented that “military service members fear reprisal if they refuse to participate in 
the AVIP [anthrax vaccine immunization program]” Further, “research demonstrated that 
a substantial number of service members disagreed with issues regarding the ethics, 
safety, and efficacy of the AVIP.” Finally, with regard to the “ethics dimension,” 
research “clearly suggests that the mandatory nature of the AVIP is not endorsed by most 
military service members” (Pica-Branco & Hudak, 2008, 429–33). The DoD, versus the 
manufacturer, paid for the “education campaign” to attempt to overcome these problems 
(GAO-NSIAD, 2000b, p. 2), adding to the value innovation of the anthrax vaccine 
marketplace. 
Regarding the safety dimensions of concern to the customers, historic and 
recent indemnification provided “targeted liability protections for anthrax 
countermeasures based on a credible risk that the threat of exposure to Bacillus anthracis 
and the resulting disease constitutes a public health emergency” (see Appendix 7) 
(Caldera, 1998; DHHS, 2005; DHHS, 2008b). The “threat of exposure” and declared 
public health emergencies unexpectedly served the motive of the silent partner, the 
perpetrator of the anthrax letter attacks. The FBI found, “with respect to the motive” and 
the “troubled nature of Dr. Ivins” that “his concern about the end of the vaccination 
program” created “a situation, a scenario, where people all of a sudden realize the need to 
have this vaccine,” thus assuring continuation of the “Blue Ocean” strategy (see 
Appendix 11) (FBI, 2008, p. 12–15). 
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An additional important aspect of the business strategy lying behind the 
anthrax vaccine included lobbying efforts. According to a Los Angeles Times 
investigation, in 2005 the anthrax vaccine manufacturer’s “yearly spending for lobbying 
nearly quadrupled, to $1.41 million.” In 2006, “it reached $2.1 million, federal records 
show. All told, from 2004 through June 2007, the company used 52 lobbyists at a cost of 
$5.29 million, the records show” (Willman, 2007). According to another article, the 
company also used its contract proceeds to purchase “recombinant anthrax vaccine 
technology for the bargain-basement price of $2 million.” In 2006, the previous recipient 
of contracts for the modern recombinant anthrax vaccine, Vaxgen, lost an $878 million 
contract with the DHHS. During this time frame, the old anthrax vaccine manufacturer’s 
“politically connected” principals spent up to $220,000 for lobbying and campaign 
contributions. Reports that Emergent BioSolutions attempted to “paint Vaxgen as 
unreliable” highlight apparently effective attempts to eliminate and reduce the 
competition (Allen, 2008). The lobbying business strategy success in garnering contracts 
and influence with FDA as its regulator allowed additional “Blue Ocean” strategies to 
find new market value within existing contracts. When the FDA “granted a shelf life 
extension from 3 to 4 years,” the company received additional funds totaling “$30 million 
for doses previously delivered” to the SNS (Business Wire, 2007; EBS, 2009; Marr, 
2008). After the FBI revealed that the U.S. Army scientist committed the anthrax letter 
attacks, a reasonable expectation of contract review apparently did not occur, and instead 
the government vetted an additional $404-million contract for anthrax vaccine and 
published a simultaneous anthrax emergency declaration through the year 2015. During 
that time frame the old anthrax vaccine manufacturer, Emergent BioSolutions, “spent 
$575,000 lobbying the federal government,” including paying for visits to the DoD, the 
DHHS and the DHS according to financial disclosures (Associated Press, 2008). 
The value innovation surrounding the anthrax vaccine represents an 
enviable niche market where the government’s “funding renovation efforts,” plus 
“advance payments” and over 1,000% for “increasing contract prices” marked the 
epitome of a “Blue Ocean” enterprise (GAO-NSIAD, 1999b, pp. 1, 2). Of course, while 
the market methods and profit motivations remain irrelevant, the business factors 
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identified in this “Blue Ocean” strategy analysis may warrant review by government 
officials and awareness by the American people. In the end, the process irregularities, 
intimidate relationships, and the lax governmental oversight facilitated the steep value 
curve for anthrax vaccine. In retrospect, the market realities provide food for thought for 
officials interested in the “ethical dimensions” of future contracts for the SNS, 
particularly those requiring DHS endorsement. 
3. Power, Policy and Politicization 
The DHS strategic leadership challenge requires involvement of the 
stakeholders—the American people. This is contrasted with the DoD’s ability to dictate 
policy and frame its use of the vaccine as a “Commander’s program,” implemented in the 
name of good order and with discipline. Clearly, this approach will not be effective with 
the U.S. citizenry. Analysis of the DoD experience, anticipating the interests of the U.S. 
public, may accordingly dictate alternative planning strategies or modification of the 
prior strategy canvas allowed to date on more captive markets. Strategic planning in the 
realm of biodefense offers both challenges and opportunities. 
Using Kim and Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005), 
specifically Appendix B, as a template, we discover a guideline to compare classic versus 
progressive outlooks on strategic planning. Carrying the analysis further, the following 
examination attempts to compare the advantages of ideas put forth in John Bryson’s 
Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening 
and Sustaining Organizational Achievement (Bryson, 1995) to those of Brafman and 
Beckstrom’s The Starfish and the Spider. This section of the thesis’s gap analysis couples 
the most valuable and positive aspects of each into a value innovation planning strategy 
to derive effective and affordable national biodefense policy and procurement, with the 
current U.S. anthrax vaccine as the focal point. 
The second appendix of Blue Ocean Strategy offers a tutorial on two schools of 
thought about how business architectures and actors approach their marketplaces. The 
“structuralist” view symbolizes the more classical perspective where “market structure” 
directly relates to “conduct,” and in turn the “performance” of a business. Looking at an 
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alternative approach, one possibly more progressive in nature, we find the 
“reconstructionist” view. This approach empowers “endogenous” growth from within a 
business or marketplace in order to create new prospective markets (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005, p. 209). The present thesis promptly adopts the structuralist viewpoint in terms of 
policy-planning strategy, while acknowledging the propensity for a marketplace actor’s 
attraction to a reconstructionist approach. That approach specifically looks for ways to 
stimulate demand in order to “expand existing markets and create new ones” (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005, p. 211). The anthrax letter attacks serve as a quintessential example 
within the U.S. military-industrial-biodefense-pharma apparatus where a reconstructionist 
individual unleashed anthrax spores on the U.S. public. The FBI offered the theory “that 
by launching these attacks, [the perpetrator] creates a situation, a scenario, where people 
all of a sudden realize the need to have this vaccine (FBI, 2008, pp. 12–15). Saving the 
“failing” anthrax vaccine program through the attacks represents an archetypal 
reconstructionist strategy, one that created a demand through fear. Unfortunately, this 
strategy served to promote a product through a crime and murders, versus the 
perpetuation of sound biodefense products and policy. This is precisely why the 
structuralist methodology must be emphasized in policy formulation as a counterweight 
to reconstructionist tactics. Dramatic increases in bioterrorism hoaxes, such as nearly 500 
fake anthrax threats across two decades (Monterey, 2009), also represent the 
reconstructionist approach, though certainly not all were directly linked to the anthrax 
vaccine market creation as the primary motive. However, the hype and fear of these 
events served the same objective—to create new markets and demand. As a case in point, 
government appropriations increased in the range of over $50 billion for biodefense since 
the anthrax letter attacks and therefore document the new markets made possible through 
hoaxes and the domestic terrorism murders (Bryson, 1995; Mueller, 2006; Willman, 
2007; Allen, 2008; Clark, 2009). 
In contrast to the reconstructionist approach represented by the anthrax attacks, 
the structuralist approach, being more conventional in nature, fits well within the 
principles outline by Bryson, instrumentally serving the eventual recommendations 
formulated in the present thesis. The strategic management nature of Bryson’s “Strategy 
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Change Cycle” emphasizes a process continuum beyond mere planning, and including 
implementation (Bryson, 1995, p. 31). This thesis encourages that continuum by the 
DHS. The cyclical aspect of Bryson’s model lends well to the strategic oversight 
requirements necessary within the U.S. biodefense apparatus based on both the historic 
experience of the anthrax letter attacks, but also through commonsense due to the 
dangerous nature of potential unauthorized proliferations by nonstate actors. In addition, 
the book’s planning process sponsorship principles emphasize the need for “creative 
thinking, constructive debate, and multiple sources of input and insight,” as well as the 
willingness to “exercise power and authority to keep the process on track” (Bryson, 1995, 
pp. 301, 302). Such concepts are crucial, particularly in the realm of military bioresearch 
and defense culture. If not fostered, at times such attributes find themselves suppressed 
unless they promote institutional objectives. Most importantly, the Bryson ideas relate to 
the “enforcing of norms” (Bryson, 1995, pp. 314, 315), or rules and laws, an essential 
attribute for accountability in the realm of biodefense to ensure the security of the 
pathogens under research (Hernandez, 2009a; Hernandez, 2009b; Associated Press, 
2009b). 
Bryson’s “interconnected leadership tasks” concepts hold direct relevance to the 
DHS anthrax vaccine and its strategy canvas outlined earlier (Bryson, 1995, p. 298). In 
evaluating the broader market for the DHS, as opposed to the more limited DoD market, 
chapter 11 of the Bryson text provides important reminders about “understanding the 
context” of any given strategy and the requirement that “leaders should be especially 
attentive to the possibilities for rather dramatic strategic change” (Bryson, 1995, p. 299). 
Anthrax vaccine use by the DHS presents an opportunity for “understanding the people 
involved,” and remembering that “feedback from others is often highly useful” (Bryson, 
1995, p. 300). With any future DHS effort in “sponsoring the process,” leaders should 
“encourage and reward creative thinking, constructive debate, and multiple sources of 
input and insight” (Bryson, 1995, p. 301). Similarly, by “facilitating the process” the 
DHS should “press groups toward action and the assignment of responsibility for specific 
actions” (Bryson, 1995, pp. 305, 306). By doing so, DHS subordinate leadership will 
inevitably analyze the problematic DoD experience with the anthrax vaccine and realize 
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that these approaches were less active. The DoD experience reveals a seemingly 
Machiavellian “Commander’s program” (Chu, 2005; Hersack, 2001; Shelton, 2001, p. 3, 
slide 2), one where the “team” approach was emphasized to quell dissent and questions 
about the vaccination program (Cragin, 1999). The ‘get on board, or get out’ strategy, 
though ultimately successful within the unique culture of the DoD, may not prove 
effective given DHS’s target audience of first responders and the citizenry writ large. In 
this larger context, “enforcing norms, settling disputes, and managing residual conflicts” 
(Bryson, 1995, p. 314) must occur with thoroughness and transparency. Analyzing the 
legal problems identified in the DoD experience remains essential for the DHS as it 
evaluates the strategy canvas previously employed by the anthrax vaccine manufacturer 
and the DoD as an FDA-acknowledged co-manufacturer and client. By avoiding the legal 
pitfalls encountered by the DoD, the DHS will “foster organizational integrity and the 
education of others about ethics, constitutions, laws, and norms” pertaining to use of the 
vaccine on a larger market. A thorough review of the entire issue will facilitate the public 
servants responsible for the strategic planning in their efforts to “apply, adapt, and 
resolve” issues pertaining to both “laws and norms” (Bryson, 1995, p. 315). 
a. Power 
Another resource within Bryson’s Strategic Planning for Public and 
Nonprofit Organizations offers a starting point in the process to review the DoD 
experience and evaluate how it translates to the larger DHS market through “stakeholder 
identification and analysis techniques.” By applying the Power Versus Interest Grid, we 
help “planners identify the players or the people whose interests and power bases must be 
taken into account in order to address the problem or issue at hand” (Bryson, 1995, p. 
338). 
By reflecting on the DoD experience, soldiers as the “subjects” possessed 
a high interest but low power. The troop’s position contrasted with DoD leadership’s high 
level of interest and power, i.e., as “the players.” First responders and DHS leadership 
accordingly represent the subjects and players respectively for anthrax vaccine use in a 
new market via the SNS. At the bottom of the grid, the citizenry at large represents the 
“crowd,” yet they might also share the upper-left quadrant if subjected to the vaccine. 
Finally, congressional and legislative lawmakers rest in the lower right of the grid as 
“context setters,” with a potentially lessened direct interest, though a high level of power 
to impact the strategy, as they did within the DoD’s experience. The DHS application of 
this same model would find citizens at the top of the chart as their interest in the subject 
increases due to potential exposure in a bioterrorism scenario with the product’s 
distribution from the SNS. Table 4 depicts the Power versus Interest grid as it applies to 
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Table 4.   Power versus Interest Grid 
 
Additional tools from the Bryson text might also prove useful in the 
accountability efforts for a more complete analysis. These tools include the Problem-
Frame Stakeholder Map, the Ethical Analysis Grid, the Policy Attractiveness Versus 
Stakeholder Capability Grid, and the Policy Implementation Strategy Development Grid 
(Bryson, 1995, pp. 347, 349, 352, 353). 
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b. Policy 
Extrapolating on the accountability theme, using one of those tools from 
the Bryson resource offers a grid to model the attractiveness of anthrax vaccine policy 
procurement and use versus stakeholder capabilities to affect those policy processes 
(Bryson, 1995, p. 352). Table 5 depicts a Policy Attractiveness versus Stakeholder 
Capabilities grid. 
Stakeholders’ Capability to Implement Policies, Plans, or 
Proposal for Procurement and Use of Anthrax Vaccine


























































Table 5.   Policy Attractiveness versus Stakeholder Capabilities 
 
As opposed to the “power versus interest grid” depicted in Table 4, the 
citizen-soldiers and first responders swapped positions  with the vaccine promoters on the 
vertical scale. Similarly, lawmakers and DoD or DHS leaders also exchanged positions. 
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The point is that the promoters of a product within a controversial market more 
reluctantly accept program guidance and policy planning. Likewise, DoD and DHS 
leadership may be less interested in the process than the lawmakers tasked with ensuring 
that such programs comply with the laws they legislate for oversight purposes. The 
lawmakers equate to the structuralists in this example, and the promoters of the vaccine 
fall into the reconstructionist category. For instance, the Army scientist who committed 
the anthrax crimes clearly fits the profile of someone who stimulated demand and created 
a new market, falling on the low and left quadrant of both the vertical and horizontal axis 
of the grid. Because of this disadvantaged position, the alleged perpetrator resorted to 
extraordinary measures to accomplish his goals as a stakeholder. Certainly, the potential 
reconstructionist tactics for market development, i.e., the demand-creating shortcut 
through crimes, hoaxes and unprecedented lobbying efforts (Allen, 2008; Associated 
Press, 2008; Willman, 2007) require the checks and balances of the structuralist school 
where proper planning appropriately reigns in the upper right-hand corner of the grid. 
As a final and important metaphor for this section of the thesis, The 
Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations presents 
another facet for the proposed blended planning strategy, adding to the powerful synergy 
beyond that of “structuralism” versus “reconstructionism.” In this case, the themes of 
“centralization” versus “decentralization” provide valuable potential for the planning 
process (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2008, pp. 21–45). The centralization themes blend well 
the structuralist concepts, driving the requisite processes through thorough planning and 
proper oversight. In contrast, the decentralization themes fit particularly well with the 
goal to acquire diversified biodefense products for different threats. Perhaps more 
importantly, the decentralization theme aligns with the logical goal of creating products 
that meet the demand of defending against multiple threats. As opposed to the anthrax 
vaccine and other biodefense initiatives, which focus on vaccinology to target singular 
threats, antibiotics serve to counter myriad potential known and unknown threats, and 
therefore present a decentralized approach to address diverse needs within the biodefense 
marketplace. Antiviral and antibiotic treatments also enjoy governmental 
recommendations for their use and further development (CDC-ACIP, 2008; CDC, n.d.; 
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Graham & Talent, 2008), whereas anthrax vaccine appears to extract significant 
governmental appropriations (FBO, 2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008). 
c. Politicization 
Business strategy and discussions of power, interests, policy, and 
stakeholders aside, conceivably much of the anthrax vaccine issue perhaps boils down to 
politicization of the threat and the vaccine. As introduced in Chapter IV’s program 
evaluation’s qualitative analysis of intelligence, Dr. Mark Lowenthal, a former assistant 
director of the CIA captured the need for “intelligence products that are reliable, 
unbiased, and honest (i.e., free from politicization) (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 7). Lowenthal 
goes on to state, “These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth.” He 
calls our attention to the CIA HQ inscription that reads, “And ye shall know the truth, and 
the truth shall make you free.” Following the quote he editorializes, “It is a nice 
sentiment, but it overstates and misrepresents what is going on in that building or any 
other intelligence agency.” A literal read of these thoughts means that the former assistant 
director of the CIA, and former vice chair of the National Intelligence Council, argues 
that the byproducts of the intelligence community (IC) are not necessarily about the truth. 
Dr. Lowenthal’s caveat that “the government and the underlying policy processes are 
essentially political in nature” supports this theme. Dr. Lowenthal also provides the 
insight that “politicization by intelligence officers may also be a question of perception” 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 138). Lowenthal touches on the FBI director’s ten-year tenure as an 
example (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 39). He recounts how “politicization was always possible 
but did not become a reality until 1977” (the date when President Carter apparently 
ousted George Bush as the director of the CIA). Lowenthal touches on the hope that 
“proper training and internal reviews could avoid politicization of intelligence” 
(Lowenthal, 2006, 2006, p. 28). One way the IC might achieve this goal is to ensure that 
their information, intelligence, and final intelligence originates from solidly vetted truths. 
Alternatively, Lowenthal specifically cautions that analysis written based 
upon “supposition” may fail to be convincing and may be more vulnerable to 
politicization (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 128). As Lowenthal alludes, the balance sought must 
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find an analytical truth somewhere between “evidence” and “supposition.” Lowenthal 
also raises the reality of “winners and losers” and the risk that “intelligence officers may 
intentionally alter intelligence” due to “career interests, or outright pandering” 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 137). Lowenthal recalls how policymakers can apply professional 
pressures using the example of Vice President Cheney’s repeated requests for briefings, 
sometimes from outside the IC during the controversies pertaining to WMD’s in Iraq 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 186). Although Dr. Lowenthal’s book explains that the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence ultimately “found there was no politicization of Intel” 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 194), a thorough read of the various bipartisan analyses of the issue 
after the Democratic party took control of the committee reveals differing conclusions 
(United States Senate, Intelligence Committee, 2008).60 A disciplined, balanced, 
shoulder-to-shoulder front by the IC, sensitive to the perceptions of politicization, may be 
able to overcome such political pressure, but requires strong IC leaders. Those leaders 
must guard their intellectual objectivity vigilantly or risk reversion to scapegoat status. In 
an interview, President George W. Bush asserted accountability rested with the IC when 
responding to questions about failed intelligence assessments regarding WMD in Iraq. 
The president stated, “The biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the 
intelligence failure in Iraq. Many people put their reputations on the line. ... I wish the 
intelligence had been different, I guess” (ABC News, 2008).  
Reasonably, in the case of the anthrax vaccine, politicization of the 
process occurred. Early on military saw the “need to make the case that anthrax is 
currently the principal biological warfare (BW) threat” (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 
 
60 Competitive Analysis of the subject of intelligence politicization within the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence found conclusions refuting the appearance of politicization during the 108th 
Congress (2003–2005), when the Republicans held the majority. Alternatively, the 110th Congress (2007–
2009) found the Democratic majority publishing Senate Report 110-76, “Prewar Intelligence Assessments 
About Postwar Iraq,” Senate Report 110-345, “Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by 
U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information,” and Senate Report 110-346, 
“Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation 
Group and the Office of Special Plans Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.” The 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found, according to the DoD Inspector General, “inappropriate 
intelligence activities” where the IC misrepresented the intelligence and the threat, and of “significant 
claims that were not supported by the intelligence.” Chairman Rockefeller asserted that the, “Bush 
Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses,” and “relied on flawed intelligence ... 
deliberately,” which were “not fully accurate” (United States Senate Intelligence Committee, 2008). 
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1995, p. 5). Other military generals recognized the DoD’s vaccine “was NOT the one 
tested,” as well as problems with asserting that “desert storm illnesses were not cause[d] 
by the anthrax vaccine,” when there is “no record of who received the shots.” 
Politicization and self-interests attempted to protect the program, the “DoD & the 
Administration” from the inevitable “big time trouble” (see Appendix 8) (HR, Committee 
on Government Reform (HR 106-26), 1999b; DoD-JPOBD, 1999; Miller, Engelberg, & 
Broad, 2002a, p. 266).  
Analyzing the anthrax vaccine case study against the realities of power, 
policy, and politics applies valuable business strategies. The association allows us to 
“fold” or merge both Blue Ocean Strategy structuralism and reconstructionism with the 
classic concepts and tools presented in Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations, as well as the innovative adaptation concepts of centralization versus 
decentralization presented in The Starfish and the Spider. A possible approved recipe for 
strategic planning in biodefense emerges based on the case study of the anthrax vaccine 
experience. The recipe logically suggests that structuralism emphasized at the 
governmental oversight levels serves to counteract potentially destructive 
reconstructionism efforts, and preclude politicization and its aftermaths. Simultaneously, 
the centralization themes in the same light serve to ensure that the regulatory governance 
arena guides the policy, planning, and procurement process on a vector toward 
decentralized product development of treatments which prevent multiple or decentralized 
threats. 
In conclusion, the DHS must attempt what the DoD potentially failed to 
do by ensuring that “effective strategic planning is a collective phenomenon, typically 
involving sponsors, champions, facilitators, teams, task forces, and others in various ways 
at various times” (Bryson, 1995, p. 316). The effective strategic planning process also 
requires transparency whenever possible. Ultimately, if any of these methodical strategy 
processes fail, national leaders may become the scapegoats when poorly conceived policy 
decisions go awry. 
 163
4. Multidisciplinary Approaches to Anthrax Vaccine 
In addition to the social psychological, economic, and political explanations for 
the “gap,” the following gap analysis section reviews historic multidisciplinary 
interactions related to the U.S. government’s procurement of the anthrax vaccine. 
Illustrations from contrasting vignettes display diverse multidisciplinary views about the 
propriety of the vaccine. The split in opinion, across multiple professional and 
organizational lines, serves as supportive background for the thesis’s course-of-action 
recommendation to perform a comprehensive review of anthrax vaccine procurement for 
the SNS. The contrasting examples of multidisciplinary inputs and oversight relate to the 
division of opinion over the propriety of the vaccine. Selected vignettes reveal some 
government officials attempting to act as “circuit breakers,” highlighting the vaccine’s 
regulatory and legality problems. In contrast, other government officials perpetuated the 
policy and obscured the legal barriers, effectively “politicizing” the process. 
Since the 2001 anthrax letter attacks indeed successfully revitalized and expanded 
use of the vaccine, an intellectually honest review of past professional multidisciplinary 
interactions remains vital in terms of reevaluating how our nation formulates future 
biodefense policy and establishes appropriate procurement processes. The following 
multidisciplined oversight breakdowns included varied professions—doctors, lawyers, 
and scientists. Casting light on these vignettes offers an opportunity to correct past 
failures or, at a minimum, preclude repetition through the thesis’s recommended courses 
of action. Aspects of those actions appear to comport with the agenda of the new FDA 
Commissioner, Dr. Margaret Hamburg. Therefore, Dr. Hamburg provides the analysis’s 
first positive vignette by evaluating her professional assessments of the anthrax vaccine. 
Under Dr. Hamburg’s leadership, we should expect a multidisciplinary review of both the 
vaccine and the highly complex organizational structure of the biodefense apparatus 
(Bonin, 2007, pp. 228–68). 
a. Vignettes Critical of Anthrax Vaccine 
The newly confirmed FDA commissioner, Dr. Margaret Hamburg, 
asserted in confirmation hearings that scientific and accountability-based operations 
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might renew public confidence (Alonso-Zaldivar, 2009). Dr. Hamburg’s previous 
experiences demonstrate a reputation for a “science-driven” modus operandi, and “a 
proven track record of successfully managing large, complex organizations” (Richwine, 
2009). Of note, Dr. Hamburg is not a stranger to this topic and has previously articulated 
the need for “new vaccines, especially against anthrax.” She also expressed objectives to 
“shape policies against the nefarious use of biological agents, while safeguarding 
legitimate research” (Hamburg, 1999). Such on-the-record statements bode well for the 
present thesis’s courses of action to review past and future biodefense strategies. 
Clearly, the 2001 anthrax letter attacks appeared to outflank efforts by 
administration officials to “minimize” (Chu & Aldridge, 2001) continued use of the 
vaccine. Those efforts support the documentary record divulged in Chapter II’s literature 
review and Chapter III’s case study that demonstrated that the vast majority of scientists 
questioned the anthrax vaccine publicly prior to the DoD’s initiation of force-wide 
mandatory inoculations in 1998. DoD scientists recognized the vaccine as an 
“experimental limited use vaccine” (Takafuji & Russell, 1990, p. 156) prior to the launch 
of DoD’s mandatory program. Ultimately, such conclusions held weight with the courts 
and led to illegality rulings against the DoD mandate (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2003; Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). With respect to expanded use of the vaccine for 
the SNS, DoD scientists recommended prudence early on, stating that the “characteristics 
of the vaccine and the constraints on the present method of manufacturing argue strongly 
against procuring large amounts for civilian use” (Russell, 1999). Notably, literally every 
scientist or physician writing peer-reviewed articles questioned the vaccine’s safety or 
efficacy prior to the mandatory DoD program and the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. One 
scientist who continued to confront the anthrax vaccine post-1998 included Dr. Walter 
Schumm, a retired U.S. Army Reserve Colonel working for Kansas State University. Dr. 
Schumm found significant associations between anthrax vaccine and the maladies 
associated with Gulf War illness (Schumm et al., 2007, p. 1414).61 Additionally, Dr. 
Margaret Ryan, U.S. Navy, discovered a low incidence of birth defect associations (Ryan 
 
61 See also Schumm et al., 2007, p.457; Schumm & Nass, 2006, pp. 747–52; Schumm, Jurich, 
Bollman, Webb, & Castelo, 2005, pp. 342–48; Schumm & Webb, 2005, p. 331; Schumm, 2004, p. 977–78; 
Schumm et al., 2002). 
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et al., 2008, p. 434). Dr. Suzanne Timmer and a team of U.S. Navy doctors discovered 
pneumonitis links (Timmer et al., 2002, p. 741). Other non-DoD scientists discovered 
conclusions contrary to those of government scientists supporting the policy. They 
reported gastrointestinal adverse reactions (Geier & Geier, 2004, p. 762), “severe adverse 
events” (Geier & Geier, 2006, slide 33), and significant “joint related adverse reactions” 
(Geier & Geier, 2002, p. 217). The Journal of Emergency Medicine also reported on 
“Lymphocytic vasculitis associated with the anthrax vaccine” (Muniz, 2003, p. 271).  
Moreover, one military physician refused to administer or receive the 
anthrax vaccine based on his concerns about the legality of the vaccine mandate and the 
manufacturer’s known production line problems (see Appendix 6) (FDA, 1997). The 
doctor, Captain John Buck, believed he held “a responsibility to … protect the rights of 
the troops” (Katz, 2001) and his military oath’s requirement to follow only legal orders 
(DoD, 1962; HR, Committee on Government Reform (HR 106-130), 1999, p. 186). The 
doctor’s defense attorney argued that the military order was “patently illegal,” but the 
military court prohibited any evidence at trial that questioned the presumption of legality 
of the order (Eberhart, 2001b). This nuance of military law, previously explained with the 
Kisala case described in Chapter IV’s program evaluation’s formative analysis subsection 
on judicial review, meant that a soldier could not challenge the legality or “inference of 
lawfulness” of the military mandate. Military law also explicitly maintains that the 
“inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the 
commission of a crime” (DoD, 2008, p. 14.c.(2)(b)IV-19). Arguably, the mandatory 
vaccine program constituted a crime since the court subsequently declared it illegal (Doe 
v. Rumsfeld, 2003; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2007). At the time, the 
military tribunal found Dr. Buck guilty of disobeying a lawful order and precluded the 
defense from presenting evidence about the same illegalities later confirmed by the 
federal courts. Military attorneys commented on the circularity of the legal conundrum as 
an “uphill battle in getting evidence of the safety, efficacy and necessity” (Lynch, 2003, 
p. 60) heard in court. In essence, military legal authorities benefited from a procedural 
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environment where the “defense is left defenseless” (Katz, 2001, p. 1852, fn. 257)62. 
Ultimately, the military court sanctioned the doctor with restriction, fines, and a 
reprimand (Mientka, 2001b). 
A retired FDA regulator, and former Air Force officer, Sammie R. Young, 
echoed Dr. Buck’s concerns about production issues. Mr. Young submitted testimony to 
the FDA during the court-ordered licensing comment process in 2005 to ensure 
compliance with the federal regulations (Young, 2005, p. 1). An additional civilian 
practitioner, Dr. Meryl Nass, a long-time critic of the anthrax vaccine, based on her 
professional evaluations of soldiers suspected to suffer from adverse reactions, published 
several articles on the subject. According to Dr. Nass, vaccinees “report symptoms 
resembling Gulf War illnesses.” She critically evaluated the FDA approval 
“retrospectively” based on “significant changes made to the vaccine’s composition since 
1990.” She correctly asserted prior to the 2005 licensure including inhalation anthrax as 
an approved indication that the “mandatory use for inhalation anthrax [was] ‘off-label,’ ” 
or not in accordance with the approved labeling of the product. Dr. Nass warned, “New 
trends could weaken prelicensure efficacy and safety review of medical products 
intended for biodefense and avoid manufacturer liability for their use” (Nass, 2002). 
The above vignettes involving the atypical examples of medical 
professionals questioning the vaccine ultimately lost out to alternative multidisciplined 
efforts focused on sustaining and expanding the vaccine program after the anthrax letter 
attacks. 
 
62 According to a legal analysis of the issue, when “the lawfulness of the order is in fact challenged, it 
is normally an issue of law to be resolved by the military judge as an interlocutory matter” (Lynch, 2003, 
pp. 54–55). In referencing a Duke Law Journal analysis (Katz, 2001), the author explains that a “military 
panel, as finder of fact, does not get the opportunity to consider defense evidence pertaining to safety, 
necessity and efficacy of the vaccine” (Lynch, 2003, p. 55). The legal evaluation suggests that the vaccine 
issue must be “viewed as a mixed question of law and fact that is properly resolved by a military panel as 
the ultimate finder of fact, not by the military judge” in order to “permit a military accused to offer 
evidence regarding the safety and efficacy” of the vaccine (Lynch, 2003, p. 71). “This approach … would 
at least allow a military accused the opportunity to present his or her argument to a finder of fact” (Lynch, 
2003, p. 74). 
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b. Vignettes Supporting Anthrax Vaccine 
Despite diverging threat assessments, past regulatory problems, and court 
rulings affirming past illegalities, additional vignettes illustrate numerous government 
professionals successfully defending anthrax vaccinations. Examples included 
affirmations of the threat after the anthrax letter attacks designed to reinstitute the policy 
(Keys & Taylor, 2005). 63 As early as 1995, the DoD emphasized the threat. Comments 
by Brigadier General Walter Busbee, Joint Program Manager for Biological Defense, 
documented in meeting minutes obtained by congressional investigators, stressed the 
“need to make the case that anthrax is currently the principal biological warfare (BW) 
threat” (see Appendix 3) (DoD-JPOBD, 1995, p. 5). Soldiers unconvinced by this case 
faced ad hominem disparagement by military generals who described the concerned 
troops as “refuseniks” and claimed they “don’t want to be in the military (HR, Committee 
on Armed Services, 1999, pp. 22, 33, 56). Other military officers compared their soldiers’ 
concerns to conspiracy theories and challenged their competence (Strawder, 1999).64 In 
retrospect, court rulings vindicating the licensing problems place these tacit or outright 
attacks in perspective. Government reports commented on the dispute and found, “There 
 
63 Hearing excerpts, Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program:  “You will die 
if you don’t get a vaccine. That is the reason why this Department, when we got incontrovertible evidence 
in 1997 that we were facing weapons on the battlefield that were going to put anthrax on our troops, that we 
said we are going to have to inoculate” … “in 1997 we received unequivocal evidence, absolutely 
unequivocal evidence, that Iraq weaponized anthrax, and we have never, through the inspection regime, 
been able to confirm the destruction of those devices. We, therefore, have to conclude that anyone in 
General Zinni’s theater of operations, if we were to get into combat again, could face an immediate anthrax 
attack. An anthrax attack is fatal if you are not inoculated, and therefore, we have to take these steps. It is 
unequivocal. ... As I said, it was in 1997 when we got absolute, uncontrovertible [sic] evidence that we 
have this threat, and that is when the Secretary said we are going to protect the troops,” and “We have very 
few refuseniks, but to make a celebrity cause out of people who say they don’t want to be, we have people 
who don’t want to be in the military all the time” (HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, pp. 22, 33, 
56). 
64 Excerpt from the Anthrax Vaccine Agency newsletter, June 1, 1999: “‘Right to the Point’…Much 
of the hand-wringing and bizarre allegations about the vaccine is coming from a vocal minority of people 
who think the “field” is where a farmer works and “Gortex” is one of the Power Rangers. Most of these 
folks have never spent a single moment in harm’s way and have no appreciation of what that sacrifice 
means—and they openly resent the limited budget currently used to finance our nation’s defense. … 
Unfortunately, those of us who actually have to fight our nation’s wars cannot afford such childlike 
optimism about the world we live in. Other groups believe that we are spreading a virus through 
vaccinations that will weaken our military and allow the uprisal [sic] of the New World Order. I don’t make 
this stuff up ladies and gents … it’s too rich even for Hollywood. … See you on the high ground, By Major 
Guy Strawder, United States Army, Director, AVIP Agency—For those who have had to fight for it, 
freedom has a special flavor the protected will never know…” (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 15). 
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was a general and pervasive degree of dissatisfaction among guard and reserve pilots and 
aircrew members about the completeness and accuracy of most of the information DoD 
provided on the anthrax vaccine” (GAO, 2002a, p. 23). The reports, and these examples, 
documented a clash of disciplines.65 Some operationally oriented military members, 
accustomed to broken equipment being “grounded,” uniformly rejected the anthrax 
vaccine program as a flawed policy based on the contradictory official assessments of the 
anthrax vaccine. In contrast, the vaccine proponents appeared to obscure the vaccine’s 
problems with diversionary disparagement of their operationally trained colleagues, 
effectively impeding an otherwise healthy multidisciplinary dialogue. 
Another example involved Lieutenant General Ronald R. Blanck, U.S. 
Army Surgeon General during the 1999 time frame. On one hand, General Blanck 
previously testified to Congress explaining, “Records of anthrax vaccinations are not 
suitable to evaluate safety.” He added, “The vaccine’s effectiveness against inhaled 
anthrax is unknown,” concluding that the “vaccine should therefore be considered 
investigational when used as a protection against biological warfare.” General Blanck 
admitted the vaccine was a potential cause of Gulf War illness (United States Senate, 
1994, pp. 15, 35). Despite these admissions, the general later testified differently to the 
Senate about the vaccine’s investigational license application for inhalation anthrax 
stating, “It is really for the facility, not for the vaccine per se.” The inquiring senator 
responded, “Oh, I see, okay. All right. That clears that up.” In fact, the anthrax vaccine 
license application specifically requested the FDA to approve anthrax vaccine for 
“inhalation anthrax” (see Appendix 5) (DoD, 1999b), a restriction that General Blanck 
had previously identified to the Senate in 1994. General Blanck also wrote opinion 
editorials to quell questions. General Blanck’s essay for the Army Times, titled “Ignore 
the Paranoiacs; the Vaccine is Safe,” incorrectly asserted that the vaccine had been 
 
65 The “clash of cultures” explained above owes its origins to the very training that the military gives 
its operationally oriented members. A part of the long-term multidiscipline analysis requires government 
officials to recognize when military members in particular become undutiful. Indeed, “within our school of 
military thought, higher authority does not consider itself infallible. Either in combat or out, any time a 
situation arises where a majority of military-trained Americans become undutiful, that is a very good 
reason for higher authority to resurvey its own judgments, disciplines and line of action” (DoD, 1975, p 51, 
item 13). 
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licensed by the Food and Drug Administration since 1970 (Blanck, 1999). In reality, the 
license remained unfinalized by the FDA until 2005, rendering the vaccine mandate 
illegal. Federal court injunctions in 2003 and 2004 contravened Blanck’s assertions, 
along with the belated 2005 licensure (FDA, 2005b). General Blanck also insisted that 
manufacturing quality control problems related only to “record-keeping.” FDA license 
revocation warnings explicitly contradicted this contention (see Appendix 6) (FDA, 
1997). The General testified that the “threat is real,” while his fellow U.S. Air Force 
Surgeon General, Lieutenant General Charles Roadman, framed concerns over the 
vaccine as “fear of immunization” (HR, Committee on Government Reform 1999, 
pp. 15–17). Both arguments ostensibly diverted from legitimate legal, regulatory, and 
medical issues. To some degree, the general was involved with the first Persian Gulf War 
unapproved manufacturing changes to the vaccine. General Blanck chaired an 
“Implementation Working Group,” according to DoD documents and provided “weekly 
production reports” during the effort to “increase production” anthrax prior to the war 
(DoD, 1996, item 56). The manufacturing changes related to the attempt to increase 
quantities of the product but were unapproved at the time. The unapproved alterations 
and the vaccine’s experimental use for inhalation anthrax both meant that soldiers 
deserved their legal right of informed consent. General Blanck clarified in subsequent 
congressional testimony that he understood those legal requirements. When asked by a 
legislator if he would “implement this same program if FDA did not approve the 
vaccine,” the general responded, “Yes.” He provided the caveat that DoD “would 
implement it differently because then the vaccine would be in an investigational new 
drug status, an IND status.” While assuring “the same confidence in the vaccine,” he 
explained the DoD “would then have to use informed consent and take other measures as 
part of our implementation program” (HR, Committee on Armed Services, 1999, p. 48). 
Other disciplinarians shared Blanck’s knowledge of challenges posed by 
the anthrax vaccine. An Army Chemical Corps officer, Brigadier General Eddie Cain, e-
mailed colleagues concerning GAO testimony delivered during a 1999 hearing on 
anthrax vaccine. Cain confessed areas where DoD “came up flat,” including concerns that 
DoD’s vaccine “was NOT the one tested.” General Cain discussed the slippery slope of 
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DoD reporting “desert storm illnesses were not cause[d] (sic) by the anthrax vaccine,” 
when there is “no record of who received the shots.” General Cain’s e-mail expressed 
worry that the “DoD & the Administration” would be in “big time trouble” if they could 
not address these questions (see Appendix 8) (HR, Committee on Government Reform, 
1999; DoD-JPOBD, 1999; Miller, Engelberg, & Broad, 2002a, p. 266). Whether General 
Cain eventually informed the Congress of these internal DoD concerns deserves further 
review. These unresolved issues go to the core of testing irregularities, licensing 
problems, early-1990 unapproved manufacturing changes, the known need for a new 
vaccine (see Appendix 2) (DoD, 1985, p. 3), and illnesses coincident to Gulf War service. 
The appearance of less-than-candid testimony left the program intact, shielding these 
matters from inquiry. 
Another officer, Brigadier General Paul Weaver, director of the Air 
National Guard, received admonishment from the DoD inspector general for testimony 
that “lacked the necessary element of ‘straightforwardness.’ ” The testimony in question 
related to personnel attrition caused by the vaccine program. Investigators found the 
general’s testimony “inconsistent with guidelines for honesty as set forth by the Joint 
Ethics Regulations.” The inspector general determined that the general had framed his 
testimony “in such a way as to lead recipients to confusion, misinterpretation, or 
inaccurate conclusions” (Eberhart, 2001). In addition, Marine Major General Randall 
West, the DoD Special Assistant on anthrax, received a verbal admonishment from 
Congress. West testified that he was unaware of, and could not comment on, a GAO 
report’s conclusions. Congressional members took issue with West’s contention that he 
was unaware of the GAO report findings, forcing the general to admit that he was in fact 
“briefed on what [GAO] intended to say and what they were going to present as 
testimony.” Congressional members accused the general of providing “disingenuous” 
testimony (HR, Committee on Government Reform, 2000, p. 447). General West’s 
experience adds to the impression that DoD leaders defended the policy potentially at the 
expense of institutional integrity. 
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Beyond testimonials, other military scientists acknowledged the 
“unsatisfactory”66 nature of the vaccine (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994; Brachman & 
Friedlander, 1998, p. 737) but later altered their opinions in support of the policy. Dr. 
(Colonel, U.S. Army) Arthur Friedlander wrote seemingly critical articles about the 
vaccine prior to the DoD mandate. His later articles contradicted previous critiques, 
inaccurately describing the vaccine as “FDA licensed” (Friedlander et al., 1999, 
pp. 2104–06). Significantly, Friedlander participated in the vaccine’s “Investigational 
New Drug” (IND) (see Appendix 5) (DoD, 1999b) application process,67 one which 
rendered the vaccine mandate unlawful (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004). Although Friedlander 
was aware that “no data on … efficacy in humans” existed for anthrax vaccine (Ivins, 
1992), he later testified at a Canadian court martial that he was “not aware” of U.S. 
government licensing applications to obtain approval for the vaccine’s investigational use 
against inhalation anthrax (Prober, 2000). Since Friedlander participated in these 
proceedings as a DoD officer and scientist, his subsequent denials about the 
investigational new drug process represented a multidisciplinary breakdown. Indeed, 
legal disciplinarians required the officer’s candid scientific expertise to adjudicate a 
military legal issue during the court martial proceedings. Ultimately, the Canadian 
military dropped all charges, instead determining that the anthrax vaccine violated the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (DND, 2002). The current Canadian military 
position states, “At this point in time, we are not requiring our people to have anthrax 
vaccinations nor are we considering it” (Moore, 2007). Conceivably, the precedent of the 
negative impact of the anthrax vaccine experience in the 2002 time frame continues to 
 
66 “The current vaccine against anthrax is unsatisfactory for several reasons.” The “degree of purity is 
unknown.” The “undefined nature of the vaccine and the presence of constituents that may be undesirable 
may account for the level of reactogenicity observed.” … “There is also evidence in experimental animals 
that the vaccine may be less effective against some strains of anthrax” (Brachman & Friedlander, 1994). 
67 Dr. Friedlander was involved extensively with the investigational new drug license application, 
prepared by the U.S. Army in 1995, filed by the manufacturer in 1996, and updated in 1999. As a U.S. 
Army officer Friedlander attended joint FDA-DoD meetings related to the application and its updates. The 
meeting attendee list for the Investigational New Drug (IND), #BB-IND 6847, update meeting included 
“Col Art Friedlander, USAMRIID,” and was held in Room 1A09, Building 29B, at 1300 hours on 
December 15, 1998. The FDA Form 1571 includes in block 7, “indications” for the Investigational New 
Drug Application as “Inhalation Anthrax” (DoD, 1999; DoD-JPOBD, 1995, p. 3). 
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trouble Canadian military authorities as that nation contemplates H1N1 inoculations for 
forces currently deployed to the Middle East (Brewster, 2009). 
Officials for the new administration similarly comprise diverse disciplines 
and inevitably must chart their own courses of action on this complex issue. As a final 
vignette, we examine a new administration official with a professional background 
requiring threat emphasis. Dr. Tara O’Toole, appointed to serve as the DHS 
Undersecretary for Science and Technology, formerly directed the Center for Biosecurity 
at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC). Previously, she served as a co-
founder of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies (UPMC, 2009a; 
UPMC, 2009b).68 Early on, her associates affiliated with John Hopkins defended the 
anthrax vaccine program. The announcement of Dr. O’Toole’s nomination also noted her 
involvement with exercises such as “Dark Winter” and “Atlantic Storm.” Dr. O’Toole’s 
exercises emphasized the threat of biological attack (DHS, 2009a), providing her with 
skills potentially well suited for a DHS directorate known for an “emphasis on high-
consequence biological threats” (Bonin, 2007, p. 239). Yet some expressing concerns 
about Dr. O’Toole relay their impressions of her unrealistically dire assessments, as 
documented by 2005 predictions of up to 40 million plus casualties potentially caused by 
the bird flu (Milbank, 2005). These causalities did not occur, although Dr. O’Toole was 
not alone with her forecasts. Dr. Gregory A. Poland69 described the threat as the “most 
horrific disaster in modern history,” adding “the clock is ticking. We’ve been warned.” 
Other colleagues questioned that Dr. O’Toole’s predictions “don’t seem to be based on 
any reality,” and publicly encouraged the administration to seek nominees who support 
“rational fact-based policies”70 (Clark, 2009). Other UPMC Biosecurity Center 
 
68 The $1 million seed money for the original center (Greenberg 1999) pales in comparison today to 
the almost $57 billion (Clark 2009) spent on biodefense since 2001 as a consequence of the result of the 
domestic anthrax letter attacks, and the over $1.2 billion spent on anthrax vaccine procurement (FBO, 
2004; FBO, 2005; FBO, 2007; FBO, 2008). 
69 Dr. Poland also serves on the Defense Health Board and Armed Forces Epidemiological Board 
(DoD, 2007) with a history of advocating DoD’s anthrax vaccine use prior to the program’s being found to 
be illegal (Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004; IOM, 2002, p. 7). 
70 Milton Leitenberg, a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, wrote a study on 
biological weapons threats for the U.S. Army War College titled, “Assessing the Biological Weapons and 
Bioterrorism Threat” (Leitenberg, 2005). 
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colleagues vehemently defended Dr. O’Toole, such as retired U.S. Air Force Colonel 
Randall Larsen. Colonel Larsen dismisses O’Toole’s critics by citing classified 
information to make his case.71 Dr. O’Toole’s confirmation process also advanced 
important ethical issues that oblige reflection, including her role as the strategic director 
for the Alliance for BioSecurity. The Alliance served as a collaborative corporate effort 
to promote biotechnologies, such as anthrax vaccines, and biodefense research. Reports 
allege that the Alliance has spent over $500,000 since 2005 in lobbying endeavors with 
the federal government, and apparently Dr. O’Toole failed to report her affiliations prior 
to her confirmation process. In her defense, DHS officials contend that reporting was not 
required due to the nonincorporated status of the Alliance. Critics suggest that such 
entities carry out “stealth lobbying” through avoidance of incorporation and violate the 
goal of transparency of government. Critics contend that the practice “runs counter to the 
intent of the law” (McElhatton, 2009). In fairness, several other anthrax countermeasure 
companies, including Emergent BioSolutions, manufacturer of the current anthrax 
vaccine, as well as Human Genome Sciences, Inc., and PharmAthene, makers of 
additional anthrax countermeasures, hold membership in the Alliance (UPMC, 2009a). 
Time will tell how appointees such as Dr. O’Toole perform and whether or not their 
future policy recommendations and threat assessments earn a reputation as sound and 
scientifically based. 
 
71 Col. Larsen is a decorated combat pilot and author of Our Own Worst Enemy (Grand Central 
Publications, 2007). 
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The aforementioned nonexclusive72 multidisciplinary examples warrant a 
comprehensive review in any effort by the DHS to scrutinize relationships and past 
policy decisions regarding anthrax vaccine. Such a review may subsequently warrant 
elimination of the current anthrax vaccine from SNS, a rescission of the DHHS anthrax 
emergency declared in the fall of 2008, increased security measures for biological 
pathogens, and biodefense procurement policy using sound risk assessment for viable 
threats. At a minimum, such a review might instructively serve our new officials, such as 
Secretary Napolitano, Dr. Hamburg, and Dr. O’Toole, as they make their mark on this 
important debate. 
Current or future officials must address past problems if they influence 
present policy, while discouraging exaggerations of the threat and disparagement of 
employees as tactics to override legitimate concerns. Most importantly, this 
recommended approach encourages new officials to forthrightly address the historical 
process issues related to the anthrax vaccine as they chart future policy in the best 
interests of civilian control of the military73 by the executive departments they lead. 
 
72 Another perceivably negative multidisciplinary example includes Dr. (Colonel, U.S. Army) 
Theodore Cieslak. On a positive note, the doctor and officer acknowledged that a multidisciplinary 
approach to biodefense “concerns the intelligence, law enforcement, medical, and public health 
communities” (Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999; Cieslak & Eitzen, 2000; Cieslak et al., 2000). He also recognized 
antibiotics as the “choice for treating victims of terrorism or warfare,” while also emphasizing the need for 
“good intelligence” and a “heightened awareness of the threat” as a “cornerstone of bioterrorism defense,” 
(Cieslak & Eitzen, 1999, pp. 554–55). Further analysis demonstrates Dr. Cieslak’s attempts to allay other 
professionals’ concerns regarding recommendations for the anthrax vaccine’s future use by first responders. 
Specifically, in a recent meeting of the DHHS and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices (ACIP), a 2008 summary report deemed “occupational groups engaged in 
response activities are not routinely recommended to receive anthrax vaccine due to lack of a calculable 
risk assessment.” Meeting minutes captured Dr. Cieslak’s participation, as well as his questioning of the 
recommendation. While acknowledging that the board did “not have enough information about risk,” he 
advocated deferring to the earlier DHS recommendation based on the intelligence and “information to 
which Secretary Chertoff is privy.” The meeting minutes accordingly clarified the correct interpretation of 
the DHS Secretary’s memo, which actually confirmed, “There is not currently a domestic emergency 
involving anthrax.” That memo also confirmed, “Additionally there is not currently heightened risk of an 
anthrax attack,” and “we have no credible information indicating an imminent threat of anthrax involving 
bacillus anthracis” (CDC-ACIP, 2008, pp. 97, 101, 103–4). 
73 Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State outlined key qualities for any profession, including 
expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. These characteristics apply to the required multidisciplinary 
review of the anthrax vaccine issue. Huntington asked, “What does the military officer do when he is 
ordered by a statesman to take a measure which is militarily absurd when judged by professional 
standards?” Huntington answered, “The existence of professional standards justifies military disobedience” 
(Huntington, 1957, p. 8).  
 175
B. CLOSING THE GAP WITH TRUST 
Trust—this core concept of the interaction of convictions and beliefs holds 
seemingly vast proportions, yet in fact is very simple. Some define trust simply as 
“confidence.” Trust possesses grammatical qualities as verb and noun, a shared 
confidence in abilities and a mutual understanding of “integrity” (Covey & Merrill, 2006, 
pp. 5, 223). In other words, we trust due to trust. Whether the verb or noun comes first 
remains unimportant. What is important is the transitive nature of trust as verb and noun, 
versus which empowers the other. To have trust and to trust becomes a process, and that 
process completes a cycle of trust. The cycle of trust emerges as more important than the 
order of the words. While perhaps pedantic to some, the discussion of trust and the trust 
gap related to the anthrax vaccine requires inspection due to the myriad examples of 
scientific inconsistencies, regulatory deviations, and violations of the law that represent 
holes in the anthrax vaccine program’s integrity. 
Whereas integrity is a desired quality in any person or within a program, trust 
reflects integrity between two or more people, between those people and their 
organizations or perhaps between the people and the government’s programs. The present 
thesis contends that a fundamental requirement for programmatic integrity and 
governmental trust exists just as the institutional requirements for the core value of 
integrity remains a uniform standard (United States Air Force [USAF], 1995) for the 
personnel subjected to the programs. Many examples outlined in the prior chapters of this 
thesis reveal that at times with the anthrax vaccine that cycle of trust appeared elusive. 
Indeed, the United States, as well as English and Canadian allies, experienced a 
“decrease in levels of trust,” both with respect to anthrax vaccines and with respect to the 
military institution. In response to suspicions, the governments rolled out education 
efforts to “increase confidence,” yet these may have led to a “decrease in levels of trust” 
on both sides of the ocean (Murphy, Marteau, Hotopf, Rona, & Wessely, 2008). Within 
the United States, from all branches of the armed forces, the impression persists that 
“serious questions about the safety and efficacy of the vaccine remain unanswered” 
(Allison, 2002; Murphy et al., 2008). An Army attorney’s academic effort in addressing 
the anthrax vaccine controversy suggested six years ago that “the Department of Defense 
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must act now to regain service members’ trust if the program is to be as successful.” His 
professional military and legal judgment concluded that the questions about the vaccine 
policy represented a “legitimate controversy” (Lynch, 2003, p. 78–80). Nonexclusive 
legitimate controversial factors included the documented safety questions resident in the 
earlier work of military researchers as described in the literature review in Chapter II, the 
prior awareness by the DoD about the vaccine’s investigational status as detailed in the 
case study in Chapter III, and the debate over efficacy as explained in the program 
evaluation in Chapter IV. Concerning the controversy over efficaciousness, a respected 
attorney and legislator, Representative Christopher Shays, penned the congressional 
report concerning the vaccine’s “unproven” status. He wrote: 
The AVIP should be suspended because it lacks an essential element in a 
medical program: trust. However well intentioned, the anthrax vaccine 
effort is viewed by many with suspicion. It is seen as another chapter in a 
long, unhappy history of military medical malfeasance in which the 
healing arts are corrupted to serve a lethal purpose. (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 
45) 
Retired military leaders who reflected on that “unhappy history” acknowledged 
that the “level of trust began to deteriorate with the Defense Department’s failure to come 
to grips with reports of the toxic effects of Agent Orange, the defoliant employed to 
destroy the jungles in Vietnam.” The retired general added: 
The department was slow to respond to initial reports of illness from 
soldiers who had handled the defoliant during the war, and to the stories of 
cancers that appeared later. That failure was compounded in the 1990s by 
the department’s perceived reluctance to resolve the complex questions 
raised by Gulf War syndrome—and by its apparent inability to refute the 
assertion that at least some of the reported medical problems were caused 
by hastily conceived combinations of medicines administered to soldiers 
to protect them from the potential effects of Saddam Hussein’s biological 
and chemical weapons. (Scott, 2000) 
Ultimately, the relevance of the trust dilemma within the DoD anthrax vaccine 
experience between soldiers and the institution translates directly to the trust that the 
American people must have in their government regarding anthrax vaccine, or any other 
countermeasure, in the nation’s SNS. Just as soldiers and citizens should be able to trust 
(v.) their government, public officials must similarly strive to earn their trust (n.). While 
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the courts confirmed the basis of the trust dilemma in findings, the Congress eloquently 
captured the essential missing element of trust in hearings74 and reports75 when 
describing the DoD anthrax vaccine experience (HR, Committee on Government Reform, 
1999; HR 106-556, 2000). The factual record regarding anthrax vaccine, along with other 
defense-related medical controversies, gives credence to the DoD’s understanding that 
“within our school of military thought, higher authority does not consider itself 
infallible,” and that at times there is “very good reason for higher authority to resurvey its 
own judgments” (DoD, 1975, p. 41). The government and the DHS in particular can 
therefore learn from the negative externalities of the DoD anthrax vaccine experience, 
and also from the DoD’s positive example with respect to the department’s recognition of 
the organizational trust dynamics involved. The root causes of the DoD trust issues 
directly relate to the cycle of trust established by DHS as the department endorses 
countermeasures for the SNS for the nation’s citizenry. Ultimately, Americans must trust 
(v.) DHS and must have trust (n.) in the products that the DHS uses its authorities to 
approve for the SNS (POTUS, 2004; POTUS, 2007a; POTUS, 2007b; POTUS, 2003c). 
The DHS has the wisdom of time and the opportunity to reflect on the DoD’s cycle of 
trust, to help maintain its own stewardship of trust with the American people on this 
issue. 
 
74 Trust quotes from HR 106-17 include, “The missing element of the mandatory anthrax vaccine 
program is trust” and “It comes down to trust. These are issues of trust. We are not in a combat situation, 
but when we are in a combat situation that is a vital element of our ability to perform” (HR 106-17, 1999a, 
p.1, 105). 
75 Trust quotes from HR 106-556 include, “Many members of the armed forces do not share that faith. 
They do not believe merely suggestive evidence of vaccine efficacy outweighs their concerns over the lack 
of evidence of long term vaccine safety. Nor do they trust DoD has learned the lessons of past military 
medical mistakes: atomic testing, Agent Orange, Persian Gulf war drugs, and vaccines. Heavy handed, one-
sided informational materials only fuel suspicions the program understates adverse reaction risks in order to 
magnify the relative, admittedly marginal, benefits of the vaccine” and “the AVIP should be suspended 
because it lacks an essential element in a medical program: trust. However well-intentioned, the anthrax 
vaccine effort is viewed by many with suspicion. It is seen as another chapter in a long, unhappy history of 
military medical malfeasance in which the healing arts are corrupted to serve a lethal purpose” and “if there 
is one thing that the subcommittee learned from its review of DoD’s anthrax vaccination program it is that 
the trust of many service members has been severely shaken. Acceptance of the recommendations in the 
subcommittee’s report and reversal of prior disciplinary actions will go a long way toward rebuilding the 
trust of service members in the DoD and would be in the best interest of our Nation’s armed forces” (HR 
106-556, 2000, pp. 2, 45, 67, supplemental words of Representative Bernard Sanders). 
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Over time, the DHS must impartially evaluate the effectiveness of the DoD 
model. The mantra of obedience, with the firm message that “DoD must stay the course 
and never concede that force health protection should be a discretionary choice of each 
individual service member” (Curry, 2004), harmed the cycle of trust between soldiers and 
their command. A “bad” order effectively became a prejudice to good order and 
discipline. The DoD methods clearly seem incompatible in a DHS endeavor to protect the 
public health from the threat of anthrax due to bioterrorism. 
As a former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Stephen J. 
Hadley said, “Maintaining the trust and confidence of our men and women in uniform is 
critical to the future of our armed forces” (Public Broadcasting System [PBS], 2000). 
Similarly, the DHS must balance historic experiences and objective evaluations about the 
pallet of countermeasures available against maintaining the trust and confidence of the 
American people. The examples from all chapters of the above analysis demonstrate a 
tarnishing of the cycle of trust within the DoD anthrax vaccine experience. This thesis 
advocates that the DHS and the DHHS learn from this record and avoid creating an 
additional chapter for subsequent analyses. 
C. SUMMARY ON THE OPENING & CLOSING OF THE GAP 
As discussed in the program evaluation’s summative analysis subsection on 
biosecurity, in Chapter IV, a recent GAO report speculated about the government’s 
inability to “conclusively determine what motivated” the anthrax letter bioterrorism 
culprit. This indifferent view on motive perhaps misses the mark, particularly in light of 
the extensive work that the GAO has previously published on the problematic procedures 
relating to the anthrax vaccine (GAO, 2009, pp. 40–41). In effect, the motive of the 
anthrax attack perpetrator holds added importance in a retrospective effort to analyze the 
gaps and myriad broken processes underlying the countermeasure’s history. Federal 
investigations to date fail to transparently evaluate these flawed processes in the post-
2001 time frame, yet this process reigns as essential in the pursuit of determining the 
propriety of the old anthrax vaccine’s inclusion in the SNS. 
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The DHS and governmental challenge in closing the gap and evaluating the 
failures or successes of the DoD anthrax vaccine history embodies the essential need to 
determine if that experience presents a “suitable foundation for contemporary national 
medical or public health policy” (Schumm et al., 2009, p. 597). In doing so public 
officials should avoid spackling over the documented problems. A solution path provided 
in the recommendations of the next chapter offers one template for how executive-level 
officials can exert the authority granted by the American people to restore trust and close 
the gap. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION 
1. Phase III, Corrective Actions 
Continuing from the phase I and II root-cause analysis processes (DOE, 1992) 
outlined, and partially exercised, within the case study in Chapter III, the thesis’s 
multimethodology approach recommendations chapter presents the opportunity to 
suggest phase III corrective actions. The thesis recommends executive branch 
intervention through presidential establishment of a governmental entity to investigate 
and direct corrective actions following a formal, thorough root-cause assessment phase. 
Renewed review of the anthrax vaccine begins with a collaborative effort between 
the DoD, the DHS, the DHHS, the DOJ and the FBI to recommence a comprehensive 
phase I data collection. Referring back to Chapter IV’s program evaluation’s summative 
analysis subsection on comparative policy, this thesis recommends a presidential study 
directive (PSD), followed by a presidential policy directive (PPD) (POTUS, 2009), to 
initiate this fresh start. The new presidential administration formalized the PPD and PSD 
process for related Homeland Security initiatives.76 
The PSD allows the United States to conduct a thorough policy review, whereas 
the PPD enables promulgation of policy decisions. Resultant PPDs allow the United 
States to direct policy actions related to the anthrax vaccine. The PSD-PPD process 
reaffirms the nation’s commitment to guard against illicit release of pathogens and adhere 
to the BTWC. Together, these actions will lead to less escalatory and controversial 
biological defense prophylaxis policies. Such an approach aligns with allied strategies, 
avoids BW escalation, and precludes facades of protection against multifarious threats. 
 
76 The Federation of American Scientists provide web site access to the single PSD and PPD 
published to date by the Obama administration; they are related to Homeland Security Council absorption 
into the National Security Council (POTUS, 2009). 
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a. Presidential Study Directive (PSD) 
This thesis recommends initiation of a presidential study directive (PSD). 
The PSD process assures the current anthrax vaccine’s inclusion as a component of the 
SNS represents a policy option worthy of transfer to, and adoption by, the new 
administration. The PSD must compel a systematic examination of the root causes behind 
the unauthorized 2001 release of anthrax by a nonstate actor from the U.S. biodefense 
program, as confirmed by the FBI. The new administration’s selection for FDA 
commissioner, Dr. Margret Hamburg, previously advocated safeguarding biological 
technologies from proliferation and recommended the development of “new vaccines, 
especially against anthrax” (Hamburg, 1999; Richwine, 2009). Considering the 
commissioner’s present position, the new administration’s PSD process should therefore 
analyze the assumptions behind her 1999 recommendations, which parallel those 
presented in this thesis, and how they may apply to modifications of contemporary U.S. 
biodefense policy. 
Despite the pre-2005 illegal use of the vaccine, based on the vaccine’s 
unfinalized license and experimental status, current utilization of the product is ostensibly 
legal (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009). The PSD team should address whether or not the 
current technical legal propriety of the vaccine equates to policy worthy of the American 
people given the historic safety and efficacy questions. In essence, simply because the 
FDA and DoD surmounted the legal challenges to the vaccine, and because courts choose 
to “defer to the FDA’s judgment” (Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 2009, p. 13–14), the PSD panel 
must evaluate whether the countermeasure translates into an effective and necessary 
component of the SNS for the American population as a whole. 
Examining these questions requires the PSD team to analyze the depth of 
past HSPD fulfillment, particularly given the requirement for the DHS to review the 
composition of countermeasures in the SNS. An exacting focus on the possibility that the 
department endorsed the anthrax vaccine unquestioningly, based on DoD or DHHS 
advisement, requires attention. A comprehensive review of the multidisciplinary and 
organizational relationships should proceed without ignoring the complete legal and 
regulatory schematic as potentially occurred with previous executive level reviews. The 
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PSD process requires a thoughtful attempt to restrategize the nation’s biodefense 
doctrine, to monitor biodefense business relationships carefully, and to monitor any 
“intimate” or potentially unhealthy departmental-manufacturer associations closely. 
If the PSD panel determines documented problems with the old vaccine 
continue to hold merit, planned use of the current anthrax vaccine on the civilian 
population via the SNS warrants review. If the PSD concludes that the “characteristics of 
the vaccine and the constraints on the present method of manufacturing argue strongly 
against procuring large amounts for civilian use” (Russell, 1999), a subsequent PPD 
allows the government to correct current policy and procurement directions. 
b. Presidential Policy Directives (PPD) 
Following the PSD review, the administration should consider a 
presidential policy directive (PPD) in order to modify procurement plans for the old 
anthrax vaccine and ensure increased security of the U.S. biological defense program. 
The PPD may find prudence in formally reaffirming U.S. commitments to guaranteeing 
nonproliferation and adherence to the BTWC. In addition to evaluating the anthrax 
vaccine’s suitability as a component of the SNS, the PSD and resulting PPD should also 
reassess the propriety of the 2008 DHHS “anthrax emergency” declaration. A rescission 
of the declaration should necessitate conversion of unallocated or future BioShield 
resources to procurement of a new vaccine and FDA approved antibiotics based on CDC 
advice that BioThrax® remains “not recommended for routine pre-event anthrax 
vaccination” (CDC, n.d.; CIDRAP, 2008). 
If the PSD process determines that the tenets of the HSPDs to review 
countermeasures in the SNS require reaccomplishment, the PPD serves as a mechanism 
to direct this action. As a byproduct, the PSD-PPD process assures proven 
countermeasures for viable threats when applied to future biodefense and procurement 
policy in order to avoid blindly adopting earlier attempts at corrective policy that may 
neglect the core problems involved. 
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c. Biodefense Czar Appointment 
The PSD-PPD process should consider appointment of a biodefense czar, 
or equivalent position, based on the high-risk activities and perceptibly poor record of the 
U.S. biodefense community. The czar provides oversight for the departments assigned to 
comply with HSPDs. 
The czar also offers a solution to the significant gap in biodefense 
accountability. A recent GAO report affirmed the need for governmental partnerships to 
create viable solutions to oversee current or planned high-containment laboratories77 
(GAO, 2009, pp. 10, 22). The GAO reiterated the FBI allegations about the U.S. Army 
scientist “sole culprit” status as the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax attacks, that he 
“helped develop an anthrax vaccine for U.S. troops,” and received the highest DoD 
awards for “helping solve technical problems in the manufacturing of licensed anthrax 
vaccine” (GAO, 2009, p. 37). While inconclusively addressing “motive,” the GAO 
restated the fact that: 
At the time of the attacks, Ivins was under pressure at work to assist a 
private company that had lost its FDA approval to produce an anthrax 
vaccine the Army needed for U.S. troops, and which Ivins believed was 
essential for the anthrax program at USAMRIID. (GAO, 2009, p. 39) 
In the “Recommendations for Executive Action” of the report, the GAO 
specifically recommended executive branch–level collaboration, including the DHS, and 
advised the government to “identify a single entity charged with periodic government 
wide strategic evaluation of high-containment laboratories.” The report recommended 
risk assessment and increased security reliability for both pathogen and personnel (GAO, 
2009, pp. 68–69). The report’s analysis and essential measures stopped short of 
addressing the root motivations of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, intimate governmental-
business relationships, organization dynamics, institutional inertia, and the human  
 
 
77 DHS BSL-4 facilities include the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center, Fort 
Detrick, Maryland, and the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), Manhattan, Kansas (GAO, 
2009, p. 22). 
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behavioral forces at the core of the emergency occurrence. Due diligence by the 
biodefense czar in the future must analyze those forces and their potential negative 
momentums. 
As attempted in Chapters III through V of this thesis, by addressing the 
facts and motivations surrounding potential contributory causes and the subsequent 
problematic events, this thesis advocates the correction of past behavioral deviations and 
the strengthening of current or future oversight mechanisms. In doing so, the biodefense 
czar, or a similarly empowered entity, should possess the authority to make 
recommendations that might mitigate the institutional and behavioral forces at the root of 
the motives and circumstances behind the anthrax letter attacks. To stop shy of this level 
of thorough and retrospective analysis risks a repeat of the emergency occurrence, or at a 
minimum a perpetuation of unhealthy dynamics and relationships. 
d. Biodefense Commission (BDC) 
This thesis recommends decisive action through the PSD-PPD process for 
the additional formulation of a Biodefense Commission (BDC), potentially directed by 
the biodefense czar. The BDC will serve as a formal body to assist the biodefense czar in 
overseeing HSPD, regulatory, and legal compliance. BDC oversight authority should 
follow the historical model of the 1946 formulation of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and its 1974 reorganization as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.78 The BDC may 
determine that a requirement exists for further accountability in order to reduce the 
probability for future problematic events, perhaps in coordination with the DOJ. BDC 
formulation serves to preclude future mismanagement, from a policy and appropriations 
perspective, by halting wasteful spending on known inadequate biological defenses. 
The BDC’s oversight power should consider reversal of current contracts 
for the current anthrax vaccine jointly endorsed by the DHS, the DHHS, and the DoD79 
 
78 For U.S. Department of Energy historic information on the NRC and AEC, see NRC, n.d. The idea 
for emulation of AEC/NRC model was first espoused by Colonel John Richardson, USAFR, retired. 
79 GAO Report #08-88, “PROJECT BIOSHIELD: Actions Needed to Avoid Repeating Past Problems 
with Procuring New Anthrax Vaccine and Managing the Stockpile of Licensed Vaccine” (GAO, 2007d). 
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for the SNS80 based on DOJ and FBI revelations of potency problems by the 
manufacturer preceding the vaccine’s licensure. Considering the CDC excludes anthrax 
vaccine as a recommended “first line” treatment for inhalation anthrax infection, the 
present thesis encourages the BDC to reaffirm national biodefense policy centered on the 
resiliency of antibiotic procurement, such as penicillin, ciprofloxacin, and doxycycline 
for pre- and post-exposure of multiple threats (CDC, 2001). Prophylaxis procurement, 
such as multipurpose, proven, and recommended antibiotics, repairs the “doctrinal 
departures” represented by the past twenty years of anthrax vaccine prophylaxis. 
The PSD-PPD process, biodefense czar appointment, and BDC 
establishment moves the United States in the right direction, in alignment with the 
“resilience” themes espoused by the DHS. The new “resilient” (DHS, 2009c; Napolitano, 
2009) national state of mind desired for Homeland Security requires a complementary 
“resilience” (Ripley, 2009, pp. 85–107) of trust in the government and confidence in the 
resiliency of countermeasures stockpiled in the SNS. The BDC may determine that 
antibiotics provide the best recipe for resiliency as opposed to questionably effective 
vaccines focused against singular threats (HR 106-556, 2000, p. 17). Resiliency themes 
encouraged in this thesis also comport with the latest direction espoused by the President 
of the U.S. and the National Security Council with publication of the National Strategy 
for Countering Biological Threats. The report expresses the goal to “improve 
international preparedness and global resilience against potentially catastrophic outbreaks 
of infectious disease,” while “optimizing security of known virulent high-risk pathogens 
and toxins.” The report encourages the “empowering an informed, involved, and 
observant citizenry,” and “complying with our obligations” under the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (National Security Council, 2009, p. 6, 13, 15, 21). 
 
80 Strategic National Stockpile regulatory history excerpt from CDC web site: “The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 tasked the Department of Homeland Security DHS with defining the goals and 
performance requirements of the SNS Program, as well as managing the actual deployment of assets. 
Effective on 1 March 2003, the NPS became the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Program managed 
jointly by DHS and HHS. With the signing of the BioShield legislation, the SNS Program was returned to 
HHS for oversight and guidance. The SNS Program works with governmental and non-governmental 
partners to upgrade the nation’s public health capacity to respond to a national emergency. Critical to the 
success of this initiative is ensuring capacity is developed at federal, state, and local levels to receive, stage, 
and dispense SNS assets” (CDC, n.d.). 
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The BDC provides a logical enforcement mechanism to the PSD-PPD 
process, as well as a leadership venue for the biodefense czar to oversee the belated 
development of a new anthrax vaccine called for 25 years ago. The BDC should expedite 
development of the new anthrax vaccine based on Institute of Medicine (IOM) findings 
that BioThrax® is “far from optimal” and a “new vaccine, developed according to more 
modern principles of vaccinology, is urgently needed” (IOM, 2002, p. 208). Adoption of 
the PSD-PPD-BDC proposal represents healthy change, whereas the current path risks a 
continuation of past problems and a lack of governmental accountability when viewed 
from a historical perspective. 
e. Surveillance 
The PSD-PPD process, and resultant BDC, should ensure surveillance of 
past BioThrax® vaccinees. The FDA’s 2002 labeling for the vaccine included new 
revelations about adverse safety information, including birth defect possibilities and 
adverse reaction rates up to 175 times greater than previously acknowledged.81 Post-
anthrax vaccine program surveillance of previously inoculated citizens and soldiers 
remains a priority based on the unprecedented adverse reaction report rates submitted due 
to the vaccine.82 
 
81 The FDA-approved anthrax vaccine label for the product now called Biothrax® included the 
following warnings, “Preliminary results of a recent unpublished retrospective study of infants born to 
women in the U.S. military service worldwide in 1998 and 1999 suggest that the vaccine may be linked 
with an increase in the number of birth defects.” VAERS (Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System) notes 
included: “Through October 2001, VAERS received approximately 1850 spontaneous reports of adverse 
events ... Approximately 6% of the reported events were listed as serious. Serious adverse events include 
those that result in death, hospitalization, permanent disability or are life-threatening.” Also, “across these 
studies, systemic reactions were reported in 5–35% of vaccine recipients,” which compares to .2%, from 
the previous label—an increase of 25 to 175 fold. Finally, “reports of fatalities included sudden cardiac 
arrest (2), myocardial infarction with polyarteritis nodosa (1), aplastic anemia (1), suicide (1) and central 
nervous system (CNS) lymphoma (1)” (FDA, 2002a). 
82 FDA-released Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) data rose from 42 reports on 
March 24, 1999 for 634,000 inoculations, to 1,578 as of June 20, 1999 for 2,071,876 inoculations. Most 
recently, as of July 22, 2008, 5931 reports resulted from 7.5 million doses (FDA, 2008a). This 
approximately 1,000% or ten-fold increase in reporting for doses given may coincidentally correspond to 
the GAO’s report of a 100-fold increase in vaccine potency. VAERS reporting also documented 19 deaths. 
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2. Phase IV, Inform 
In line with the commendable transparency inherent in the FBI’s revelations 
regarding the origins of the anthrax attacks, the PSD-PPD process should ensure that the 
BDC informs the U.S. Congress and the American people about releasable lessons 
learned and corrective actions following a methodical investigation. Additional 
recommended courses of action by BDC officials include the reaffirmation of biosurety 
regulations and the establishment of strict accountability measures for any future program 
discovered operating outside of the nation’s regulatory and legal frameworks. 
The first three recommendations of the most recent 2009 progress report on the 
2008 Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism study affirm 
the themes emphasized in this thesis. The need for transparency in reinforcing domestic 
biosecurity remains paramount, as does reassuring the international community about a 
U.S. commitment to guarantee biosecurity and nonproliferation (Graham & Talent, 2009, 
p. 25; Graham, 2008). The Commission’s additional recommendation for high-level 
executive-branch restructuring and designation of a “White House principal advisor for 
WMD proliferation and terrorism” corresponds to this thesis’s and PSD-PPD courses of 
action for appointment of a biodefense czar and a BDC (Graham & Talent, 2009, p. 26). 
The final recommendation by the congressionally sponsored commission 
encourages the government to “work to openly and honestly engage the American 
citizen, encouraging a participatory approach to meeting the challenges of the new 
century” (Graham & Talent, 2009, p. 27). This suggested coherent direction firmly 
addresses the fundamental goal articulated in this thesis for transparency by the 
government and candidly informing the American people. These recommended courses 
of action serve to arrest a 50-year culture of extralegal activities and regulatory 
noncompliance permeating the history of the old anthrax vaccine. 
3. Phase V, Follow-up 
The follow-up phase ensures that corrective actions resolve the problems. In 
addition to providing oversight of DoD biosecurity and involvement in biologics in the 
future, the BDC must monitor DoD compliance with the 1972 Convention on the 
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Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological Weapons 
prohibiting the development of offensive biologic capabilities, as well as compliance with 
President Nixon’s 1969 decree to discard offensive materials.83 Considering the 
unauthorized anthrax attacks by a lone actor arguably represented an offensive release of 
aerosolized spores, albeit unauthorized, the status of the United States’ reputation with 
international allies and cosigners warrants consideration based on the nation’s pledge to 
comply with the convention. BDC follow-up reporting to Congress and the president 
regarding chartered responsibilities should occur annually, while the president 
concurrently reaffirms compliance intentions to international partners. 
The BDC should capitalize on current collaborative checks-and-balances 
mechanisms for increased oversight, such as supporting a thorough 911 Commission–
style inquiry as recommended by some members of Congress (Holt, 2009a; Holt, 2009b). 
Such a process facilitates an objective review regarding the causal chain of events 
preceding the anthrax attack emergency occurrence, as well as scrutinizes the 
government’s reactive regulatory actions following the event. Application of the template 
presented in this thesis allows the DHS to simultaneously commence its own event-cause 
case study analysis and synthesize the historic scientific and regulatory processes in order 
to evaluate the suitability of the old anthrax vaccine’s inclusion as a component of the 
SNS (United States Department of Education, 1985). 
The follow-up phase seems prudent since inevitably future generations of 
Americans will do so in response to a documented void of reflective analysis following 
the anthrax letter attacks. This recommended follow-up process engenders trust, 
minimizes political and institutional biases, and increases the government’s credibility. 
 
83 The U.S. Department of State information on the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction includes the following background as an excerpt, “Shortly after President Nixon took office, he 
ordered a review of U.S. policy and programs regarding biological and chemical warfare. On November 25, 
1969, the President declared that the United States unilaterally renounced first use of lethal or 
incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological 
warfare. Henceforth the U.S. biological program would be confined to research on strictly defined 
measures of defense, such as immunization. The Department of Defense was ordered to draw up a plan for 
the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. On February 14, 1970, the White House 
announced extension of the ban to cover toxins (substances falling between biologicals and chemicals in 
that they act like chemicals but are ordinarily produced by biological or microbic processes)” (BTWC, 
1975). 
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B. SUMMARY RECOMMENDED RESTORATION OF TRUST 
Retired Lieutenant General James Terry Scott, who formerly served as the 
director of the National Security Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, wrote an article titled, “Sticking Point; In Defending Its Troops 
Against Anthrax, The Pentagon Has Injected Distrust Instead” (Scott, 2000). In this 
article about the anthrax vaccine controversy, General Scott discussed the Vietnam era 
genesis of the demise of trust within the military when dealing with medical issues. 
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb also addressed the fragile element 
of trust and the damage done if the government lacks the necessary vigilance. Mr. Korb 
commented about the anthrax vaccine’s “terrible impact on morale.” He added, “The 
Anthrax Immunization program was a disaster from its inception. It should have been 
voluntary, not mandatory, and should not have been started until there was much more 
evidence that it was needed and safe” (PBS, 2000). 
The nation should not accept, nor can it afford, a similar “disaster” of uncertainty 
about the safety and efficacy of SNS anthrax countermeasures. The same language 
chosen by the federal courts when adjudicating these issues for the armed forces applies 
with heightened importance when reflecting on the government’s responsibilities for 
America’s citizens: 
The men and women of our armed forces deserve the assurance that the 
vaccines our government compels them to take into their bodies have been 
tested by the greatest scrutiny of all—public scrutiny. This is the process 
the FDA in its expert judgment has outlined, and this is the course this 
Court shall compel FDA to follow. … Accordingly, the involuntary 
anthrax vaccination program, as applied to all persons, is rendered illegal. 
(Doe v. Rumsfeld, 2004, pp. 42–43) 
The American people will know if the government acts in the “spirit of 
transparency,” the “first key to restoring public trust” (Covey & Merrill, 2006, p. 154). 
Consideration of the PSD-PPD-BDC process to address these vital issues offers a logical, 
and perhaps overdue, first step to restore the public trust in the biodefense realm. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The preceding thesis recommends that the DHS leadership ask the tough 
questions and modify SNS procurement strategy if necessary. The methodological 
quadrangulation sought to increase perspective and “box” in unresolved problems in 
order to help preclude future harm to national credibility in the realm of biodefense. The 
preceding case study timeline, and inclusive multiprism analysis, raise numerous non 
sequiturs. Follow-on logical questions include, why did the military mandate the old 
anthrax vaccine, despite knowledge of its unsatisfactory status and known legal hurdles? 
Further, why did the DHS endorse anthrax vaccine for the SNS in light of the problematic 
DoD experience? Finally, why did the government accelerate procurement after the FBI 
plausibly associated the 2001 anthrax attack motive to the vaccine’s “failing” status? 
In answering these questions, an analysis deficit appears to exist by the DHS and 
the DHHS in adopting the anthrax vaccine from the DoD. The answers may lie in the 
various cognitive “gaps” of failed examination outlined in this thesis. A failure of 
application of legal frameworks, doctrinal precedents, and advisory warnings precipitated 
the potentially dangerous shift. Willfully blind disregard of the recorded problems laid 
the foundation for the ensuing analysis deficit. The subsequent reluctance to evaluate the 
implications of FBI disclosures further widened the deficit. At some point in the process, 
reliance on the old vaccine delayed or halted the synthesis of alternative 
countermeasures. Consequential bureaucratic biases ultimately hampered the nation’s 
current scientific, military, and governmental leaders’ ability to rectify the past errors. 
Taken as a whole, the collective application failures, analysis deficits, evaluation 
biases, and synthesis cessation require correction. Failing to cast light on the errors may 
constitute a cognitive condition worse than the preceding failures. Therefore, this thesis 
concludes that the anthrax vaccine experience represents an outlier case, with anomalies 
that deviate from the American people’s expectations for good government and public 
health policy. The DHS must now resolve whether its message to the American people 
will be the “old boilerplate” script about “an extremely successful program,” or whether 
the departments and leaders responsible choose a different path and strategic vision. 
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A. REVIEW OF CLAIMS, WARRANTS, AND EVIDENCE 
The central research claim for the thesis argued that the existing anthrax vaccine 
should not be included in the SNS in light of the controversial scientific, regulatory, 
legislative, judicial, and ethical processes studied. Moreover, the claim asserts that the 
procurement of anthrax vaccine is indeed wasteful because alternatives with fewer 
liabilities exist. The examples outlined in the quadrangular methodology buttress the 
claim based on the documented application failures, analysis deficits, cessation of 
synthesis, and evaluation biases. 
The warrants, or reasons, involve the complex regulatory, scientific, legal, and 
legislative landscapes “boxed” in by the quadrangular methodology. The documented 
government awareness of the safety, efficacy, and legality problems with the old, 
currently stockpiled, anthrax vaccine resulted from unhealthy centralized decision-
making processes and extralegal regulatory mistakes bracketing the pivotal 2001 anthrax 
letter attacks. Evidence supporting the argument primarily originates from historic critical 
congressional reports, scientific assessments, and, most significantly, the documented 
awareness by the Defense Department about the need for a new vaccine as early as 1985. 
FBI evidence bolsters thesis conclusions and recommendations based on the 
Bureau’s findings about the scientific frustrations over vaccine potency problems. Those 
problems, and the vaccine’s “failing” status, likely contributed to the anthrax attack 
motive. The evidence also demonstrates that the CDC recommends antibiotics to protect 
against the most deadly inhaled form of the disease in lieu of anthrax vaccine. Such 
evidence begs the question why the government did not reevaluate the suitability of the 
anthrax vaccine after the FBI’s disclosures. Instead, the government accelerated 
purchases for an expanded market. 
The warrants, claims, and evidence presented in this thesis effectively attempt to 
reinvigorate the proper legal, regulatory and procurement processes abandoned by the 
DoD, DHHS and DHS. Digesting the implications of the evidence, and acting on the 
conclusions, protects the nation’s leaders from the deleterious impact of allowing 
bioterrorism crimes to dictate reactive bioterrorism procurement policy for the SNS. 
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B. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
In this thesis the author leveraged a nonmedical background and operational skill 
set in order to proffer a fresh approach in scrutinizing the old anthrax vaccine issue. As a 
result, the author potentially avoids the biases and cognitive limitations discussed in 
Chapter V’s gap explanations. Any concern as to the author’s lack of objectivity should 
be alleviated by the fact that the official DoD position pre-1998 essentially mirrored 
those presented and advocated by the author. The 1999 opinions expressed by the new 
FDA commissioner similarly parallel the findings and recommendations of this thesis. 
Any concerns about the subjective limitations of the materials presented encourage the 
government to recommence additional levels of inquiry by the DHS as the lead agency 
for incident management and SNS stockpile composition under the auspices of HSPD 5, 
8, 10, 18, and 21. The first order of business requires reconsideration of current policy in 
light of the fact that prior official positions of the DoD, and opinions of the new FDA 
commissioner one decade ago, closely resemble this author’s current recommendations. 
The thesis incorporated myriad threads of inductive reasoning through the four 
methodologies to derive a logical conclusion that anthrax vaccine inclusion in the SNS 
requires review based on the various tentacles of past problems. The quadrangular 
methodological approach supports the suggested courses of action articulated in the 
recommendations. Such a review does not guarantee successful accomplishment of the 
recommendations. A review also provides the possibility that additional information, 
unavailable to the author, will overcome the conclusions of the quadrangular analysis. 
Additionally, alternative information may overcome the inductive reasoning 
approach of this thesis. On the other hand, the DoD’s more deductive approach appears to 
rely on two premises:  “Anthrax kills, vaccination protects” (Cragin, 1999). Regrettably, 
DoD records effectively contradict this sound bite. Therefore, the DHS must weigh the 
inductive reasoning presented in this thesis against the deductive conclusions of the DoD. 
The DHS may determine that DoD reasoning falls short based upon the lack of validation 
of both premises. As well, the DHS, as a relatively new actor in the executive landscape 
and with anthrax vaccine, may determine the fresh approach presented in this thesis of 
thorough retrospective review overrides any limitations within the research methods. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
In line with IOM determinations about the “paucity of published peer-reviewed 
literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine” (IOM, 2000, p. 259), a similar scarcity of 
anthrax vaccine strategic review apparently exists. This thesis represents the author’s 
attempt to fill the void of strategic review. Mushrooming procurement of the product for 
civilian applications dictates such a review as proposed by this thesis. A significant 
potential byproduct of the thesis exists if the policy and the product undergo a thorough 
and candid reevaluation. The consumers benefiting from the cost savings resulting from 
adoption of thesis recommendations include American taxpayers not yet directly 
subjected to the potential ill effects or inefficacy of the controversial old anthrax vaccine. 
In addition, senior policymakers and Homeland Security practitioners benefit 
from a comprehensive review of the issues, one literally nonexistent in the post-2001 
anthrax letter attack environment. Historic issues which should also be addressed as a 
consequence of this thesis include a study of the arguably adulterating manufacturing 
changes made to the anthrax vaccine before and after the first Persian Gulf War and their 
possible associations to Gulf War illnesses (21 U.S.C. §351, 1997). This thesis 
significantly recommends particular attention to the filtration changes reported by Dr. 
Ivins (Ivins et al., 1994, p. 873), as affirmed by the GAO (GAO, 2001b, pp. 4–5, nn. 8–
10, 12). While ignored by the FDA and IOM, DoD coordinated manufacturing changes, 
and resulting plausible increases in vaccine potency, appear to be linked to the vaccine’s 
“failing” status and the motives behind the 2001 bioterrorism attacks according to the 
FBI (FBI, 2008, pp. 12-15) (see Appendix 11). The crimes, purportedly by design, then 
led to the DoD anthrax vaccine program’s revival, a belated 2002 approval of the vaccine 
manufacturing process, the vaccine’s 2005 court ordered licensure, and ultimately the 
vaccine’s expansion as a component of the SNS as biodefense countermeasure. 
The preceding thesis served as an objective means to encourage similar reflection 
by the president and the DHS on the significance of these events. The resulting 
reassertion of civilian control may protect leaders from the inherited liabilities associated 
with continued use of the current anthrax vaccine. A thorough and transparent review will 
engender trust, while also strengthening future programmatic and procurement processes. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1: EARLY LICENSURE MEMORANDUMS 
The National Institute of Health (NIH) noted the manufacturer failed to 
submit the required “scientific evidence for efficacy of the vaccine.” The 
NIH granted the anthrax vaccine license pending efficacy data submission 
(Pittman, 1969a, p. 1; Pittman, 1969b, p.2). The Centers for Disease 
Control challenged the licensing application due to “no controlled 
evaluation studies” (Kokko, 1969, p. 2). 
Memorandum from Dr. Margaret Pittman, NIH, Public Health Service, to 
Dr. Sam Gibson, Assistant Director, Licenses and Inspections, NIH, re 
anthrax vaccine, 1969, February 10 (Pittman, 1969a): 
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Memorandum from Dr. Margaret Pittman, NIH, Public Health Service, to 
Dr. Sam Gibson, Assistant Director, Licenses and Inspections, NIH, re 
anthrax vaccine, 1969, September 30 (Pittman, 1969b): 
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Memorandum from Penti Kokko, Director, Laboratory Division, CDC, 
Public Health Service, Department for Health Education and Welfare to 
Dr. Roderick Murray, Division of Biologics Standards, NIH, 1969, 
January 22 (Kokko, 1969): 
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APPENDIX 2: DOD REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL 
The DoD Request for Proposal (RFP) for a new anthrax vaccine. The RFP 
stated, “There is an operational requirement to develop a safe and effective 
product which will protect US troops against exposure from virulent 
strains of Bacillus anthracis … There is no vaccine in current use which 
will safely and effectively protect military personnel against exposure to 
this hazardous bacterial agent” The RFP clarified that the current vaccine 
is, “highly reactogenic [reactive], requires multiple boosters to maintain 
immunity and may not be protective against all strains of the anthrax 
bacillus” (DoD, 1985, p. 4): 
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APPENDIX 3: DOD LICENSING AMENDMENT 
DoD’s Joint Project Office for Biological Defense (JPOBD) recognized 
anthrax vaccine as “not licensed for a biological defense indication” based 










Meeting minutes and slides related to the October 20, 1995 DoD “Meeting 
on Changing the Food and Drug Administration License for the Michigan 
Department of Public Health (MDPH) Anthrax Vaccine to Meet Military 
Requirements.” The minutes detailed “the process for modifying the 
MDPH anthrax vaccine license to … expand the indication to include 
protection against aerosol challenge of spores.” In discussing the previous 
clinical trials, the working group acknowledged, “there was insufficient 










APPENDIX 4: “INHALATION ANTHRAX” APPLICATION 
Investigational New Drug application—Form FDA 1571—Michigan 
Biologic Product Institute (MBPI)—for “inhalation anthrax, change in 




APPENDIX 5: APPLICATION UPDATE TO FDA 
Investigational New Drug Application—Form FDA 1571—submitted for 
the express purpose of updating the earlier application to obtain an 
indication for “inhalation anthrax” (see block 7) (DoD, 1999b): 
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APPENDIX 6: FDA REVOKE NOTICE & INSPECTIONS 
The FDA filed a Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR) the manufacturer’s 
license on March 11, 1997 (FDA, 1997) for deviations from cGMPs. 
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The FDA “Inspectional Observations” noted on line 1 that “the 





APPENDIX 7: DOD INDEMNIFICATION DOCUMENTS 
DoD indemnification documents revealed language omitted from public 
communications:  “The obligation assumed by MBPI under this contract 
involves unusually hazardous risks associated with the potential for 
adverse reactions in some recipients and the possibility that the desired 






APPENDIX 8: TESTING AND POTENCY PROBLEMS 
May 5, 1998 memo from Fort Detrick U.S. Army Contracting Officer, 
Joseph Little, confirming early problems with supplemental testing and 
potency of the anthrax vaccine. Excerpt: “suspend any further potency 
testing under the supplemental testing program because the results 





Brigadier General Eddie Cain e-mails concerning GAO testimony 
delivered during a 1999 hearing on anthrax vaccine included the general’s 
statement that DoD “came up flat,” and that DoD’s vaccine “was NOT the 
one tested.” General Cain discussed the DoD’s reporting that “desert 
storm illnesses were not cause[d] (sic) by the anthrax vaccine,” when there 
is “no record of who received the shots.” Cain’s e-mail expressed worry 
that the “DoD & the Administration” would be in “big time trouble” if 




APPENDIX 9: KARL ROVE MEMO TO DOD 
Presidential Senior Advisor, Karl Rove tasked DoD Undersecretaries of 
Defense (USD) Dr. David Chu and Edward Aldridge to review the 
“political problems” associated with the anthrax vaccine and Gulf War 
Illness (Rove, 2001): 
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APPENDIX 10: DOD UNDERSECRETARY MEMO 
DoD Undersecretaries Dr. David Chu and Edward Aldridge reviewed the 
“political problems” associated with the anthrax vaccine and Gulf War 
illness. The undersecretaries presented recommendations to Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Highlights included continuing the program 
only “at a minimum level”; implementing “an acquisition strategy to 
purchase additional bio-detectors and stockpiles of antibiotics to augment 
force protection in the absence of an anthrax vaccine”; developing a 
“coherent institutional process to assess and prioritize biological threats 
and approve the use of associated countermeasures”; and the development 
of a “national long-range vaccine that will address the full range of 
requirements of the DoD, DHHS, and other stakeholders in this plan” 
(Chu & Aldridge, 2001): 
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APPENDIX 11: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
Excerpts from a press release and transcript demonstrate the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation associated frustrations by a U.S. Army scientist 
over testing irregularities with the anthrax vaccine as a possible motive for 
the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. The FBI alleged a U.S. Army scientist’s 
motive surrounded the fact the “anthrax vaccine he was working on was 
failing” due to potency problems (FBI, 2008, excerpts from press 
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